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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is based on an investigation of the legal aspects of the management of petroleum 
revenue in Ghana in order to promote sustainability and thereby avoid the replication of the 
resource curse syndrome. The Parliament passed the laws for the regulation and 
management of petroleum revenue, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) 
2011 and Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016. The thesis argues that the 
current state of the law, and regulatory environment have far-reaching impacts on the 
promotion of transparency, accountability and sustainability in the socially beneficial 
management of petroleum revenue. Some inherent challenges that may inhibit the 
management of petroleum revenue include possible non-prosecution of mismanagement of 
oil revenue because of the powers of the Attorney General to exercise nolle prosequi. There 
have also been considerable infractions such as not fulfilling auditing and reporting 
requirements, non-remission of revenues into the appropriate funds or accounts, and failure 
of sufficient engagement in impactful investments in priority areas stipulated in the PRMA.  
 
The research further analyses how the best practices as contained in the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative standards and Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for 
Sovereign Wealth Funds can be adapted in implementing the PRMA. It recommends the 
establishment of the Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative as a corporate body 
with powers to promote transparency in petroleum revenue. It further proposes the 
establishment of the Sovereign Wealth Fund as a specialised corporate entity to manage the 
funds. It recommends the earmarking of certain percentage of petroleum revenue for the 
promotion of developmental projects in host communities. It concludes that there is a need 
to strengthen the legal regime for the management of petroleum revenue through enabling 
environment for sustainability, transparency and accountability and checking against 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Ghana’s petroleum resources should not translate into a resource curse as it has been 
experienced by many resource rich countries. Ghana is now an oil producing country with 
the enormous discoveries made at the Jubilee oil fields in 2007.1 It is a matter of concern 
that “If not well managed, wealth in oil, gas, diamonds, gold and other minerals may 
contribute to poor economic performance, weak and unbalanced growth, impoverished 
populations, aggravated conflict, environmental damage, and ineffective or authoritarian 
rule.”2 It is believed that the oil sector will in turn impact on other investments that are 
supportive of the oil and gas sector such as manufacturing, general trading, real estate 
(including building and construction), banking, insurance and the hospitality sectors.3  
 
Such socio-political dislocation is partly indicative of the resource curse syndrome which, 
over the years, has been the focus of scholars and policy makers. This thesis intends to 
contribute to this discourse. Countries with resources endowment should ideally utilise 
revenue from their petro-wealth to promote sustainable development and economic 
prosperity of the people, thereby reducing poverty levels.4 As will be shown later in this 
chapter, there are multiple definitions about what constitutes sustainable development. 
However, the starting point for the definition and the generally accepted definition is the 
one offered by the Brundtland Report (Our Common Future). According to the Brundtland 
Report, sustainable development is generally defined as development that ‘meets the needs 
                                                          
1 Felix Kumah-Abiwu, Edward Brenya and James Agbodzakey, ‘Oil Wealth, Resource Curse and 
Development: Any Lessons for Ghana?’ (2015) 6(1) Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 
62, 62. 
2 Heikki Holmås and Joe Oteng-Adjei, ‘Breaking the Mineral and Fuel Resource Curse in Ghana” in OECD, 
Development Cooperation Report 2012: Lessons in Linking Sustainability and Development (OECD 
Publishing 2015) 124. 
3 See Emmanuel Ashiedu Codjoe, Foreign Direct Investment in Ghanaian Manufacturing: Exploring the 
Extent of Technology Transfer and Exporting Behaviour by FDI Firms (PhD Thesis School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London 2012) 125. 
4 CP McPherson, ‘Necessary but not Sufficient: Anticorruption and Transparency’ (2007) 7(3) Journal of 




of the present without compromising the future of generations to meet their own needs’.5 
While the concept has been subjected to intense debate, it is generally accepted that 
integrating the concerns of environmental, economic and social development of the people 
is in consonance with the principles of sustainable development. These concerns are 
enshrined in: “the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given” and “the idea of limitations imposed by the state 
of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet both present and 
future needs”.6   
 
It may therefore be argued that sustainable development of nonrenewable energy resources 
can be grouped into extraction and conversion of the resources. This thesis is concerned 
with the conversion of the resources into wealth creation through taxation, revenue 
management, and developments that have much impacts on the living standards of the 
people.  
 
An antithesis to the above proposition is the resource curse, which is explained by the 
theories of the ‘paradox of plenty’ and ‘resource curse’ depicting a situation where 
countries that are largely dependent on natural resources such as oil and gas become less 
developed and perform significantly worse than countries which are less endowed with 
natural resources.7 With the stride towards economic stability and growth, the citizens of 
Ghana have expressed ‘fear that the new discovery of oil and its attendant revenues may 
overwhelm the nascent institutions thereby derailing positive reforms and economic 
growth’.8 The continued exploitation of the petroleum resources in Ghana should be such 
                                                          
5 See World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford 
University Press, 1987) 8. 
6 Ibid. 43. See also Peter P Rogers and KF Jalal and JA Boyd, An Introduction to Sustainable Development 
(Earthscan 2008) 20. 
7 TL Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states’ (University of California Press 1997); RM 
Auty, Industrial Policy Reform in six Large Newly Industrializing Countries: The Resource Curse Thesis 
(World Bank 1994) 11-27. 
8 The Petroleum and Poverty Paradox: Assessing U.S. And International Community efforts to fight the 
Resource Curse (Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate , One 




that the resource endowment should not lead to a resource curse but should offer the 
blessings of sustainable development.  
 
In 2007, before the discovery of commercial quantities of oil and gas in Ghana and 
commencement of commercial production in 2010, the main resources that have been 
subjected to exploitation for foreign exchange revenue generation were cocoa, gold and 
timber.9 Mineral resources in the mining sector are principally gold, diamond, bauxite and 
manganese, with gold constituting over 80% of revenue accruing from the mining 
industry.10 It was reported that the revenue generated from the exportation of gold in the 
entire mining sector in 2013 constituted 86% of the total revenue from the mining sector.11 
Ghana is rated as the 2nd largest producer in Africa and 10th gold producing country in the 
world.12  
 
The oil and gas industry now out-performs other sectors and has also overtaken revenue 
from gold mining. There may be the tendency to rely on the oil and gas industry as the 
main source of revenue and panacea to economic challenges, without taking into 
considerations the need to diversify the economy and promote sustainable development. At 
the point of commencement of commercial operations, it was reported that the Jubilee Field 
was with a reserve of about 800 million barrels of crude oil and “upside potential of about 3 
billion barrels of oil”13 Other prolific fields are the Sankofa-Gye Nyame (SGN) Fields, 
Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN) Fields and more discoveries are still being made. 
The turning point with the oil discovery has raised considerable concern in Ghana; there is 
the need for Ghana not to be entangled in the resource curse which has been the case for 
                                                          
9 I Gary, ‘Ghana’s Big Test: Oil’s Challenge to Democratic Development’ (Integrated Social Development 
Centre and Oxfam America 2009) 2, <www.oxfamamerica.org/files/ghanas-big -test.pdf> accessed 7 June 
2016. 
10 Boas & Associates, GHEITI Report on the Mining Sector 2014 (2015) 9. 
11 ‘Legal and Regulatory Changes in Ghana Address Challenges Facing Mining’, available at 
<http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/breaking-new-ground-legal-and-regulatory-changes-are-
works-address-challenges-facing-sector>. 
12 Ibid. 16. 




most developing countries.14 The major concern is the need for sustainable management of 
this wealth for the benefit of the current and future generations by avoiding the resource 
curse. Practical examples are seen in countries such as Nigeria and Angola. The situation in 
Nigeria is one of ‘political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor 
macroeconomic management’ in spite of its abundant petroleum resources.15  
 
The phenomenon of resource curse has risen to the level of international concern as it is 
paradoxical that countries rich in natural resources have continuously failed to utilise the 
revenue from the resource proceeds for the betterment of the life of their citizens. Most of 
these countries remain in abject poverty, still heavily reliant on foreign aid, and continue to 
experience political unrest as seen in Nigeria. For example, the Nigerian civil war from 
1967 to 1970 reflects the struggle for the control of resources.16 The situation in Nigeria 
also shows cases of ‘political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor 
macroeconomic management’ in spite of its abundant petroleum resources.17 Angola, like 
Nigeria, was characterised by civil unrest which was connected to the struggle for the 
control of natural resources.18  
 
However, some developed countries have different stories; Norway presents a practical and 
reliable example of a country that has approached its oil and gas prosperity from a different 
perspective. It has been able to maximise the potential of its oil and gas industry to continue 
to make life better for its citizens and achieve accelerated national economic development 
by avoiding the resource curse phenomenon.19 
 
                                                          
14 Gary (above). 
15 AA Akinrele, ‘Transparency in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry’ (2014) 7(3) Journal of World Energy 
Law and Business 220, 222. 
16 Onyemaechi Frederick Onwubiko, Azizan Asmuni, Khairuddin Idris and Jamilah Othman, ‘The Causes, 
Effects and Potential Solutions to the deep rooted Niger Delta Oil Crisis’ (2013) 1(6) International Journal 
of Social and Behavioural Sciences 122, 122. 
17 Adedolapo A Akinrele, ‘Transparency in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry’ (2014) 7 (3) Journal of World 
Energy Law and Business’ 220, 222. 
18 See A Gonzalez, ‘Petroleum and it Impact on Three Wars in Africa: Angola, Nigeria and Sudan’ (2010) 16 
Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development 58-86. 
19 See Tina Hunter, ‘Comparative Law as an Instrument in Transnational Law: The Example of Petroleum 




Plausibly and as one author has noted ‘the impact of petroleum activities on the economic 
development of the country will depend on how transparently and efficiently oil revenues 
are managed’.20 The PRMA has been developed in response to the need for petroleum 
revenue management in Ghana. The PRMA is targeted at ensuring the revenue from oil is 
managed effectively and in a transparent manner. The PRMA is a novel and welcome 
development as it is designed to ensure the prudent management and utilisation of 
petroleum resources.  The revenues accruing to Ghana from petroleum resources are paid 
into the Petroleum Holdings Account with the Bank of Ghana for onward distribution into 
designated accounts provided in the PRMA. It provides for the payment of not more than 
70% of the revenue into the Annual Budget Funding Account.21 The remaining is paid into 
the Stabilisation Fund (21%) for cushioning the effect of fluctuation in oil prices22 and into 
the Heritage Fund (9%) to cater for the future generations.23 The PRMA also provides for 
reporting and auditing instruments as well as transparency requirements.24 The expenditure 
of oil revenue also has to be publicised in at least two national daily newspapers under the 
auspices of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) which was created 
under section 51 of the PRMA. 
 
The PIAC has the power to monitor and evaluate compliance with Petroleum Commission 
Act, 2011 by government and other relevant institutions in the management and use of the 
petroleum and investments, 25 provide independent assessments on the management and use 
of petroleum revenue, 26 and to ‘provide space and platform for the public to debate 
whether spending prospects and management conform to development priorities as 
provided under section 21(3).’27 The PIAC reports its activities on a quarterly and annually 
bases.28 Such reports must be published on its website and in two national newspapers. The 
                                                          
20 Kwaku Appiah-Adu, ‘Introduction’ in Kwaku Appiah-Adu, Governance of the Petroleum Sector in an 
Emerging Developing Economy (Gower Publishing Limited Surrey 2013) 2. 
21 Section 17, 19-21 PRMA 2011. 
22 Section 9 PRMA 2011. 
23 Section 10 (2a) PRMA 2011. 
24 Sections 8 and 42-48 PRMA 2011. 
25 Section 52 (a). 
26 Section 52 (c). 
27 Section 52 (b). 




PIAC must also hold public meetings twice a year to report on its mandate to the general 
public and finally, submit a copy of its semi-annual report to the President and parliament.29 
The legal basis is there for PIAC to play a more proactive and constructive role in the 
management of petroleum revenue.   
The major focus of the government, stakeholders and academics in the wake of the 
discovery of oil and gas is what Ghana should be doing to effectively avoid the resource 
curse phenomenon and ensure that it does not replicate the trend in other oil rich 
developing countries.30 A considerable body of work has been produced from the 
perspective that Ghana should avoid the resource curse.31 This research will take a different 
approach by arguing for the need to incorporate the tenets of sustainable development in the 
principal legislations for addressing the resource curse phenomenon in petroleum revenue 
management in Ghana. It also addresses these legislations to see if they can effectively 
address the resource curse in the oil and gas industry based on the ethos of sustainable 
development, making a detailed proposal for the development of legal framework that will 
integrate the environmental, economic and social factors into petroleum revenue 
management.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The main aim of this research is to examine how the PRMA can prevent the resource curse 
in Ghana by promoting sustainable development in the management of petroleum revenue 
through transparency, accountability and sustainable management of petroleum revenue. 
                                                          
29 Section 56. 
30 See JA Bamiduro, ‘Nigeria and the Petroleum Resource Curse: What Ghana Can Learn For Improved 
Management of Oil and Gas Revenues’ (2012) XII (1) Global Journal of Human Social Science 8, 16.; 
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Therefore, the aim of the research will be to examine how the three limbs of sustainable 
development (economic, environmental and social) are articulated in the legislation. The 
specific objectives of the research are: 
 
1. To analyse the extent to which the law can promote transparency and accountability 
in the management of petroleum revenue thereby avoiding the resource curse. 
2. To examine whether the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana conforms to 
best practices in transparency, accountability and management of petroleum 
revenue; and 
3. To set out a robust proposal on how the law should be designed towards the 
realisation of sustainable development in the management of petroleum revenue in 
Ghana thereby addressing the resource curse. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The principal question sought to be answered in this research is how can the PRMA 2011 
assist in the sustainable development of petroleum resources and the management of 
petroleum revenue in Ghana, thereby preventing resource curse?     
From the principal research question other questions follow: 
1. To what extent to have the law promoted transparency and accountability in the 
management of petroleum revenue in Ghana thereby avoiding the resource curse? 
2. Does the regime for management of petroleum revenue in Ghana conform to best 
practices in terms of transparency, accountability and management of petroleum 
revenue? 
3. How should the law be designed towards the realisation of sustainable development 
in the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana and also address the resource 
curse? 
In answering the research question on extent to which the law has promoted transparency 
and accountability in the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana thereby avoiding the 
resource curse, chapter two critically assesses the resource curse phenomenon taking into 




resource rich countries have made appreciable progress in the management of their 
resources as seen in the case of Norway, a good number have not maximally utilised their 
resources. The chapter identifies the need for the existence of a robust institutional 
framework that ensures the state effectively manage and account for its natural resources.  
In order to establish credible institutions to attain the required positive result, there is the 
need for the law to ensure the establishment of a credible institutional framework, reform 
the ailing institutions and establish a credible judicial system to checkmate corruption 
through credible and timely adjudication of the law. Chapter three sets legal perspectives of 
petroleum revenue generation and management in Ghana. The chapter examined the 
management of the resources and other provisions pointing towards the sustainable 
management of petroleum resources that should address the resource curse. The chapter 
also identifies the environment in which the law will operate for the avoidance of the 
resource curse, and chapter seven recommends the promotion of sustainable development 
as a means of avoiding the resource curse in Ghana.  
 
In answering the second research question as to whether the regime for management of 
petroleum revenue in Ghana conforms to best practices in transparency, accountability and 
management of petroleum revenue, chapters four and five clearly set the foundation by 
respectively identifying the existing legal regime for the revenue generation and 
management and the context in which the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana 
operates. In chapter five, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standards 
are examined showing that it is targeted at entrenching transparency and accountability. 
Findings from the analysis showed that the existing legislative frameworks on transparency 
in the oil and gas sector in Ghana have loopholes on disclosures and calls for the need to 
fast track the legislative process in the enactment of the Ghana Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) specific legislation. Chapter six found that apart from the 
employment of transparent means of management of petroleum resources, accounting for 
the revenue is equally crucial. There is the need to give considerations to approaches that 
foster the increase in the revenue base of the country in a manner that the funds from the 




responsible investments. One global approach that has emerged has been through the 
recognition of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(the Santiago Principles). Incorporating the Santiago principles in the law will make fortune 
from petroleum wealth to be effectively managed for the good of the people of Ghana. 
 
The final question on how the law should be designed towards the realisation of sustainable 
development in the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana and as well address the 
resource curse is answered with the key findings drawn in chapter seven. The chapter 
recommended that for priority to be given to transparency and accountability, there is the 
need for the setting up of efficient regulatory framework to enhance sustainability through 
investment. There should be in place sustainable investment of petroleum revenue for the 
good of the people through the incorporation of best practices. These best practices should 
ensure effective management of sovereign wealth fund, creation of mechanisms for the oil 
rich regions to benefit from the proceeds of oil through earmarking of certain amount of the 
oil revenue for their development. The law can therefore operate as an instrument for the 
promotion of accountability and transparency and sustainable management of petroleum 
resources for the good of Ghana if it is well-crafted and implemented to the letter. 
 
1.4 CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
There are some assumptions which underlie this research. First is that utilisation of the 
PRMA from the perspective of sustainable development will address the likelihood of 
resource curse in Ghana and promote sustainable development. PRMA may offer an 
opportunity for sustainable management of petroleum revenue and diversification of 
Ghana’s abundant natural resources to avoid the resource curse if properly implemented 
taking into consideration the principles of sustainable development. 
To ensure sustainable development in Ghana, capacity building in the oil and gas industry 
should be promoted. This will lead to employment opportunities, economic development as 




develop its own capacity, it would reduce engaging foreign experts and importing facilities, 
which are expensive for the oil and gas industry.32 The development in capacity building 
will also aid Ghana in devising means to thoroughly ensure that its revenues are not 
siphoned but properly managed for the good of the people. Therefore, the technological and 
service sectors will be adequately engaged. As Amoako-Tuffour and Owusu-Ayim, rightly 
observed that the fiscal regime for petroleum revenue in Ghana can be regarded as 
reasonably competitive when compared to its counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
the risk of revenue delay is high and the degree of progressivity is weakened by the absence 
of cost recovery limits, weak capitalisation provisions, and capacity for verification and 
monitoring of contractors’ costs and investments. 33 They further warn against ‘a superficial 
revision [of the fiscal regime] that does not respond adequately to these concerns betrays 
the trust of citizens in the State’s capacity to realise the full benefit of resource extraction 
for the public good’.34  
 
1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The enormous endowments from oil and gas in Ghana were highly welcome and there has 
been the prevalent view that the oil and gas will translate into economic prosperity in 
Ghana and create more jobs as well as provide a huge revenue for the government. This 
situation has given the government an onerous task of having to attract the goodwill of the 
people and taking steps in keeping with the expectations of the people. The above scenario 
is aptly captured by Lahn and Kooroshy as follows: 
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Announcements of commercial discoveries of oil, gas and/or minerals 
inevitably raise expectations among the population. This means that 
governments are immediately under pressure to deploy revenue quickly. 
At the same time, governments see the inflow of revenue as a means of 
solving various macroeconomic problems and thus of helping them to be 
re-elected. And if the country is a kleptocracy, rapid revenue inflows 
create a pot of money to be raided as quickly as possible.35 
 
As stated by Obeng-Odoom, ‘when it was first reported that oil had been struck in 
commercial quantities in Ghana, John Kufour, then the president of Ghana, gave an 
impromptu speech about how the economic destiny of Ghana would significantly change 
because of the benefits of the oil industry’.36 Also excited was the then Minister of Energy 
who brought a small quantity of oil as a “physical proof” that Ghana has joined “the club of 
oil producers” in the ceremony that ensued before parliament.37 Ghana, upon the discovery 
of oil and gas, hastily passed the revenue management law. Immediately there was the need 
for amendment of the law as agitations were raised. This necessitated the amendment of the 
law. Exploration and production also commenced without the overhaul of the 
environmental laws of the country which were not conceived to fully reflect the entire value 
chain or the best practices in the oil and gas industry. It has also been contended generally 
that Ghana should have first developed the needed capacity before opening the gates for 
foreign investors. The contenders of this proposition supported their position with what 
Norway did upon the discovery of oil and gas. No doubt that the prime position of 
petroleum at both international and domestic configurations of countries could pose 
problems. Expressing this in melancholic terms, Acosta and Heuty, capture the Ghana 
mining industry as follows:   
Ironically, the prospect of a future oil bonanza comes at a time when the 
country still struggles with the management of mining activities. Current 
challenges in the mining sector include weak existing legislation for the 
oversight of mining activities, weak capacity of local mining communities 
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to effectively use royalty payments for poverty reduction, and the 
proliferation of ethnic and regional conflicts of interest.38 
 
The observation above raises similar concerns on the need for the Ghana petroleum 
industry not to be enmeshed in the resource curse controversy. It further tends to 
demonstrate that the elements of resource curse cannot be said to be new in Ghana in that 
they already existed in the mining industry. Could these have a domino effect of the 
petroleum sector having been the situation in the mining industry? There is still some 
perception that Ghana is prone to the resource curse. For example, in the study of the 
accountability on the Jubilee Field, it was stated by Brobbey that the Jubilee Field 
operations are characterised by ‘operations coalesced with pervasive patronage politics and 
hence revenues obtained have been misappropriated or mismanaged in favour of a few 
Ghanaians at the expense of the majority otherwise known as the ‘resource curse’’39 and 
that “Clearly, Ghana’s Supplementary Budget exposed the obsession for spending by 
Governments of resource producing countries. They do not know ‘breaks’ even if it means 
violating the legal frameworks or interpreting them to suit their interests”.40  
 
Oil companies are shifting to Ghana all in the hope of tapping the favourable investment 
climate in Ghana. Therefore, most of these companies are moved by the desire to make 
profit and not by the need to enhance the sustainability of the host communities. Largely, 
the Ghanaian government will get what it bargains for41 and the question is whether Ghana 
is prepared for this through effective and sustainable management of its petroleum revenue 
in such a manner that it encourage sustainable development.  Ghana should also prepare for 
the future generation. This will be done by ensuring that the resources revenue is not 
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depleted, there is efficient utilisation of the natural resources, the environment is protected, 
and the capacity of the people and communities are built towards the effective management 
of these resources. It is in light of these that two important legislations are analysed in full 
for the purpose of showing their relevance in achieving sustainable management of Ghana’s 
resources.  Moreover, there appears to be some level of uncertainty and an impression 
seems to be created that the government is geared towards spending the oil revenue given 
Section 1 of the PRMA allows the use of the oil revenue for collateral.42 
 
The law should set parameters for the management of these resources, local content 
involves the development of the resource expertise, without which the people will not be 
able to manage the wealth they derive from the petroleum resources. For example, the 
traditional concession contract granting exclusive oil and gas rights to multinational oil 
companies for duration of 70 years and above was rated as not offering sufficient revenue 
for states that practised them. This was because they lacked the bargaining power owing to 
the fact that there was no capacity to build the industry at that time. The Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural gas incentive which was an arrangement between the Nigerian government and 
multinational oil companies left Nigeria at a huge loss with extremely high incentive just 
because Nigeria wanted to invest in a sector which lacked expertise. Had Nigeria developed 
its capacity, between 1958 and 1990 when the NLNG was passed into law, much would 
have been saved in terms of oil revenue. Unfortunately, in the bid to change and make it 
more attractive, there are stability provisions in the law that barred government from 
making any amendment to the law. The assertions reflect that developing countries relying 
extensively on foreign direct investment will usually lower the cost to be faced by the 
multinational corporations bringing in their capital and knowhow and the consequence of 
such is that the citizens may not be well positioned to seek remedies against the 
corporations.43  
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There is the consensus that petroleum resources will continue to play a lead role in energy 
security, international trade and investment. However, certain concerns have been raised 
about the need for the diversification of the economy as well as energy generation. As with 
oil price volatility, the fall in oil prices and foreign exchange in recent times affirms this 
assertion. With the oil price shocks and the role played by the OPEC, the International 
Energy Agency came up as a means of bringing about the development of other energy 
sources. Countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have been developing measures to shift from reliance on petroleum resources. 
Progress is being made in these areas, under the auspices of the EU as most EU countries 
have developed policies and laws that deemphasise the use of petroleum resources and 
placed emphasis on renewable energy.  
 
The EU has since 2009 developed framework to ensure that 20% of the domestic energy 
consumption is derived from fossil fuels44 and countries such as Germany have exceeded 
this.45  Recently, the Saudi Arabian Government reported that it would move away from an 
oil dependent economy by sourcing 100 percent of its energy from elsewhere.46 This stark 
reality is further confirmed by the development of shale gas making waves in the United 
States of America. More countries are becoming oil producing countries including Ghana 
and the implication is that Ghana is now less dependent oil purchase from other countries.  
 
There is a strong case for sustainable diversification as proffered in the case of Venezuela 
that has built its sectors on oil rents as demonstrated by Massabie.47 Preparing for all this 
raises critical questions on the need for effective petroleum management and the need for 
sustainable utilisation of the revenue generated from petroleum for the good of the present 
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generation as well as the future generations yet unborn. Ghana must be conscious that its oil 
and gas resources are exhaustive and may be depleted over time.48 
 
The tasks to be confronted in this research will be to investigate the loopholes or areas of 
leakages in these laws to ensure that Ghana has the most viable law and policy for 
petroleum revenue management and sustainable utilisation of the proceeds. As the sector 
develops, it becomes obvious that there are more challenges ahead that will need to be pre-
empted and addressed before they become a full-blown problem that could translate into a 
curse rather than a blessing to the economy.  
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research utilised the doctrinal approach. The purpose of the doctrinal research is to 
inquire about what the law is and how it is applied in a given situation.49 The application of 
the doctrinal approach, for example, may be seen in the judicial exposition of the Ghanaian 
case of John Akparibo Ndebugre v The Attorney General and Ors,50 where the court 
decided that in line with the provisions of the Article 268 of the Constitution of Ghana, 
contracts relating to natural resources require parliamentary approval, holding that the 
purpose of such provision is ‘to ensure transparency, openness and parliamentary consent 
in the national interest’.  In the Nigerian case of Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Company Nigeria Limited51 where the court held that the provisions of the 
Associated Gas Reinjection Act 1979 which allows flaring of gas in certain circumstances 
was in breach of the fundamental human rights and dignity enshrined in the Constitution of 
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the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights 
since gas flaring has negative impacts on life.  
 
The Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) reinforces 
the doctrinal approach employed in this thesis. In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) invoked the principle of sustainable development by 
balancing the need for environmental protection and the promotion of economic 
development in the matter concerning the construction of hydroelectric dam project. As 
Schwartz contends, ‘sustainable development can transpose as an element of the process of 
judicial reasoning in applying the concept to resolve disputes in which environmental 
objectives and developmental goals conflict. Essentially, this regime allows legal 
intervention to occur on a variety of levels.52 
 
It will evince the theoretical bases underpinning measures addressing the resource curse 
and the principles established for the promotion of sustainable development, integrating 
environmental, economic and social concerns in petroleum revenue management in Ghana. 
Therefore, the methods adopted in this thesis shall be based on legal analyses of the 
provisions of the law as they pertain to the petroleum revenue management in relation to 
principles of sustainable development and theories of resource curse. The laws of other 
countries to be considered in this thesis were thoroughly analysed to see how they have 
been used to address the issues raised in this research. The secondary sources employed 
qualitative research drawing from literature (journal articles, textbooks, reports and online 
sources) on sustainable development and resource curse. There was reliance on relevant 
documents emanating from the government and non-governmental organisations. 
Complementing the use of qualitative research methodology was the use of textual analysis 
of already collected data, documents, reports and scholarly publications of the subject 
matter.53 It is mirrored that: 
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A social scientific text analysis aims to explain the life-world 
within which the text is embedded; to open up the perspective 
of the author that is delineated by his/her social and cultural 
context and to draw attention to the structural aspect of 
everyday practices and meaning patterns.54 
 
Textual analysis requires exposition and interpretation of the contents of texts. For 
example, understanding of thoughts, ideas and positions on certain aspect of the research 
was through the distilling of information from PIAC annual reports and the review of 
scholarly works on resource curse as postulated by scholars. Taking the qualitative 
approach into account, this research particularly in chapters five and six respectively 
assesses the Ghana’s petroleum revenue management law regime against the EITI 
standards and the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(the Santiago Principles). 
The research shall also employ a comparative research methodology for the purpose of 
teasing out what Ghana should do or avoid by improving its laws. Therefore, the position in 
Nigeria and Norway will be considered. The comparative analyses will bring these 
elements to the fore by examining what the countries have done to effectively address the 
management of petroleum revenue for sustainable development and check the resource 
curse phenomenon. It will also allow for the understanding of the deliverables from other 
countries which can comfortably be inspired to review the laws. The comparative research 
method is also utilise in the research to benchmark the current state of affairs in relation to 
management of petroleum revenue in accordance with the EITI standards and Santiago 
Principles, which are notable instruments for accountability and transparency in the 
management of petroleum revenue. It found it expedient that having been developed 
overtime through best practices, benchmarking and comparing these principles in the areas 
of transparency, accountability and prudent management of petroleum revenue could offer 
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a viable options for sustainable management of petroleum revenue in the bid to avoid the 
resource curse in Ghana.   
The use of comparative research has enabled this research to situate examples from other 
country case studies within the broader spatial and temporal contexts of the research. 
Whilst Nigeria and Norway are singled out given their importance in looking at the 
petroleum revenue management from diagonally opposed perspectives of the resource curse 
(negative lessons vs. positive lessons), there are other countries which relevant lessons may 
be drawn from or that may offer viable explanation of some points in the research, such 
countries are mentioned to offer a further wide coverage of the perspectives of appreciating 
the sustainable management of petroleum revenue. To this end, countries such as Spain, 
Netherlands, Angola, Sudan, and Botswana among others have been mentioned.   
The choice of Nigeria for this research rests on the fact that Nigeria is an oil rich 
developing country that has not translated its oil revenue into sustainable benefits55 but has 
been faced with agitation.56 Ghana shares the same colonial ties with Nigeria. They were 
both British colonies in West Africa and had independence within the same period. They 
are referred to as common law countries that have adopted the English common law as their 
legal system.57 They have witnessed their democracy being truncated over a long period of 
time due to military intervention. Though the commercial discovery of oil in Nigeria dates 
back to 1956, it was not until 2011 that the sovereign wealth fund was initiated.58 
Norway, on the other hand, represents an oil-rich country that has uniquely promoted 
sustainable management of petroleum revenues and avoidance of the resource curse. 
Norway is worth considering since it takes the debate beyond mere management of the 
resources to how revenue can be utilised to diversify the economy and achieve 
sustainability.  It operates one of the most robust sovereign wealth funds in the world, now 
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known as the government pension fund.59 According to the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy in 2006 ‘Norway has a potential for maintaining profitable oil 
production from the North Sea for another 50 years and its gas production for another 100 
years’.60 
By and large, the common ground for the three countries is connected to the fact that the 
countries in question operate a centralised ownership and governance of petroleum 
resources.  Article 257(6) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana provides that:  
 
Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, 
rivers, streams, water courses throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic 
zone and any area covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is the 
property of the Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in the President on 
behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana.61 
 
Section 44(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended): 
 
‘…the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and 
natural gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the 
territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest 
in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
Section 1 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 of Norway provides that “The Norwegian 
State has the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits and the exclusive right to 
resource management”. The implication or incidence of such ownership is that it is the 
central government that has the power to make laws and regulate petroleum resources to the 
exclusion of other units of government within the states in question. Another striking 
similarity is that in the countries under contemplation the government participates in the oil 
and gas industries by acquiring stakes or entering through contractual arrangements through 
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the government owned corporate entities, which can sue and be sued in their corporate 
names. These corporate bodies are GNPC (Ghana), Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (Nigeria), and Equinor (Norway).  
 
Though the research essentially considers the Nigerian and Norwegian jurisdictions as 
comparators, references shall be made to other countries that offer best practices solutions 
or examples in so far as they fit into the context of the analyses made in the thesis. In all, 
the method of this research is summed up in the following phases as follows: First, looking 
at the theoretical underpinnings of the research and what the law is to determine adequately 
how petroleum revenue management and promotion of sustainable development can be 
achieved to avoid the resource curse by analysing sources of the research; second, drawing 
lessons from other countries for the purposes of learning from best practices and avoiding 
bad practices. Third, synthesising the findings and offering prescriptions for the amendment 
of the law to improve them in the actualisation of revenue management for sustainable 
development in Ghana based on lessons learnt from Norway, Nigeria and other countries. 
 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This research is based on examining the management of petroleum revenue for sustainable 
development with a focus on sustainable conversion of the petroleum resources to revenue 
yielding ventures, effective management of the revenue and development of human capital. 
Acknowledging the broad nature of the resource curse debate and sustainable development, 
the thesis shall specifically focus on two principal legislations to determine how their 
contents and scope of the laws have promoted the management of petroleum resources in 
order to realise sustainable development in the petroleum industry. It will also look at the 
position in Nigeria and Norway for the purpose of discerning how best Ghana can manage 
its petroleum resources in the pursuit of sustainable development. It will also consider the 




more transparent, accountable, productive and sustainable ways of managing Ghana’s 
petro-wealth.  
 
1.8 BRINGING THE RESOURCE CURSE IN GHANA INTO CONTEXT  
 
1.8.1 The Resource Curse Phenomenon  
 
The purpose of this section is to put into context the resource curse in Ghana. This is the 
core of the thesis as it examines literature on the resource curse generally as well as related 
studies on resource curse in Ghana. Upon the discovery of natural resources in most 
resource endowed countries, the governments’ objective will be the maximisation of the 
resources to achieve socio-economic goals of the nation. This was the kind of attitude 
expressed by Ghana upon the discovery of oil.62  
In the wake of the discovery of oil and gas in Ghana, scholars have expressed their views 
and fears that Ghana should not replicate the resource curse of other countries.63 This thesis 
therefore leans on the views that natural resources should contribute to economic 
development as well as the attainment of sustainable development.64 Ntakrah has 
approached the study of the resources curse from a sustainable development path.65 
Furthermore, Starkey appears to have followed a similar approach.66 This thesis will, 
nevertheless, carry out analyses from the generally agreed dimensions to sustainable 
development in relation to the laws that have been promulgated to address the resource 
curse in Ghana.  
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The researcher decides to follow the approach because, in most cases, the objective of 
sustainable development in the oil and gas industry does not appear to be realised. As 
argued by Barma et al, “Resource wealth should translate into collective and sustainable 
development”; however “many resource dependent developing countries pursue short-
sighted and suboptimal policies in relation to both the extraction and capture of resource 
rents and the spending and savings from their resource endowments”.67 Looking at these 
expressions it would be seen that Ghana should actually take great care so that this 
syndrome does not find its way into her oil and gas sector.  
On the other hand, the resources should result in the growth of the economy, development 
of other resources and infrastructural development, and should not become the main reason 
to neglect other sectors of the economy. On this note scholars from Ghana have responded 
by examining the operation of the revenue management law in determining whether such 
laws will in their strict sense protect Ghana from the much-touted resource curse.68  
Studies have further shown that natural resources may be a source of rent seeking, 
corruption, violent conflict and a host of other vices that have truncated the stability of most 
nations. Resources are being mismanaged and corruption is usually common place.69 
Therefore, the bedrock of the theoretical postulations on the resource curse is the ‘windfall’ 
nature of revenues and the idea that a new ‘booming’ sector renders other sectors 
uncompetitive in the world market”.70 
According to the renowned French political theorist, Jean Bodin: “Men of a fat and fertile 
soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards whereas … a barren country makes men 
… careful, vigilant and industrious.”71  This statement captures aptly the resource curse 
which was popularised by the world through the symbolic Dutch disease of the 1970s. The 
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resource curse is considered in the symbolic term as ‘paradox of plenty’. This connotation 
is associated with a situation whereby a country that is rich in natural resources remains 
economically poor. Therefore, notwithstanding the abundance of resources, the standard of 
living in such countries is high and the human development indices of such countries are 
rated as very poor.  The resource curse has received extensive attention among scholars. 
Different views have been put forward since the emergence of the concept. It is a concept 
that has found its way into the lexicon of natural resources governance offering 
explanations on why mineral and natural resources rich countries remain poor while others 
have been able to translate their resources into prosperity for the nation. Countries have 
been exploring various ways to maximise their resources for the good of the people, 
however in most resource rich countries, the reverse has always been the case. The petro 
wealth has not been converted into the needed or expected resource development which 
was in contemplation at the period when the resources were discovered in the regions.  
Wokoro has attempted to describe the resource curse as an “inverse relationship between 
development and resource abundance”.72 He continued further that the “inverse relationship 
is demonstrated by the fact that resource-poor nations have significantly outpaced resource-
rich nations in development” citing examples from Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon to buttress his point on the level of underdevelopment of these sub-Saharan African 
countries in spite of the fact that they are endowed with enormous petroleum resources that 
could have been utilised for economic development.73  
Capturing the situation with specific examples, he notes that oil constitutes 97.5% of 
Nigeria foreign earnings and 81% of the revenue of government, and despite the enormous 
petro-wealth, 54% of the population live on an average of 1 US Dollar daily.74 On Angola, 
he observed that the life expectancy is about 42 years and that the oil revenue has been 
mismanaged leading to poor infrastructural development.75 On Equatorial Guinea he notes 
that: “Notwithstanding oil revenue rising to $4.8 billion in 2007, comprising about 82% of 
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government revenue, and a GDP of $18.5 billion, a population of approximately 633,000 
lives in poverty, while the country’s elite squanders the nation’s wealth”.76 Similar situation 
is also found in Gabon where he states that “Despite Gabon’s oil wealth, for over 30 years 
its population of approximately 1.3 million has lived in poverty”.77  
Therefore studies coming from Ghana have expressed scepticism that Ghana could avoid 
the resource curse in the oil and gas industry given that there is evidence of its 
manifestation in other sectors such as the gold mining sector.78  In what may appear to be 
pessimistic, Kuzu and Danaa Nantogmah state that “100 years of mining gold and other 
minerals have not translated into significant transformation of the Ghanaian economy”.79 
Osei-Hwere has also expressed same while quoting a World Bank Report which maintains 
that: “Local communities affected by large-scale mining have seen little benefit to date in 
the form of improved infrastructure or service provision, because much of the rents from 
mining are used to finance recurrent, not capital, expenditure”.80 In the same token, a World 
Bank study further confirmed that “As a source of revenue, gold is the main mineral 
resource for foreign earnings (the highest single foreign exchange earner since 1999), but 
its actual contribution to development remains limited”.81 
Most resource rich countries have been characterised by poor economic development. The 
citizens live in abject poverty while there are exploration and production activities ongoing. 
The revenues that are generated from the resources have not been appropriately channelled 
towards the development of the society. The rich in such countries continue to get richer 
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and most of those in governance do not give consideration for the need to diversify the 
economy. There is a great gap between the haves and the have nots. Whether Ghana will be 
able to utilise the petroleum revenue management law to address this phenomenon is part of 
the critical considerations for this doctoral study.  
Most scholars have on several occasions taken a more conclusive view that natural 
resources availability results in economic woes for most nations. For example, Warner 
maintains that there are three curses inherent in less developed countries that derive their 
national incomes from natural resources which are that they breed “authoritarian 
governments, they are at a higher risk for civil conflict, and they exhibit lower rates of 
growth. Several causal pathways explain these surprising correlations between natural 
resources and national misery”.82  
 
The assumptions that underlie the resource curse is that countries that are very rich in 
natural resources record economic woes as they are economically poorer than countries that 
have little or no resources. It therefore depicts a circumstance whereby a country that is 
endowed with natural resources but has not achieved economic prosperity appear to vary 
with a resource poor country that has progressively developed its economy positively 
notwithstanding that it is constrained by lack of adequate resources that would have aided it 
to be more successful. Leonga and Mohaddes observe that: “According to the resource 
curse paradox, resource rich countries perform poorly when compared to countries which 
are not endowed with oil, natural gas, minerals and other non-renewable resources”.83 This 
proposition gains support from the findings of Auty that: “Since the 1960s, the resource-
poor countries have outperformed the resource-rich countries compared by a considerable 
margin”.84 Therefore, “resource abundance is believed to be an important determinant of 
economic failure”.85 
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In a report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, it 
was stated that that there are many factors that are linked to the resource curse such as the  
1. Dutch disease, depicted by a situation whereby there is an increase in foreign 
exchange and cheap imports resulting in fall in domestic production and economic 
growth;  
2. a situation whereby there is “crowding out of factors of production (land, labour, 
capital)” owing to the dominance of exportation;  
3. development being centred on a particular area such as the promotion of the mineral 
resources without cross-sectoral development and, diversification or investment; 
overdependence on export revenue from the dominant sector;  
4. efforts channelled towards developing the domestic sector through inefficient 
policies  that end up being uncompetitive through the use of trade protectionist tools 
and subsidies;  
5. “negative effects of commodity price and revenue volatility on incentive structures 
related to policy and investment decision-making and consumption patterns”;  
6. utilising the country’s future natural resources as collateral or “often involving the 
expenditure of disproportionately large amounts of credit to meet short term needs”;  
7. ineffective growth with “state-centric economic policy-making when there is access 
to large extractive industry revenues”; and opportunity for corruption and political 
rent-seeking to thrive because of the abundance of revenue and non-transparent 
contracting and market processes, particularly in the petroleum industry thereby 
encouraging corruption and political rent seeking.86 
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The term was coined to describe the situation in the Netherlands in 197787 in the wake of 
oil extraction in the North Sea and the resultant explosion in foreign exchange receipts in 
the Netherlands. The development was so enormous that other sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing and other industries were abandoned with emphasis being placed on the 
proceeds from foreign earnings accruing from oil and gas. The Dutch disease demonstrates 
a situation of “appreciation of the real exchange rate and the resulting process of de-
industrialization induced by the increase in oil exports”.88 In the words of Karl, “Persistent 
Dutch Disease provokes the rapid, often distorted growth of services, transportation and 
other non-tradable while simultaneously discouraging industrialisation and agriculture - a 
dynamic that most policy makers seem incapable of counteracting.89 Thus, the Dutch 
disease  simply connotes the situation where countries which because of the abundance of a 
particular mineral resource, abandon other sectors by paying attention to the booming 
sector, resulting in negative economic development in the other sectors. This can also be 
taken to mean lack of sustainability and failure to prepare for the scenario where the 
booming sector turns out not to be able to contribute positively to the growth of the 
economy. 
The paradox as demonstrated by the Dutch Diseases has also been traced to other examples 
as seen in the new world gold in Spain during the 16th century; “the Australian and 
Californian gold rushes in the nineteenth century, a coffee production boom in 1970s 
Colombia, and from rising oil revenues in Nigeria and Venezuela, which may be said in 
current day to have extended to Russia.90  
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1.8.2 Environmental Dimensions to the Resource Curse 
 
The environmental degradation in the exploitation of natural resources causes harm 
particularly from the stage at which seismic exploration is carried out to the time when 
production, transportation and eventually distribution to consumers occur. There are serious 
environmental impacts, owing to the pollution. In countries hit by the resource curse, no 
effort is made to protect the environment. The interest for the government is centred on 
exploiting the benefits and utilising the proceeds of oil, without factoring in the need to 
give the environment the optimum protection required in the process.   
This pollution from the resources affects the quality of lives of the people. Life expectancy 
has been affected and even the means of livelihood may also be negatively impacted by the 
activities of the oil and gas companies engaging in petroleum operations. The government 
seems to place more premium on the resources it intends to generate than on the 
environmental wellbeing. Therefore, countries where the resource curse syndrome is 
prominent will neglect the impact the resources exploitation will have on the environment. 
The emphasis will be based on what they can gain from the oil companies that they engage.  
Usually they are very reluctant in setting high environmental standards because of the fear 
that they are likely to lose revenue from the multinational oil companies who may prefer to 
invest in climates where the rules are relaxed. Good environmental practices which ought to 
be the paramount considerations of these countries may be toyed with by the regulators.  
That is one of the reasons why most multinational oil companies are considered to have 
committed serious environmental offences in places where they operate. They exit the 
industry without punishment as they know that they can thrive in regions where the 
government will rather prefer to derive the benefits from these companies instead of 
outright cancelation of the licences of the companies that are involved in the environmental 
degradation or fining them.  
Even with the current development whereby some countries are moving towards the 




most resource-cursed countries will be reluctant in ensuring that the oil companies pay for 
the environmental degradation they have caused. There are responsive steps to penalising 
the degradation of the environment by labelling it as ecocide. In France, the law went 
heavily against Total SA because its ship known as Erika was sunk in the river. Total SA 
was made to pay the sum of €375,000 as a fine by the Criminal Court of Paris, being the 
maximum penalty allowed to be awarded for ecological prejudice.91  
Kosmos Energy which is involved in the exploration activities within the jubilee field was 
alleged to have spilled 699 barrels of mud containing poisonous substances that are 
damaging to the ecosystem.92 The Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology set up 
a committee to investigate the complicity of Kosmos Energy and later imposed a fine of 
$35 million on Kosmos Energy, which on its part maintained that the imposition of the fine 
was illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional because the ministry was not vested with the 
power to impose such fines.93 In the words of Egbefome, ‘The posture of KOSMOS 
frightens all well-meaning Ghanaians as to what awaits us in the near future, in case, God 
forbid, there is an occurrence of what happened at the Gulf coast’.94 Therefore, in addition 
to avoiding the inherent risks, ‘something’ must be given back to the environment for its 
exploitation and this could come in the form of environmental restoration from revenues 
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1.8.3 Economic Dimensions to Resource Curse 
 
Most resource rich countries consider that the resource is capable of enabling them achieve 
economic prosperity. This is because there are no efforts to link other sectors of the 
economy with the progress that has been made in the natural resources sector.96 The focus 
has been on exploiting the resources for the purpose of boosting foreign exchange earnings. 
The resource rich countries depend solely on exportation of their resources to advanced 
countries. Other areas of the economy are neglected as quick money can be easily obtained 
from oil and gas export with agriculture in particular suffering considerable neglect. 
Therefore, a recent study by Acheampong, Ashong and Crystal Svanikier looks at Ghana 
among other countries from the perspective of diversification of the economy utilising the 
revenue generated from the dominant natural resources will enhance economic 
development objective, thereby checking the problem of the resource curse.97 
The oil price shocks of the 1970s marked a major turning point for the advanced nations in 
addressing the problem of energy security. They considered that since they were deficient 
in natural resources; they should endeavour to explore other energy sources that will enable 
them to diversify to other sources as a counter to the price shocks resulting from the 
activities of OPEC. These countries formed the International Energy Agency (IEA) as a 
counter to the activities of the OPEC as a virtual cartel with the power to set global oil 
prices.  
Steadily, through the IEA, the advanced countries have been evolving practices and 
measures that are promoting the diversification of their energy mix to include renewable 
energy sources such as biomass, solar, wind, hydro, geothermal energy sources to power 
their economy. They have been able to develop advanced technologies to increase the share 
of renewable energy in the energy mix. Countries such as Germany have become world 
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leaders today in the use of renewable energy sources for its electricity sector. There are 
other technological developments that are also upcoming by other countries in devising 
technologies that will enable them to extract oil from places which have in the past been 
considered not geologically and economically realistic to harness such resources. Progress 
is also being recorded in the shale gas extraction in countries such as the United States of 
America.  With this success story recorded, it can be said that lack of abundant natural 
resources turns out to be a form of blessings as it encourages or spurs these countries to be 
innovative which in turn translates into blessings for them. In other words, existence of 
natural resources becomes a curse to the rich countries who have not taken adequate 
precautionary steps to prepare for the future by not exploring other sources in the event that 
their oil and gas resources run dry. The significance of lacking abundant natural resources 
is reflected in developments in Kenya where though the country lacks petroleum resources 
it has been compelled to embrace renewable energy sources by developing the sector. The 
significance of this approach is captured in Schubert’s warning that “in a not too distant 
future, oil will disappear. When it does, stability will end. Those countries that have 
diversified will move forward. Those that do not, however, will collapse economically and 
politically”.98 
Normally, the oil resource should have been used in developing the other pressing sectors 
of the economy. However, this is not always the case. More so, where an industry places 
reliance on exhaustible natural resources, such industry cannot in the long run grow like 
other industries.99 The woes recorded are because the high incomes generated by the 
resource-endowed countries are unsustainable.100   
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1.8.4 Political Dimensions to Resource Curse 
 
Many resource rich countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and Angola are yet to recover from 
the social and political turbulence occasioned by the existence of natural resources in their 
domain particularly as endowment in natural resources have complicated political and 
violent conflicts.101 The resource rich countries are usually engulfed in conflicts. Violence 
is usually employed as a means of acquiring political power that will pave way for the 
control of the resources.102 Some of these conflicts are influenced by the struggle for 
natural resources as ethnic, political or other groups fight for resource control on account of 
the rents they can derive from them. In certain instances of illegal mining the proceeds are 
used to finance terrorist activities against the state. Proceeds from resources are therefore 
sources for funding conflict or can influence countries into activities that can degenerate 
into wars.103 Also there are other forms of civil unrest that are connected with the resources. 
Ethnic militias have emerged in the regions rich in oil. Studies from Ghana have started 
expressing fears that similar crises associated with resource cursed countries may be 
perceived in Ghana.  
Their militancy is for different causes. It may be for the control of the resources or even the 
need to increase their own share of the resources in their domain. Some are even fighting 
for the injustice meted to them because of the pollution of their environment, leaving them 
with no means of livelihood of their own. According to the Natural Resources Governance 
Institute: “Since 1990, oil-producing countries have been twice as likely to have a civil war 
compared with non-oil-producing countries. Political scientists point to examples of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Niger Delta, Iraq, Libya and Angola to illustrate 
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this tendency”.104 The crises in Sierra Leone, leading to civil war was largely in connection 
to the existence of diamonds, hence the terminology, ‘blood diamonds’.  
Democratic development in most resource rich countries is very poor. Resource rich 
countries relying on unearned income from petroleum taxation lack democratic cultures as 
the government usually buys over interest group that will want to advocate for 
accountability in the collection and management of the revenue derived from natural 
resources.105 Though there is an adage which states that “the more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater the chances it will sustain democracy”;106  yet only Norway in particular, may be 
described as democratic state out of the 10 top oil producers.107 The assertion is therefore 
far from the truth to the extent that it can be held that “oil and democracy do not mix”.108  
 Democratic culture in most of these regions has not been observed to the fullest. The level 
of regard for the rule of law is very low. Due processes are not observed in the dealings 
with natural resources. Governance issues are complex with unwarranted bureaucracy built 
into the system. Nepotism and political patronage are commonplace. Non-compliance with 
the rule of law and failure to accord due process in the dealings with the government 
continue to hound stakeholder’s interest. There are even many instances whereby the oil 
companies have been accused of complicity in the breach of the rule of law. Unfortunately, 
there is an effect on the protection of fundamental human rights as resource rich and 
resource cursed countries fall short of international human rights standards.  
It has been theorised that most resource rich countries tilt towards authoritarian government 
because they place little or no reliance on taxation generated from the citizens. Such 
taxation would have made the government more accountable to its people knowing well 
that it is by cooperating with the people that they will be willing to pay tax. Since there are 
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sources which the government may derive revenue from without recourse to the people, it 
may become more autocratic because there is a perception that it stands to gain or lose 
nothing from the citizens in respect of revenue generation. 
There is usually a political dimension to the resource curse.109 Most leaders of resource rich 
countries have the tendency of wanting to remain in office and the abundance of the 
resources help them in achieving such undemocratic practices.110 Availability of natural 
resources and generation of revenue from the resources tend to create a behavioural change 
in most governments as their attitude toward economic development ventures could 
change.111  
However, Ghana has been a good reference point for democracy in Africa having 
consistently maintained a democratic trend since the return to civilian rule after years of 
military rule.112 Research from Ghana shows some forms of indications that there are some 
elements of political patronage in Ghana. This is shown in relation to the grant of oil 
licenses and stakes to members of the political class. In the same token, Stephen has 
warned that “whereas in Norway there is no perceived or actual need to create a strong, 
independent regulatory body for the petroleum industry to counter-balance Executive 
power, in Ghana, there is the need to do so as Ghana’s history and recent experiences have 
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1.8.5 Institutional Dimension to Resource Curse 
 
The government of Ghana, like that of any other country operates through the regulators in 
the industry. Likewise, there are usually the state-owned enterprises, the national oil 
company, who are created to represent the government in the control and management of 
petroleum resources.114 These institutions will need to be responsive in addressing the 
problem of the resource curse.  Of relevance to this thesis is the research of Kopiński, Polus 
and Tycholiz on the resource curse in Ghana; they have argued that Ghana is taking a 
modest step to strengthen its legal and institutional framework, promotion of accountability 
in order to “immunize” itself from the resource curse or resource disease.115 In the same 
vein, a later study by Osei-Hwere has attempted to analyse the likely need for institutional 
framework that will address the resource curse calling for regulatory institutions to be 
positioned so that Ghana does not replicate the resource curse syndrome.116 According to 
Osei-Hwere: 
...the challenge lies in ensuring that the revenues generated are properly 
managed and utilised in such a way that other sectors of the economy 
may be developed and the dependence on primary commodity exports 
does not simply deepen until Ghana suffers from the “Dutch disease” 
variety of the resource curse. The challenge also lies in the taking of 
important decisions on the establishment of an appropriate legal and 
institutional framework within which the petroleum industry may develop 
and operate.117 
 
The existing institutions and the way they are structured or restructured will be a 
contributing factor to whether a country will be entangled in the resource curse or not. 
Karl’s work supports this proposition by providing that “[T]he fate of oil-exporting 
countries must be understood in a context in which economies shape institutions and, in 
turn, are shaped by them. Specific modes of economic development, adapted in a concrete 
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institutional setting, gradually transform political and social institutions in a manner that 
subsequently encourages or discourages productive outcomes.”118 According to Barma et 
al, “The quality of a country’s institutions is central in the resource paradox” and “resource-
dependent countries are endowed with poorer institutional quality than they should 
have.”119 Graham’s research which further observed that civil societies are useful in 
addressing the resource curse in Ghana was quite introspective since institutions could be 
strengthened through the engagement of civil societies.120    
Countries that have been able to surmount the resource curse have developed robust 
institutional framework and capacity to tackle it. Notwithstanding the support for countries 
with natural resources, based on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, little effort has been put towards development of managerial capacity and 
development of expert skills for the management and regulation of the oil and gas sector.121 
In most cases the government through the machinery of the state do little to promote the 
natural resources sector because it places reliance on unearned income (such as royalties, 
fees, bonuses and taxes from oil and gas).122  
It is easier for the revenue of the state to be managed outside the budget process of the state 
by the private sector, instead of keeping the resources management within the control of 
few hands, through the use of sovereign wealth fund and creation of national oil 
companies.123 The institutions are weak in most countries that experience the resource 
curse. It is easier for the political class and the government to weaken existing institutions 
by placing their cronies who they can control in such institutions, thereby exposing the 
funds of the state to people with selfish interests or some rent seeking individuals in the 
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system.124 Countries that are able to develop their political and legal institutions in such a 
way that rent seeking is discouraged have exhibited signs of ability to manage the resources 
for the good of the people.125  
The existence of weak institutions continues to complicate the situation in these resource 
rich countries. The expertise that would have been developed over time fails to emerge. The 
industry is largely left under the influence of the multinational oil corporations who are 
much concerned with what they will get from the country. The communities therefore rely 
on corporate social responsibility from the multinational oil companies operating within the 
community. These oil companies are therefore generally perceived as being equal to the 
task that they have to produce the required infrastructural development in the areas they 
operate. These companies end up emerging as what Wokoro in his article described as 
proxy government, doing “more harm than good” by ultimately perpetuating “corruption 
and unaccountability, which undergird government failures”.126 More particularly, this 
proposition is reinforced by the fact that the government is so detached and remote from the 
people. It is on the basis of the foregoing that this thesis will carry out a detailed review of 
the petroleum revenue management law to determine the extent that it will be able to 
address the institutional framework in Ghana to address the resource curse. 
 
1.8.6 The Phenomenon of Corruption  
 
Corruption has been associated widely with countries that are rich in natural resources. The 
proceeds from oil and gas and other mineral resources do not get to the state coffers without 
the corrupt officials embezzling part of the proceeds. According to Ross, evidence exists to 
show that “when a government gets more of its revenue from oil, minerals, and timber, it is 
more likely to be corrupt” because the wealth from natural resources “often floods 
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governments with more revenue than they can manage effectively”.127 Ross further 
supported his assertions that almost 1 billion US dollars were lost in oil rich African 
countries in 2001.128 
There are cases of kickbacks in the entire system where the resource curse has manifested. 
The political class, oil companies and officials of the regulatory agencies usually 
compromise the system. The resource curse thesis has been faulted by scholars who have 
shown that there are resource rich countries that have avoided the resource curse; however, 
the thesis still occupies a position in natural resources governance because it demonstrates 
how best a country may take measures to avoid this problem of resource governance. Thus, 
the thesis contributes to the development and search for sustainable ways to utilise 
petroleum and other mineral resources.  Moreover, some countries have exhibited the 
resource curse traits and it will be of a matter of expediency for the problem to be 
addressed if Ghana is to make headway economically. Therefore, another study from 
Ghana has warned that “oil wealth could potentially worsen the country’s patronage-fuelled 
politics and foster stagnation in governance and public management”.129  
 
 
1.8.7 The Building Blocks for the Thesis beyond Other Studies/Approach to the 
Resource Curse Phenomenon in Ghana 
 
Countries have explored the use of various options to address the resource curse 
phenomenon. A good number have been internationally influenced through non-
governmental organisations. Typically, a way to check the resource curse will be through 
the use of revenue management funds, and transparency initiatives. 
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1.8.7.1 Capacity Building and Indigenous Participation 
 
At the inception of most oil and gas industries in the resource rich countries, little efforts 
were channelled towards the promotion of local capacity. The emphasis were on how the 
multinational oil companies will continue to contribute in governmental takes from the 
proceeds of oil.  Countries at that time granted concession contract to most of the oil and 
gas companies in particular area for their exclusive operations.130 The concession was for a 
long duration with the oil companies paying royalties to the government.131 Countries 
continue to desire for more revenue, which led to the development of the service contracts. 
The contractors under the service contracts engaged in oil and gas exploration and in turn 
were paid for the services they rendered. The service contract was then of two types, the 
risk service contract and the pure service contract. 132 Under the pure service contract, the 
oil company as the contractor carries out the exploration and production for a fee whether 
there is discovery of commercial quantities or not. However, in the case of the risk service 
contract, the contractor bears the risk for the exploration and production and will only be 
entitled to reward upon commercial discovery.133 These arrangements show that resource 
rich countries “sit down” and wait for the proceeds of oil rather than making effort to 
develop indigenous capacity.  
States’ desire to participate in the oil and gas sector motivated the push for the joint venture 
agreement and arrangement where the state-owned national oil firms entered into 
participation agreements with private oil and gas companies for the purpose of oil 
exploration and production.134 This system was seen as being a very robust arrangement 
that should result in participation of the national oil companies and building of capacity. 
The utilisation of these models by Nigeria for example, clearly shows the resource curse 
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syndrome. Nigeria operated joint ventures after abandoning service contracts. It entered 
into joint ventures with multinational oil companies based on the operations detailed in the 
joint operating agreements.  
The joint ventures regime in Nigeria were marred by irregularities and delays regarding 
cash calls. In short, Nigeria could not meet its financial obligations under its joint venture 
regime. As a result, Nigeria opted for the Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) under which 
it could sit “arms akimbo”, waiting for the oil companies “to do the work” and for it to take 
its own share of the proceeds of oil based on the pre-agreed formulae. This arrangement 
definitely did not give the government the urge to develop a viable local content law until 
in 2010, almost 60 years after the first commercial shipment of oil and gas in 1958, 
following the discovery in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in the present-day Niger Delta. 
Improvement in local capacity has been seen as a viable measure to increase domestic 
participation, and to offer avenue for the diversification of the economy. Local expertise 
will be employed in developing the oil and gas sector in Ghana, which in turn will have 
impact in other sectors of the economy such as the legal service and the banking and 
financial services sectors.  Moreover, one of the major challenges linked to the resource 
curse is the fact that there is lack of institutional capacity. The institutions in countries that 
are diagnosed with the resource curse syndrome are usually weak giving opportunities for 
revenue leakages and the lack of expertise to effectively manage the resources of the state. 
According to Barma, “Targeted sectoral capacity-building that emphasizes coalition 
building improves intergovernmental coordination and enhances predictability in policy 
making and implementation”.135 
1.8.7.2 Non-oil Resource and the Move towards Effective Petroleum Resources 
Management for Judicious Allocation and Utilisation  
Ghana is a country located on the west coast of the African continent. Even before the 
attainment of its independence in 1957 the country was noted for its abundant natural 
resource endowment. It has substantial deposits of mineral resources such as: gold, 
                                                          




diamond manganese and bauxite,136 which are its major mineral resources export. There is 
also evidence of tin, graphite, titanium, copper, lead and asbestos deposits in Ghanaian 
soil.137 Timber is another natural resource with which the country is endowed. After South 
Africa, Ghana is the second largest producer of gold in Africa which earned the country its 
former name, Gold Coast.138 It also ranks as the ninth largest producer of diamonds in the 
world.139 Gold production accounts for 95% of the natural resource earnings accruing to the 
country within the past twenty years.140 Gold exploration has also attracted more natural 
resources based commercial going concerns in the country. As at 1993, gold prospecting 
licensees comprises of 85 indigenous companies and 23 expatriate companies, while 
mining leases were obtained by 13 companies between 1986 to 1992. Gold has also gulped 
a greater part of the US$880 million estimated investment made into the mining sector 
since 1983.141  
Notwithstanding its contributions to the Ghanaian economy, the mining sector is still said 
to perform below its potential as a result of undue emphasis on the fiscal benefits while 
neglecting the need to address allied concerns within the mining value chain.142 In other 
words, mining activities focus on economic gains without recourse to social, environmental 
and human developmental objectives. The rapid rate of tropical forest depletion in the 
country has put sustainable forest and wild life management at great risk.143  
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Despite Ghana’s involvement in mining, it was never considered worthwhile that a law be 
established for the management of resources accruing from the mining industry until 2016 
when the Ghanaian parliament enacted the Minerals Development Fund Act (No. 912) 
2016. The Act sought to create the Minerals Development Fund for the purpose of ensuring 
that financial provisions are reserved out of resources accruing from mining activities for 
the interest of host mining communities.144 Other beneficiaries of the fund include: 
individual land interest holders in mining communities; the local or traditional 
administrative authorities of mining communities and relevant mining development 
agencies.145 The fund was established as a corporate body with artificial legal 
personality.146 Apart from parliamentary allocations, twenty percent revenue obtained from 
mining activities and secured investment returns accrue thereto, are the major sources of the 
Fund’s income.147 The governing board of the Fund established under Section 6 of the Act 
is empowered to direct its management of the fund towards-the mitigation of the 
environmental degrading impact of mining activities on its host communities and 
inhabitants; commission capital projects which will encourage economic development and 
create alternative source of livelihood for mining communities. The board is also required 
to embark on research and development activities to build human capacity for mining 
agencies; and assist in boosting the policy making, monitoring and evaluation role played 
by the relevant mining regulating Ministry.148 
The board also has the power to constitute committees made up of its members and/or non- 
members149 in order to perform a specific function or act on its behalf in exercise of any 
function it could perform on its own. One of such committees is the statutory Local 
Management Committee which the board is mandatorily required to establish for each 
mining community.150 In other words, unlike other committees which may be established 
on ad hoc basis, for specific duration and at the pleasure of the board, the Local 
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Management Committee has some degree of permanence due its statutory creation and 
specific function contained in the Act.  
 
Apart from the board and its committees, the Act further established the Mining 
Community Development Scheme which is required to exercise certain functions in each of 
the mining communities.151 The Local Management Committee acts as the management 
organ for the Scheme.152 The board disburses the funds to the Local Management 
Committee in accordance with established formalities,153 while the Local Management 
Committee acts as the operation arm of the board to execute developmental projects in their 
respective communities.154 The Scheme is established for the purpose of fast-tracking 
socio-economic deliverables to their respective mining host communities and those 
communities adversely affected by mining activities.155 
The foregoing overview of the Act demonstrates that the Ghanaian parliament intends it to 
make sure that revenue accruable from mining resources is managed to ensure sustainable 
development. This could be gleaned from Section 5 which states the purpose of the Act, 
Section 7 which provides the functions of the board; the establishment of Local 
Management Committee and Mining Community Development Scheme etc. On 
examination of Sections 5 and 7, one could identify the social, economic and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development towards which the Fund is to be directed. However, 
the shortcoming of the Act is that the Fund is limited in its scope of beneficiaries. While 
twenty percent is reserved for host community, which is a welcome development, there is 
no part of the revenue designated for other regions of the country. This is unlike the 
petroleum fund which reserved a specific percentage of petroleum revenue for the benefit 
of Ghana. Also, the Fund shows weakness in its attainment of intergenerational 
consideration of sustainable development as it does not make provision for any part of the 
fund to be reserved for future generation.  
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Taking a critical overview of the Act, Lujala and Narh find that parliament did not take the 
opportunity the Act presents due to the  failure of the house to also address important 
matters such as: mismanagement of royalties accruing from the mining sector; local content 
in the mining sector; and promotion of accountability and transparency in mineral revenue 
management.156  However, it must be stated that the Act contains some transparency 
provisions. For instances, Section 25 (1) requires the Board to receive an audit report on the 
management of the Fund and transmit its annual report to the Minister not later than a 
month thereafter. Pursuant to Section 7 (e), the board is also to develop formula for the 
disbursement and utilisation of the fund. The formula must be made public in a national 
daily newspaper. Thus, the minister helps perform over-sight check on the activities of the 
board. The downside to this is that an overbearing minister may hamper the independence 
of the board particularly when Section 13 empowers the minister to direct the board on 
policy matters which the board is compelled to act in accordance with. 
 
Models have been developed for the management of the resources in most of the resource 
rich countries.  It is important that in order to avoid the resource curse, nations should 
inevitably contribute to funds from the proceeds of natural resources which will be 
channelled towards sustainable development measures. This should be based on short term, 
medium term and long-term utilisation of the fund. It will be of great importance that these 
funds are not mismanaged in periods where there is existence of windfall profits. Most 
resource rich countries have continued to spend, forgetting that the boom in resource prices 
might not be forever and thus they might lose out in infrastructure development when 
prices collapse.  
Prudent management of revenue from resources tends to be through the use of the 
sovereign wealth fund. The sovereign wealth funds keep a certain portion of the resources 
for the future generations or periods of harsh economic conditions. Thus, governments use 
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sovereign wealth funds as insurance against future economic and financial shocks.157 It may 
be a source of diversification from oil and gas into other investments such as real estate and 
agriculture. 
There are also funds that may be used for activities such as environmental clean-up after 
economic activity has degraded the environment. These problems may take the form of 
pollution, degradation of the environment, health challenges, and negative effect of 
agriculture. The provision of funds to address the challenges can contribute to avoiding 
these symptoms of the resource curse.  Maximising the rewards derived from high value 
rents in order to cushion the effect of scarcity of resources, dwindling resources or even 
volatility in the international oil price should be factored into resource governance. 
The Ghanaian Parliament has established the Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF). 
Pursuant to the Section 1 of the Minerals Income Investment Fund Act 2018 (Act 978). The 
objective of the fund is to ensure efficient and transparent mineral revenue management in 
the class of the various Funds created under the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 
(Act 815). However, mineral resources as defined in Section 45 MIIF Act clearly excludes 
petroleum resources as contained in the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 
(Act 919). Therefore, it is not within the powers of the MIIF to collect and manage 
petroleum revenue. Toward the attainment of its objectives, MIIF is statutorily empowered 
to establish a commercial entity as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or ensure the 
enlistment of the SPV into the stock market, or transfer its rights and equities to the SPV.158 
In line with the MIIF Act, Agyapa Royalties Ltd. was established as the official SPV for 
the fund. Agyapa Royalties Ltd. is also enlisted in Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) and 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). The SPV is, thus, placed in pole position to be in 
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possession of up to $1 billion mineral funds for infrastructural projects financing for the 
Ghanaian government.159 
However, several criticisms form opposition party and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
have trailed the SPV on the basis of its lack of transparency and accountability. 160  The 
SPV is viewed as an instrument of political patronage, as persons behind the veil of the 
SPV have been identified as close relatives and associates of political office holders.161 
While the opposition party opposed the royalty deals of the SPV which were not subjected 
to parliamentary ratification, the CSOs have expressed fears over the lack of accountability 
in the management of Ghc1.5 billion oil fund as an indication of questionable transactions 
regarding MIIF.162 
The controversies which have trailed the implementation of the MIIF Act has been traced to 
the deficiency in consultation of various stakeholders in the law making process of the 
substantive and subsequent amendments of the Act in 2018 and 2020 respectively. Since 
the public was not carried along in the process, the apprehensive response of the public is 
not unexpected. This situation has clearly stand the petroleum management regime under 
the PRMA from the mineral management regime of MIIF. Thus, there would be need for 
legislative clarity in the MIIF Act that would indicate a clear delineation of what fraction of 
mineral revenue is set out for the purpose of investment, economic stabilisation and reserve 
for future generations.163 The citizen should also be carried along in the process.  
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1.8.7.3 Transparency and Accountability in the Entire Value Chain of the Sector  
 
Transparency in the extractive industry is critical to addressing the challenges of the 
resource curse. According to Barma et al, “More transparency in sector regulations and 
management improve government credibility and mitigate the risks faced by both firms and 
the state”.164 The opacity of natural resource transactions and management of revenue from 
the resources have accounted for resource curse in many countries. Lack of transparency 
breeds corruption in the petroleum industry.165 The government cannot be held accountable 
most especially where the citizens do not have the information on how the natural resources 
are being governed and how the resources are being maintained. The move to transparent 
dealings with multinational oil corporations and the declaration of what the government’s 
take is in the natural resources will enable the people to serve as watch dogs in ensuring the 
revenue is effectively managed. Disclosure is therefore the key and in line with 
international best practices the government should be able to publish its dealings in the oil 
and gas sector.  
Another paper on the resource curse in Ghana gives further support to the position to be 
maintained in the thesis when Arthur notes that “if the management of the revenue derived 
from oil activities is based on a system that is fair, transparent and accountable, then oil 
revenue will become a blessing that will facilitate socio-economic development rather than 
becoming a curse.”166 
Contracts entered with oil and gas companies should be made available in the public 
domain and it is now viewed internationally that there was no point having confidentiality 
clauses in most upstream petroleum contracts. There is also the move for nations to 
consider imbibing the freedom of information, whereby any member of the society can 
require the government to disclose certain information.  
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Most countries currently suffering from the resource curse challenges have their oil or 
mineral resources sector shrouded in secrecy. A good number of them do not have 
transparent provisions for the licencing and allocation of petroleum rights, revenue 
collection and management. Most of the contracts in these countries have confidentiality 
clauses. However, the trend is changing. A good example can be seen in the case of Liberia 
which, upon the discovery of oil, has decided to ensure that its oil contracts are made open 
to the public.  
Another approach has been the popularisation of the freedom of information law. Countries 
are evolving practices whereby the citizens can request that certain information that is kept 
in the custody of government official should be made available. This has been considered 
as a way of ensuring probity and accountability.  
 
1.9 CONTRIBUTION TO BODY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ORIGINALITY 
 
This research draws from a body of existing literature on the field of resource curse167 and 
sustainable development.168 The originality and significance of this research lies in its 
contribution to the body of existing knowledge and literature in the field of Ghana’s 
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petroleum laws as they pertain to the linkage between revenue management for sustainable 
development and avoidance of the resource curse.169  
With the commencement of oil and gas exploration and production in Ghana, much has 
been written on the resource curse, with emphasis on how the resources from oil and gas 
will be effectively managed. There is a gap on the role that sustainable development will 
play in the process. The avenue for diversification has not been vigorously engaged in the 
discourses. The research of Brazilian et.al captures the rush to oil which may be at the 
expense of the agricultural sector in Ghana, when they stated that: 
...agriculture is seriously exposed to the risk of losing external 
competitiveness through appreciation in the real exchange rate. In 
addition, because of the high degree of mobility of the labour force, an 
increased demand for labour in urban areas could lead to upward pressure 
on wages in the agricultural sector, further reducing external 
competitiveness for import-competing as well as export-orientated 
agricultural sectors.170 
 
They admonished that Ghana should “put in place measures to protect the development of 
its agro-based industries such as oil palm, cassava or cocoa”171 The consequence of this is 
that the country will be able to diversify in case oil and gas no longer yield the desired 
revenue projections made by the government.  
This research will interrogate the provisions of the relevant laws in the Ghanaian petroleum 
industry to see how they can effectively offer options for addressing the resource curse in 
the oil and gas industry and at the same time, promote sustainable development in the 
management of petroleum revenue.  It examines further how the ethos of sustainable 
development may be integrated into the PRMA 2011 to address the resource curse in 
Ghana.  Again, previous researches appeared to have only cited examples of giving 
evidence and instances why the resource curse in other countries should not be replicated in 
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Ghana. For instance, Hilson in 2014 notes that, “there is a real danger, therefore, of Ghana 
following the path of, say, Nigeria, where oil revenues have produced another strain of 
‘rentier’ politics, manifesting as corruption, embezzlement and fortified patronage 
networks”.172 This thesis will move beyond that by looking critically at the loopholes in the 
laws of these countries. For example, the provisions of the Nigeria constitution for the 
mismanagement of the excess crude oil account, where the excess profit of petroleum is to 
be paid will be examined. This is to explain the mismanagement despite the laudable 
initiative of such a provision.  
Besides, much has been said about the negatives, without looking at some areas which 
these countries have been able to develop their oil and gas industries towards sustainable 
management. The research will investigate these laws with a view to deriving lessons for 
Ghana. More so, the agitation by host communities in Ghana will best be appreciated by 
looking at the provisions in countries where there has been longstanding agitation over the 
rents of oil resources. Therefore, preventing the emergence of agitation by the western 
region may draw practical examples from the steps taken by other developing countries to 
ameliorate such a menace. 
 
Owing to the nature of extractive industries, exploration, refining, production and 
transportation of petroleum can lead to serious environmental risks.173 Host communities 
where these companies operate are exposed to environmental harm. This possible harm 
leads to host communities lobbying for a share in revenue and participation in the 
industry.174 A look at the ‘pollution haven theory’ reveals that companies usually prefer to 
cite their businesses in places where they are likely not to encounter stringent measures of 
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investments.175 It has been previously argued by Onwuekwe that to attract foreign direct 
investments, governments of developing countries have been under pressure to prioritise 
development projects at the expense of the protection of the environment.176 In addition to 
avoiding the inherent risks, ‘something’ must be given back to the environment for its 
exploitation and this could come in form of environmental restoration from revenues 
derived from petroleum activities.177 Furthermore, should there be a fund for what should 
be given back to the environment or a specific fund for environmental remediation? What 
should be the framework for the governance of such a fund in Ghana are issues which this 
research intends to advance. To arrive at this, the principles of sustainable development will 
be thoroughly engaged as they connect with intergenerational equity, polluter pays 
principle, the theory of distributive justice as well as environmental justice. 
 
Moving this research further, there will be investigation into the revenue management law 
that will promote sustainability. Existing researches have not examined the effectiveness of 
the laws in promoting environmental sustainability i.e. using a part of the fund in 
addressing the environmental imprints of oil and gas exploration and production. This 
thesis will therefore analyse the gap by examining the need or otherwise of utilising the 
petroleum revenue management legal regime in achieving sustainability. It is the argument 
of this research that petroleum revenue management will include diversifying to large-scale 
renewable energies for domestic demand, thereby exporting excess petroleum for foreign 
exchange.178  
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Due to poor management and lack of equitable distribution of revenue, most oil rich 
regions are usually entangled in communal clashes in their quest for sustainable 
development.179 There is the perception from oil producing communities that they should 
benefit more from the oil produced within their regions. Their claims are seen as legitimate 
on grounds that the activities of the oil producing companies expose them to disaster such 
as displacement of their lands, environmental pollutions, impacts on their farmlands and 
fishing rights. Countries such as Nigeria and Angola have experienced community clashes, 
attacks on oil and gas installations, loss of lives and property arising out of community 
unrest emanating from their struggle to continue to have their fair share of the revenue from 
the oil and gas resources extracted in their region.180 It is therefore important that Ghana 
should take pragmatic measures to forestall the consequences that may arise from the 
agitation.  As noted by Nakhle: ‘…dispute arises not only as to which parts of ‘the State’ 
should share the proceeds but also which different regions and societies within a nation 
state reckon that they are entitled to keep the largest share’.181 
 
Most resource rich developing countries have been exposed to wars owing to abundant 
natural resources as well documented in the cases of Nigeria (oil), Angola (oil), Côte 
d’Ivoire (cacao, diamonds), Niger (uranium), Sudan (oil) Sierra Leone (diamonds).182 
According to Tomo: ‘what is equally problematic about the legislation on the country’s oil 
revenue allocation is its failure to address the needs of the people directly affected by oil 
production activities…’ which has resulted in the Western Region chiefs demanding that 10 
percent of the country’s oil revenue should be meant for the region.183 The Chiefs’ request 
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to the parliament for 10 percent was rejected on grounds that the natural resources belong 
to the nation on not to the region.184  
 
Therefore how countries such as Norway, Chile and Botswana were able to manage their 
resource without conflicts is an indication that the manner in which distribution of a 
county’s wealth takes place is very important.185  Even in the UK which is an advanced 
country, the tension in respect of the share of the oil wealth is that: ‘In the UK North Sea 
case this debate surfaced in virulent form over Scotland’s ‘share’. Separatists and 
nationalists were anyway looking for arguments to support Scotland’s retirement from the 
Union and its return to its ancient independent state’.186 Sakyi et.al in their research 
envision that: 
  
 …sustainable development of the Jubilee Oil Field has the potential to 
bring a positive change to Ghana through the preservation of the marine 
environment and ecosystems, and improvement of the welfare of 
communities to be impacted by the oil and gas industry, while enhancing 
the economic prosperity of the nation.187  
 
The role of effective benefit sharing of natural resources can be instrumental in promoting a 
stable polity.188 How this should be done taking into consideration the established 
principles of sustainable development are very important points the thesis intends to 
explore within the context of petroleum revenue management. 
 
Of critical importance at the time of developing the institutions to man the oil and gas 
industry upon discovery of commercial quantities are issues pertaining to transparency.189 
Mismanagement of oil revenue has been linked to the absence of transparency in the 
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dealings with petroleum resources.190 However, Ghana has joined the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI).191 This may be said to have injected new meanings and 
created impetus in Ghana. The extractive industries are nongovernmental initiatives that 
originate from Norway drawing its members from nation states and civil society 
organisations. The formation of the EITI was spearheaded in Norway in 2003 and the 
initiative which has members all over the world, was registered as a nongovernmental 
organisation in Norway in 2009. The purpose is to ensure that a nation’s revenue derived 
from extractive industries should be managed in a transparent manner for the betterment of 
the people. The EITI is directed towards attacking and addressing the resource curse 
phenomena since most of the mismanagement and corruption take place in a very large 
scale in the petroleum industry.  
 
Therefore, the thesis is further inspired by Principle 1 of the EITI, of which Ghana is a 
member, which reads: ‘We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth 
should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create 
negative economic and social impacts.’192 
 
The thesis will investigate further the relationship of the PRMA 2011 and this initiative to 
appreciate Ghana’s compliance with the measures put in place by the EITI to promote 
sustainable management of resources. In this regard, the thesis tests Ghana’s compliance 
with the ‘three core requirements’: disclosure of whatever payment they make to the 
government; disclosure of receipts into the account of the government by companies; 
appointment of independent auditors to reconcile payments and receipts and publish a 
report thereafter.193 In this vein the originality of this thesis will be on the conversion of 
petroleum resources into revenue generation, management of the revenue for the future 
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generations and the promotion of human capital development in Ghana. This will be done 
with emphasis on the best practices developed through the Santiago Principles on how best 
to promote the mineral resources for the good of nations through informal set of precepts or 
principles for their management.  
 
1.10 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This research is made up of eight chapters. The first chapter puts the research in context 
giving reasons for designing the petroleum revenue management to avoid the resource 
curse and foster the realisation of sustainable development in the management of petroleum 
revenue in Ghana.  
Chapter 2 discusses the concept of the resource curse generally and relevant theories 
underlying the research, while Chapter 3 sets out the overview of the natural resources 
sector in Ghana looking at the development made so far towards the promotion of oil and 
gas in Ghana.  It looks at the discovery of oil in Ghana and steps taken towards harnessing 
the resources in the petroleum sector; the role of the various players in the industry is also 
examined. The laws, regulatory and institutional framework put in place for the governance 
and management of the resources are examined, followed by details of the revenue 
generation potential in Ghana and the challenges, particularly the traits of the resource 
curse. 
Chapter 4 shall analyse the provisions of the PRMA and how it addresses the resource 
curse and promotes sustainable development. This will draw essentially from the discourse 
in previous chapters of the thesis. It will apply the theories and principles to determine the 
extent to which resource curse can be addressed as well as promote sustainable 
development in the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana. 
Chapter 5 reviews best practices in petroleum revenue management looking at how the 




Principles on the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) of the management 
of sovereign wealth fund, by looking at the extent to which the practices have been 
integrated into the legal regime for management of petroleum revenue in Ghana.  
Chapter 7 of the thesis will examine case studies from other jurisdictions in order to shed 
light on the resource curse phenomena and show steps to be taken by Ghana so that it does 
not fall victim to the resource curse syndrome that has permeated all facets in resource rich 
countries. The countries for this discourse are Nigeria and Norway. Practical examples of 
loopholes that have allowed the resource curse to thrive in Nigeria shall be further 
elucidated while the success story recorded by Norway will be examined in the light of 
what is obtainable in Ghana so that such measures may be integrated into the law to 
promote effective and sustainable management of Ghana Oil and Gas resources for the 
future generation. Chapter 8 of the thesis evaluates the findings in previous chapters, 
drawing conclusions for the study.   
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETECAL PERPECTIVES OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
AND THE CASE FOR SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF PETROLEUM 




Natural resources are raw materials obtained from the soil or earth.1 They could be found in 
solid, liquid or gaseous state. Even though a good measure of natural resources is deposited 
in the earth, natural resource could also be found in body of waters, the subsoil, air space 
and outer space. They exist independently of the effort and creativity of man. They are 
typically interred in the soil and are exploited and extracted by human beings as suitable 
for their needs and profitability. The natural resources include mineral resources, 
agricultural resources, water resources etc. Different countries of the world have natural 
resource endowment in various measures which enhances their subsistence, economic and 
social well-being.2 The focus of this work is on the mineral aspect of natural resources as 
this is the main setting within which the resource curse is encountered.  
Mineral Resources could be defined as ‘any substance whether in solid, liquid or gaseous 
form occurring in or on the earth, formed by or subjected to geological processes including 
occurrences or deposits of rocks, coal, coal bed gases, bituminous shale, tar sands, any 
substances that may be extracted from coal, shale or tar sands, mineral water, and mineral 
components in tailings and waste piles’.3 These are broadly categorised into the 
metalliferous and nonmetal deposits which include energy fuels in certain cases.4 Mineral 
Resources have a direct or potential link with wealth creation for a country.5 
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Natural endowments have the potential to weaken a country’s institutions and thus its 
development.6 This is what has come to be known or expressed in the basic arguments in 
literature on resource curse. The earth is the repository of natural resources of various 
types, properties, qualities and value. They are also referred to as mineral resources. 
Countries are endowed with various natural resources in various measures. Natural 
Resources include crude oil, bitumen, zinc, coal, gold, diamond, lead, coal, mercury etc.  
Nations that are endowed with large deposits of mineral resources have experienced 
economic fortunes from the utilisation of these resources. The economic fortunes usually 
come with major challenges. One major challenge is that such nations tend to depend 
heavily on the natural resources as the main stay of their economy. The over dependence 
creates an extractive sector focused economy, to the detriment of the other parts of the 
primary sector and the manufacturing sector. This creates a scramble for natural resource 
exploration by the citizens, multi-national corporations, government, and other nations. 
This is because of the huge economic fortunes the industry attracts. The divergent interests 
such as the interests of the government to make huge revenue and that of the investors to 
make maximum profits can lead to clash of interest, which may culminate in conflicts of 
unimaginable proportion if not well handled. Disasters of various kinds usually occur as the 
hazard of exploration of mineral resources. These disasters may have an impact on the 
social, political, cultural, economic and environmental makeup of the society. The high 
incidence of conflicts and hazards arising from the exploration of mineral resources 
appears to adversely affect resource rich countries. This has created a feeling of 
melancholy and the assertion that a mineral resource is a curse, rather than a blessing to the 
people who possess it. This is popularly referred to as the ‘resource curse’7. It has also been 
given other expressions such as ‘Dutch disease’,8 ‘oil spoils’9 and ‘paradox of plenty’,10 
‘curse of Moctezuma’.11 
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This work shall attempt an exposition of the resource curse phenomenon. As it shall be 
observed, there are variants and diverse manifestation of the resource curse. These also 
have various impacts of social, economic, political, institutional and legal dimensions on 
the society. In this vein this thesis shall focus on the role of state institutions in entrenching 
the resource curse in resource rich countries. Law, sometime referred to as institutions, is 
the fundamental instrument by which the society is operated. This chapter argues that a 
robust legal framework or reform can be formulated to help a society prevent, resolve and 
break the circle of resource curse. 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF RESOURCE CURSE 
 
The concept ‘resource curse’ came to light in a study by Richard Auty whose investigation 
beginning from the 1960s suggests that “not only may resource-rich countries fail to 
benefit from a favourable endowment; they may actually perform worse than less well-
endowed countries”.12Countries that are highly endowed with adequate natural resources 
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were thought to have an advantage in the quest for greater economic growth until the 1980s 
when several studies emerged in the 1990s to suggest otherwise.13 
Auty’s work provoked further scholarly investigation in the field of economics into 
determining the effect of natural resource endowment on the economic fortunes of a 
country. The study by Sachs and Warner in 199514 projected and popularised the view that 
countries that possess huge deposit of natural resources have the tendency to experience 
lower economic growth than countries that are not so endowed. The phenomenon was 
referred to as the ‘natural resource curse’ and has come to be known as such in academic 
and political circles.15 
Several studies concluded that countries which derive huge revenues from the extractive 
industry find difficulty in implementing sustainable economic policies.16 Historical 
evidence supports the resource curse theory in that many developing countries which are 
endowed with natural resources have the tendency of low economic growth, less human 
capital development and inequality when compared with their contemporaries.17 Resource 
rich countries are economies in which economic growth is not export based but solely 
depends on the natural resource sector.18 The argument is that natural resources signifies 
unearned rent available to governments which has the potential of creating a negative 
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impact on the economic, institutional, and developmental trajectory of the country and, the 
interactions between the government and its citizens.19 
Further effect of dependence on natural resource rents is the tendency for countries to be 
wasteful and prodigal in their spending, especially on consumption related activities.20In 
support of this position is the experience of the 1970's and 1980's when commodity prices 
were predicted to be favourable, thereby inducing huge financial investments in 
undertakings which turned out to be ineffective when the predictions turned out to be 
inaccurate.21 
Despite this pessimism about natural resources, there is a consensus amongst scholars that 
it is not all-natural resources that have the capacity or are prone to create a resource curse 
syndrome. The preponderance of opinion in this regard posits that petroleum, gas, and 
mineral resources are resource curse prone, whereas agricultural resources are found to 
have less significant resource curse effects.22 This is because agricultural resources are 
renewable natural resources and require intense human efforts to recreate it. A developed 
agricultural sector would require involvement of labour, capital goods from the 
manufacturing sector, developed infrastructure such as good road network etc.23 In other 
words, the development and reliance on agricultural resources has positive interaction and 
impact with other sectors of the economy.  
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The subject matter of natural resource curse has received considerable attention over the 
years with the result that there are a variety of explanations for it. There are basically three 
theories that proffer explanation for the natural resource curse. They are the Dutch disease 
prototype, rent seeking prototype, and the institutional construct.24 Some authors, for 
instance, have erroneously used Dutch disease interchangeably with resource curse. 
Perhaps the confusion arises from the fact that the both terms are a direct result of 
dependence on income from natural resources. Economists have tried to draw a distinction 
between Dutch disease and natural resource curse. Dutch disease appears to be an offshoot 
of market failure, while natural resources curse appears to arise from corrupt practices or 
rent-seeking attitude of states with weak institutions which are referred to as retrogressive 
societies.25This section shall attempt to draw a distinction between these variants of natural 
resource curse.  
Dutch disease is a term that entered into the vocabulary of economists in 1977 when it was 
first used to describe the Netherland’s experience of a dwindling manufacturing industry 
after its discovery and exportation of natural gas in the late 1960s.26Excess spending 
followed the huge revenue accruable from gas production and exportation which gave rise 
to inflation and artificial increase of exchange rate.27 The manufacturing sector and other 
non-petroleum traded sector experienced a contraction due to the fact that it became more 
costly to export than to import goods.28 The large influx of foreign capital into the country 
is responsible for the increase of the exchange rate of local currency, decrease in the ability 
of local goods and industries to compete favourably with their foreign counterparts.29 This 
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has the effect of leading to a limited, stagnated or declining manufacturing industry.30 The 
slow-paced growth of the extractive industry which has the potential of slowing down the 
growth rate of other sectors of the economy has been described as the ‘resource drag’.31 
The steady influx of external funds causes a comparative increase in prices of non-traded 
goods such as construction and services provision to the detriment of non-petroleum traded 
goods such as manufacturing and agriculture, which could lead to the overshadowing of the 
supply of the latter by the former.32 
The impact of the Dutch Disease on the economy of the Netherlands could be gleaned from 
the mass migration of labour from the manufacturing sector to a more lucrative and high-
income generating oil and gas sector. The result of this shift was far reaching. First it 
created scarcity of labour in the manufacturing industry and the eventual decline of the 
industry. Second, there was a resultant high rate of unemployment due to the fact that the 
developing oil and gas sector could not absorb the teeming numbers of workers seeking 
employment in the oil and gas sector. 
In trying to explain the Dutch disease and its impact on employment, Larsen has submitted 
that ‘centralized wage formation system’ could have helped avoid the curse and the 
disease.33 The system requires that most employer/employee wage negotiations are done in 
a centralised forum which will encompass the representatives of all the employers and 
employees of the various sectors of the economy in order to negotiate and arrive at a 
uniform scale for wages in a transparent manner.34 This would reduce the pressure on 
workers in the manufacturing industry from venturing into the extractive industry given 
that they stand to gain little or no advantage by way of wage increment over others. In the 
Norwegian instance, the manufacturing sector was made the highest wage paying industry 
                                                          
30John Svending, ‘The Institutional Channels of the Resource Curse: A Case Study of Bolivia’ (2011) 
University of Lund, Minor Field Study Series 213, 17. 
31G. Davis, ‘The Resource Drag’ (2011) 8 International Economics and Economic Policy 155, 176. 
32Jonathan Di John, ‘The ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and Evidence’ (2010) ARI 172, 2 < 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/.../ARI172-
2010_DiJohn_Resource_Course_Theory_Evidence_Africa_LatinAmerica> accessed 23 May 2018. 
33Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught 
up with and Forged ahead of Its Neighbors’ (2004) Norway, Statistics Research Department, Discussion 





rather than resource extraction industry.35 This served as an incentive on the workers to 
remain in the manufacturing sector instead of scampering to the extractive industry for 
greener pasture. This is one way of avoiding the issue of labour migration and 
unemployment occasioned by the Dutch disease. 
Although the Dutch disease has been conventionally linked with petroleum exporting 
countries, some of these countries such as Norway, Saudi Arabia, Qatar etc have tried to 
avoid being caught up with this disease by refusing to convert a large percentage of 
petroleum revenue into their local currency.36 Canada also falls within this category of 
states. However, a study conducted in 2012 reveals that the Canadian economy has started 
exhibiting some symptoms of the Dutch disease. The basis for this finding is as follows:  
i. The extractive industry, particularly petroleum production, has been on the steady rise; 
there is a sudden drop in production and employment in the manufacturing sector.37 
ii. There has been sharp increase of 60 percent in the value of the Canadian dollars as 
against the U.S. dollars in the preceding ten years;38 
iii. The income from resource exports is insufficient to balance the deficit from other 
dwindling sectors of the economy;39 
iv. Emphasis has generally shifted to the non-tradable sector from the tradable sector of the 
economy; the foregoing has led to the decade with the lowest level of productivity growth 
in post-world war Canada;40 
v. The revenue generation ability of the various provinces has continued to expand 
considerably between the three oil producing provinces and the others.41 
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Countries sometimes experience a deficit in their budgetary allocations due to economic 
instability. This situation makes it difficult for them to finance their budget. The inability to 
finance the budget means that the cost of governance cannot be borne by the country. 
Measures have to be adopted to deal with this situation in order to avoid a breakdown of 
government. One of such economic solutions is the reliance on external financing, loans, 
aids and grants from International Financial Institutions (IFI) such as the World Bank 
Group, International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank (ADB) etc. During 
the 1980s most countries whose economies depended largely on petroleum revenue 
encountered serious financial turmoil due to the sudden drop in the price of oil at the 
international market. The wide negative difference in the oil returns compared to the 1970s 
prices meant that their revenue could not bear their expenditure, as it were. Resource 
dependent countries like Nigeria who were not saving for a rainy day were left with little 
option than to resort to loans from external sources such as the international financial 
institutions. The reliance on financial aid did not really solve the economic issues of the 
debtor countries due to what has been referred to as financial resource curse. This section 
intends to examine the financial aid curse as a crony of resource curse and its impact on 
economic growth. 
Financial aid from IFI such as World Bank and IMF does not come cheap. There are 
interest rates and economic conditionalities which must be satisfied by the borrowing 
nations before they can obtain such financing. The economic conditions could include the 
imposition of austerity measures and economic liberalisation policies that require the 
government to remove their presence and influence from economic activities which should 
be determined by market forces. 
Just like revenue from natural resource, foreign aid serves as surplus means of capital 
injection into the economy to give it a “big push” that will boost economic growth if the 
funds are properly managed and utilised.42 However, both could turn out to become 
incentives for political office holders to shelve taxation as a means of revenue generation.43 
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Some governments have lost sight of what role foreign aid should serve. Rather than the ad 
hoc purpose of curing budgetary deficit or boosting the economy, they easily resort to it as 
a default mode of acquisition of fund to run the state year in, year out. Financial assistance 
is like ‘lottery winnings’ which has the ‘manna-from-heaven effect’ and the feeling that it 
is ‘other people’s money’ which would easily fizzle out faster than a country’s hard-earned 
income.44 On the day of reckoning when the interest continually piles up, the financing of 
the loan claims a major part of the national budget. Resort would still be made to more 
loans to finance existing loans, thus spinning the country into the vicious cycle of long-
term economic dependence. The huge inflow of financial aid into countries like Zambia, 
Ghana and Nigeria has led to devaluation of their currencies.45 
A drop in the interest rate of international financial aid does not even serve the economic 
interest of borrowing countries. This is because it has the effect of inducing borrowing and 
an adjustment of factors of production towards sectors of the economy engaged in the 
production of non-tradables which portends productivity stagnation.46 This is further 
compounded by the increasing popular demand for non-tradable goods which has the 
ability of asphyxiating the factors of production from the tradable goods sector.47 The 
implication would be nil production enterprise and increasing national wages, stunted 
economic growth as seen in example of Greenland.48 
Resource curse can also manifest itself by way of financial channel which creates a weak 
financial systems.49 Links have been established to show how the reliance on external 
financing by consortiums in the extractive industry has led to lower credit demand in the 
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local economy which gives rise to an under-developed financial sector of the economy.50 
The high rate of interest associated with such loans has a spiral effect on production and 
prices of goods. The overall effect is felt on the economy, as the financial sector goes a 
long way to determine the growth rate of the economy.51 
Financial aid on its own may not amount to a curse if the funds are effectively managed to 
boost the economic development of the borrowing country. This brings to fore the role and 
quality of institutions. Credible institutions can advance reforms that can drive the country 
towards economic fortunes and socio-economic development.52 
2.2  INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO RESOURCE CURSE 
 
Scholars who had made earlier studies on resource curse did not consider it necessary to 
examine whether there exists any significant connection between institutions of the state 
and resource curse. This gave rise to the formation of the institutional school of thought on 
political economy. Scholars in this school have asserted that rather than cast blame on 
abundant resources for the poor economic performance of resource endowed countries, the 
focus should be directed at “asking what political and social factors enable some resource 
abundant countries to utilise their natural resources to promote development and prevent 
other resource abundant countries from doing the same”.53 In proffering an answer to this 
question, it has been posited that: “Nations fail today because their extractive economic 
institutions do not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate”.54 
Thus, the political and economic institutions of a state are responsible for the resource 
curse and not the natural resources per se, because it is the institutions of the state that 
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control and manage the resource.55 In other words, it does not necessarily follow that by 
virtue of the fact that a country is highly endowed with natural resources it is bound to 
experience the resource curse phenomenon. There are other variables that combine with the 
resource factor to give rise to a curse. To a large extent, it has a lot to do with the 
management of the funds accruing from the exploration of the natural resource. Where it is 
properly managed, it serves benefit the people and the economy of the country. 
It must be noted that there are two variants of the institutional approach. The first approach 
views abundant natural resource curse to be a result of institutional decay and corruption 
amongst the ruling class, which has negative impact on economic growth and 
development- “institutional curse.”56The second approach is “institutionalism,” which 
proposes that resource-rich countries are not doomed to attain defective institutions, rather 
frail institutions are responsible for the under-utilisation of natural resources to attain 
economic growth and development.57A more balanced institutionalist stance is the 
recognition that natural resource dependent countries are not bound to stultify, even though 
they may encounter challenges in actualising policies for the attainment of economic 
growth.58 
The role of regulation is to formulate institutional enhancement by reforming individual or 
organisational conduct to create useful impacts as a solution to socio-economic 
challenges.59 Summarily, institutions could be inclusive or extractive: the former projects 
property rights and market forces controlled trade, while the later extort resources from 
society.60 A symbiotic interaction between political institutions and economic institutions 
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serves the society well; whereas the reverse is the case where the two work at cross 
purpose.61 
Mehlum et al became the first researchers to create a theoretical model which established a 
causal link between the institutions and resource curse. According to them: 
Dysfunctional democracies invite political rent appropriation; low 
transparency invites bureaucratic corruption; weak protection of property 
rights invites shady dealings, unfair takeovers and expropriation; weak 
protection of citizens’ rights invites fraud and venal practices; weak rule 
of law invites crime, extortions and mafia activities; a weak state invites 
warlordism.62 
 
This is the basis for their submission that the quality of growth efficacy in resource 
endowed countries is basically related to the utilisation of rents obtained from natural 
resources and how it is distributed within the institutional framework.63 This is also 
referred to as resource appropriability.64 Two kinds of institutions are identified, namely: 
producer friendly and grabber friendly institutions. The difference between these two is 
that, in producer friendly institutions, ‘rent-seeking and production are complementary 
activities’; whereas in grabber friendly institutions, ‘rent-seeking and production are 
competing activities’.65Petroleum resources, mineral ores and metals arouse rent seeking 
and corrupt tendencies.66 Generally, mineral resources have been found to be more prone to 
mismanagement by countries with poor quality institutions.67 Producer friendly institutions 
are appealing to entrepreneurs, while grabber friendly institutions compel entrepreneurs to 
move from productive to unproductive activities such as rent-seeking from natural 
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resources.68 Between producing and grabbing activity, whichever is more profitable would 
determine the direction entrepreneurs would take as they are naturally motivated by the 
profitability of a business venture. The profitability of either of them is determined by the 
institutional quality and the adherence to the rule of law.69High quality institution breeds 
‘producer’s equilibrium’, whereas low quality institution begets ‘grabber equilibrium’.70 
Producer’s equilibrium entrepreneurs are producers, while for grabber equilibrium a 
section of entrepreneurs are rent-seekers which generates minimal state revenue despite 
abundance of natural resources.71 In the former case, natural resources is a ‘blessing’ while 
in the latter case natural resources would amount to a ‘curse’.72 
This concept is further elaborated thus: 
In the economy with producer friendly institutions rent-seeking and 
production are complementing activities, since institutional settings such 
as rule of law, low level of corruption, efficient bureaucracy and low risks 
of the government repudiating contracts imply that efficient rent-seeking 
is open for producers only. In competition for natural resources rents, 
producers still have legal and institutional limits in lobbying for lucrative 
contracts, subsidies and public support. On the other hand, grabber 
friendly institutions provoke direct wealth grabbing: corruption, political 
rent appropriation, shady dealings, expropriation, extortions and others. In 
this situation, it is disadvantageous to be a producer, and thus production 
and rent-seeking are competing activities.73 
 
It thus implies that resource curses such as low economic growth, environmental 
degradation, conflicts etc. do not necessarily arise from resource dependence. Rather, the 
causal link arises from the failings of weak institutions and rivalry in the extractive industry 
which is primarily responsible for the creation of natural resource dependence as the last 
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resort.74 Institutional structure of high quality would be capable of neutralising the curse by 
refraining from exhibiting rent-seeking attitude, eradicating or minimising corrupt 
practices, limiting the chances of civil strife and ensuring equitable distribution of resource 
distribution.75 Quality institutions could play a reformative role of revoking negative 
connections between natural resource endowment and poor aftermath.76 A formidable and 
effective institution, whether formal or informal, is also positioned to resolve budding 
conflicts at the incubating stage before they transform to full scale aggression.77 
The entrenchment of the rule of law in economic institutions promotes accountability, 
transparency and efficiency by dismantling roadblocks to business enterprise and 
formulating policy incentives which makes rent-seeking and corrupt practices 
unattractive.78 The underlining ideals behind these policies are to advance transparency 
initiatives within the extractive industry distribution network beginning from the 
contracting stage to how the revenue accruing from the industry is managed by the national 
budgets.79 Good institutions also allow for active participation of the citizens in 
determining how the funds obtained from their natural resource are managed and utilised. 
Citizens engage the institutions and government through civil society groups that monitor 
the management processes and mount pressures for the due processes to be adhered to.80 
Resource rent in itself is not bad. However, by history, natural resources do not necessarily 
amount to prosperity.81 Rent-seeking, which has to do with the desire for wealth 
accumulation, is popular with political systems where income from natural resource is not 
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determined by the economic forces but centrally managed and distributed amongst the 
constituent parts of the country.82 This practice leads to intense competition and a scramble 
for rents amongst the various stake holders. In this vein, a decentralised political system, 
fiscal responsibility of governments and proper human capital development are practices 
governments imbibe to avoid the curse of natural resources.83 
Though the institutions of a country may have some challenges at the beginning, economic 
growth can still be harnessed provided the government is committed to establishing 
mechanisms that would checkmate institutional roadblocks to growth.84There is the need 
for cohesion between the various institutions of the state instead of a situation where 
departments of government are working at cross purpose by pursuing their individual 
goals.85 
Just as public institutions have a major role to play in determining whether natural 
resources become a blessing or curse, abundant natural resources may also create a 
negative effect on public institutions. Logically speaking, abundant resources should 
ordinarily enhance economic prosperity and welfare of citizens, and not the reverse case. 
Where poverty still prevails despite resource abundance, it could result in decay of the 
institutions of the state.86 For instance, poverty may cause corruption amongst public office 
holders which will continue to affect the effectiveness of the institutions in performance of 
their duties. For an institution to be effective in liberating a country from the impact of 
resource curse it has to be impartial in the performance of its function. Weak institutions 
favour the interests of the political elite to the detriment of the people. The beneficiaries of 
the partial institutional framework, in turn maintain the status quo by preserving the 
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institutions in their state of defect and resisting any attempt at reforms.87 Petroleum 
resources, mineral ores and metals arouse rent seeking and corrupt tendencies.88 Diamonds 
are more prone to mismanagement by countries with poor quality institutions.89 
2.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE RESOURCE CURSE  
Crude oil is one variant of natural resources that is notorious for several negative 
implications for countries that are endowed with it. It had been stated that “oil creates the 
illusion of a completely changed life, life without work, life for free. Oil is a resource that 
anesthetizes thought, blurs visions, and corrupts”.90 It was reported that when King Idris, a 
Libyan monarch was informed of the supposed good news that the oil prospecting 
American Consortium in his territory had discovered oil, he replied melancholically: “I 
wish your people have discovered water. Water makes men work, oil makes men dream”.91 
The foregoing sentiment is not associated with crude oil alone. The natural resource curse 
has several manifestations and implications for nations which possess it if it is not properly 
managed. This section of the paper shall examine the various implications of the natural 
resource curse. 
2.3.1 Resource Conflict 
 
Two viewpoints have emerged as to whether natural resources is a source of conflict in the 
society The first view is that the deficiency and uneven distribution of natural resources 
creates conflict amongst members of the society.92 There is the opposite view that the 
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availability of abundant natural resources leads to conflict in the society.93 The latter view 
is the foundational basis for arriving at the resources curse theory.94 Both views are rightly 
held as resource conflict could be triggered by abundance and unequal distribution of 
natural resources. This point shall be seen in the discussion that unfolds in this section. 
Countries that are endowed with and place heavy dependence on abundant natural 
resources are prone to authoritarian governments.95 They are also prone to economic 
instability and resource conflict with other nations of the world.96 Resource abundance also 
serves as incentives which arouse the scramble for resultant resource rent.97 These 
tendencies are first exhibited by the expropriation of natural resource to exclusive state 
ownership and control. This is practiced in domanial systems, which recognise absolute 
state control of resources. With the exception of America, most resource rich countries 
practice this system. Under international law, the right of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources is well recognised and well established.98 It has been argued that the right 
to permanent sovereignty over natural resources is reposed in the people and not the state, 
even though the government is responsible for exerting such powers.99 If natural resources 
are said to be owned by the people for their benefit, it becomes nothing but a curse where 
dictators dispose of such resources to the disadvantage and detriment of the people.100 
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State legislation and policies toward governmental ownership and control of natural 
resources have bred civil, political and socio-economic disorder and instability.101 In 
Nigeria, for instance, all the mineral resources in the country are owned and controlled by 
the federal government102whereas, the state government retains allodial ownership of 
land103 provided it does not have mineral resource content.104 There is no legal recognition 
of the right or stake of the host community where petroleum exploration is done. Similarly, 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe, the Constitution and relevant mining 
codes transfer exclusive ownership and control of mineral resources to the government, 
which they are supposed to hold in trust for the citizens of the country.105 The non-
recognition of host community rights has given the oil companies the impression that they 
can carry on their business of oil exploration without consideration of the interest of the 
people. This has opened a floodgate of litigation and violent struggles against the oil 
companies by indigenes of the communities.106 
The struggle to exercise ownership and control over natural resource has been a source of 
conflict between companies, companies and state, intra-state and inter-state107 which has 
resulted in human tragedies.108 Intra-state resource conflicts have been found to be more 
prevalent than other variants of resource conflict.109 The proliferation of international 
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institutions at the global, regional and sub-regional level has happened to avert and also 
resolve resource conflicts110 .  
It is to be seen that the failure to recognize private property rights over natural resources 
goes a long way to provoke intra-state natural resource conflict. Weak institutions readily 
capitalise on the chance to grab huge rental value provided by the boom in natural 
resources which encourages the rise of militant groups to counter the coercive might state 
institutions employ to expropriate resource rents.111 This was and is still the issue at the 
fore of the Niger Delta crisis.112 The indigenous oil communities agitate for resource 
control despite the legal conferment of natural resources on the federal government. State 
exercise of sole control over natural resources has made indigenous people feel deprived 
and ostracised from their entitlement. This leads to stiff competition arising from prolonged 
political, cultural and socio-economic clashes between the state and indigenous people who 
can resort to intense violence.113 In extreme cases, the people could revolt against the 
government insisting on their right to self-determination recognised under international 
law.114The agitation of Southern Sudan to exercise domain rights over land and the natural 
resources contained therein and the counter position of the central government warranted 
the civil war that plagued Sudan for several years.115 
On instances where the control of resource has led to clashes between government and 
sinister mob groups, natural resources present an easy attraction to both set of actors in 
order to fund their quest for power. According to Lujala onshore oil production has more 
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tendencies to promote violence in a country than offshore production.116 Due to the 
difficult terrain, offshore oil installations are not easily susceptible to attacks and sabotage 
by insurgent groups against the government.117 However, the Niger Delta crisis does not 
lend support to Lujala’ findings. The difficult terrain did not deter the consistent sabotage 
and destruction of offshore oil pipelines, oil field and other oil installations. The militant 
Niger Delta groups had the necessary arsenals and understood the terrain well enough to 
give the Nigeria Navy a run for their money. This proffers some explanation for the 
prolonged attacks which made the Nigerian government resort to dialogue, initiation of the 
amnesty programme and rehabilitation of the militant youth before the crisis could be 
quelled down.  
The mining industry is not as highly sophisticated and technical like the crude oil 
exploration industry; hence it could be taken over by mob groups with ease.118 This is 
because products of natural resources are usually in high demand by domestic and foreign 
sources. Despite mechanisms put in place by the law enforcement agencies, there are 
always willing and available buyers to acquire these illegal products from the black market. 
It serves as an easy means of raising finance to fund warfare between the government and 
insurgent groups who are the actors in this case. In certain cases where the government has 
lost grip of the security of the state, these mob groups are allowed to coexist peacefully 
with their allotted areas to have their own piece of the national cake.119 
It is well settled that civil conflicts based on natural resources are not detachable from 
developing countries,120 especially those of the countries of the Sub Saharan region of 
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Africa.121 Diamond mining has been the source of conflict or sustained conflicts in regions 
of the world, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa countries such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Congo 
Brazzaville.122 The foremost instance of conflict diamonds which caught the attention of 
the world was the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone during the late 1990s up to 2002. A 
large amount of the diamonds field fell into the hands of the rebel forces. Illegally mined 
diamonds were traded off to Europe by the insurgent groups in exchange for arms and cash 
which aided their war campaign against the state.123 
Another instance of resource conflict arose in Zimbabwe in 2006 after alluvial diamonds 
were found in the Marange diamond fields.124 This was followed by illegal mining and 
trading of the precious stone which provoked coercive government responses.125 The use of 
force by the government could not deter the ever determined and growing number of 
people who felt the impact of the economic difficulties that plagued the country in 2008.126  
2.3.2 Mismanagement of Natural Resources 
 
The wheels of governance of a state ideally run on taxes imposed on its citizens. It is a role 
which citizens must play as part of their obligations under the social contract which it has 
with the government in exchange for the protection of lives and property.127 The 
mechanism of government for the actualisation of development of the people is run on the 
basis of taxes obtained from the people. Revenue accruable from exploration of natural 
resources is regarded as unearned profits and is generally referred to as “rents”.  
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Based on historical experience, contemporary evidence and recent case studies, research by 
the Centre for the Future State, finds that states that depend on revenue accruing from 
natural resource production do not see the need to extract tax from the citizens, hence 
making them not responsible and answerable to them.128 Obtaining state revenues from the 
populace instead of reliance on resource rent or foreign loans is one of the foremost criteria 
for ensuring state accountability to the society.129Where the government depends less on 
tax payers money to finance its activities, there is the tendency to create disconnect 
between the people and the government and makes the government less obligated to 
provide developmental objectives to the benefit of the people. It could also be an elite 
political strategy not to bother the people with much tax so that they are not inclined to 
demand for their civil rights and entitlements as citizens. In the same vein, the government 
would refuse to establish independent political and institutional mechanism that can 
question the affairs of the government and how the resource rents are managed thereby 
giving room for arbitrary governance and feeble institutions.130 Also the surge in the 
movement of human and capital resources from manufacturing and productive industries 
towards the natural resource industry limits human capital growth, which has adverse 
effects on the credibility of institutions.131 
 
2.3.3 Environmental Implications  
 
Most natural resources as noted in the earlier part of this work are interred in the earth. 
Their exploration would require some technical processes that require drilling, excavation, 
injection of substance into the earth, and the use of heavy vibration machines. In carrying 
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out these activities, results which could have an adverse effect on the health of humans and 
the flora and fauna in the environment could occur. The failure to use environmentally 
friendly means of exploration and mining of natural resources has adverse health 
implications. Despite the huge revenues accruing to the Nigerian government from 
petroleum exploration, there have been several high-level occurrences of environmental 
degradation which has continued to pose a danger to the health of members of the 
communities where these activities take place.132 
In the case of oil exploration in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, severe environmental 
pollution occurs as a result of petroleum exploration, the sabotage of oil wells and 
pipelines, indiscriminate disposal of drilling mud and crude oil waste on farm lands and 
water ways which are sources of subsistence for members of the community.133 The 
adverse effect of oil pollution on the environment is far reaching with a devastating effect 
on people who engage in fishing and farming activities. In May 2010, a report was issued 
on air and water borne lead poisoning as a result of illegal mining activities in some parts 
of Zamfara State of Nigeria which led to the death of not less than 500 children in seven 
months.134 Also in the absence of effective institutions to instill global best practice, 
harmful gases are flared in the course of oil exploration which deplete the ozone layer and 
cause serious health hazards to local residents. Similar developments have occurred in the 
Karonga area of northern Malawi where mining corporations have failed to prevent harm to 
the environment and residents due release of toxic wastes.135 In addition to this, the mining 
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corporations and the government have not been forthcoming with their promise to provide 
basic social amenities that would ameliorate the negative effects of mining activities.136 
 
2.3.4 Corruption and Mismanagement of Public Funds 
 
Corruption in resource rich countries often starts from the political process. Resource 
booms in a country often make political office attractive thereby creating fierce 
competition amongst politicians for government positions.137 This is because of the benefits 
to be derived from managing the resources. The desperation amongst politicians for 
political offices affects the quality of elections which are anything but free and fair as a 
result of election rigging, buying of election votes, use of thugs to perpetrate electoral 
violence, bribing of electoral officials and all forms of electoral malpractices.138 The failure 
of the electoral system allows for weak democratic institutions. This kind of system 
produces political leaders that will do anything to consolidate power including corrupting 
the system.  
In most oil rich economies, huge revenue from oil exportation is often collected by the 
central government which puts the state in a position to exercise more control and 
regulation of the economy when compared to most economies that depend less on oil 
production.139 Resource dependent states are prone to higher propensity to rent-seeking and 
corruption than non-resources rich economies.140 Huge budgetary allocation and revenue 
availability means more spending, hence, those at the helm of affairs have no incentive to 
create strong institutions to check state power.141 The political leaders thus retain huge 
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discretionary powers as they engage in the misappropriation of public funds. This trend has 
been described as “leadership curse”.142 Nigeria presents several examples of this kind of 
leadership; the popular example being General Sani Abacha who is alleged to have 
transferred billions of Nigerian oil dollars into his private accounts in Switzerland and 
other countries of Europe during his stay in office as a military Head of State.143 
2.3.5 Monochromic Economy and Economic Instability 
 
The abundance of natural resources and the reliance on it for the sustenance of a nation’s 
economy creates the feeling of rights and entitlements to revenue accruing therefrom rather 
than engaging in productive means of wealth creation.144 In economic parlance, this is not 
real income; it is referred to as ‘rent’. In other words, “it is simply the reshuffling of a 
country’s portfolio of assets: exchanging resources below ground for cash above 
ground”.145 In the 1960s the Nigerian economy was agriculture based. The discovery of oil 
in commercial quantities and the economic fortunes that came with it made the government 
divert the direction of the economy from an agro-allied one to a petroleum based one. 
The natural resource curse has the tendency to cause extravagant spending on the part of 
resource dependent states. This is due to the excess inflow of cash from resource rent 
during the periods of boom.146 The economic principle that plays out is that where there is 
more money in circulation, more spending is incurred and which ultimately leads to price 
inflation. During the period of the oil boom in the early 1970s, the former Head of State of 
Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon was reported to have said that there is enough money in 
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Nigeria but the problem is how to spend it.147 What followed was a burst of spending on 
unviable capital projects that served little or no good to the development of the country. 
Beginning from 1980s and subsequent years, Nigeria and other resource-rich countries 
experienced slow economic growth due to the sharp decline in the price of oil.148 
Because of the instability of international oil markets, countries that have oil-exportation as 
their economic base mostly fall victim to a sharp rise and fall in their economic growth and 
per capita income.149 During the 1st and 2nd Quarter of 2016, the Nigerian economy 
suffered a recession following the fall of petroleum prices in the international market. The 
country’s heavy reliance on petroleum exportation for about 95% percent of its foreign 
exchange was held to be responsible for that development.150 
For a resource rich economy to record sustainable economic growth, purposive plans must 
be put in place to link and reshuffle the revenue accruable from the extractive industry and 
other sectors of the economy.151 This would require that the other sectors of the economy 
be developed at the same pace or greater pace than the oil sector. Unfortunately, many 
resource-trading countries have failed to address these concerns by moving the focus of 
their economies from the extractive industries or continuous reliance on resource earning to 
where they have a diversified economy.152 Instead of economic diversification, political 
office holders and policy makers are swayed by corrupt practices and extravagant 
expenditures which create reclining economic activities, poor investments and lack of 
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interest in rechanneling excess resource income towards the development of other poorly 
developed sectors of the economy.153 
Natural resources also portend a negative impact on human capital development. It 
hampers the growth of entrepreneurial endeavours, inventions, creativity, and 
craftsmanship. The tradable industry is the pivot for growth, and economic productivity 
which continues to rise as the labour pool engaged by corporate bodies in the tradable 
sector expands.154 High salaries in the extractive industry are enough incentives to attract 
manpower from other sectors of the economy. This was one of the symptoms of the Dutch 
disease which the Netherlands faced when they resorted to crude production and 
exportation. The natural consequences of the above captured scenario are “lower 
innovation, lower entrepreneurial activity, poorer governments and lower growth”.155 One 
distinct quality identified with prosperous and developed nations is the ability to produce 
goods and services for export.156 These are mostly industrial goods and services which 
other nations cannot forego in their quest for development. The underdeveloped nations 
may only possess the ability to make and distribute simple goods that could as well be 
produced by any other nations. This does not serve them any comparative economic 
advantage. This provides an explanation for the assertion that economic development can 
be attained when a country can manage its production, especially if it addresses the needs 
of the international community.157 
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3.4 TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR PETROLEUM REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Sustainable development has been described as development that meets the needs of today 
and also caters for the future generations. 158  It is e central question in the economic 
development of countries thereby making it a highly contested concept.159 The World 
Commission on Environment and Development (or the Brundtland Commission) have 
resulted in the compelling reasons to look at sustainable development by policy makers.160 
Internationally much responses have been directed at enhancing the concept and 
mainstreaming it in development issues. This will form part of the assessment of how the 
PRMA has integrated these into its laws with a view of appreciating are the issues of inter-
generational equity, distributive justice, and the questions of justitiability.161 
Scholars have made pronouncements on the concepts of sustainable development.162 Even 
the courts have further agreed that development should be carried along certain 
considerations that accounts for the needs of the current generation and that of future 
generations. It is appreciated that in analyzing the management of petroleum revenue in 
Ghana there is a need to pay more attention to the doctrine of sustainable development as 
has been developed overtime. Overall, there are underlying principles to sustainable 
development has been seen largely from three dimensions, namely economic, 
environmental and social sustainability. In other words, they are referred to as the pillars of 
sustainable development. They are examined in the context of the research as economic, 
environmental and social.  
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Although what amounts to sustainable development may be given different interpretations 
by countries in the realisation of their economic development, the essence of the extraction 
of mineral resources is for development purpose. It will be of no benefit if natural resources 
are exploited for immediate economic gratification without giving considerations to the 
future.163 Therefore, taking care of future generations should be part of the concern of 
natural resources’ governance.  Embracing the tenets of sustainable development will 
contribute to preventing or minimising the resource curse. First, there will be room for 
economic development, as the resources will be channelled towards the realisation of the 
economic objectives of the state, through effecting revenue maximisation and distribution 
for creation of jobs, investments and a host of other economic induced developments. In the 
face of this economic development, future benefits will need to be considered through 
savings for future generations. 
The second important consideration will be that the environment should not be allowed to 
degenerate because of the bounty from natural resources. The impact of exploitation of 
petroleum resources is injurious to the environment. Most resource cursed countries do not 
usually factor in the long-term impact of the obnoxious substances on the environment and 
future generations. Resources extraction must give considerations to this; the environment 
should not be subjected to any form of exploitation that will create negative impact on the 
people.  
There is also the socially motivated objective which sustainable development has been 
considered as being capable of attaining.164 In fact, the analyses in the article by 
Lwabukuna captures how the laws related to the petroleum resources in Ghana attempt to 
promote sustainable management and utilisation of petroleum revenue.165  Sustainable 
development can promote social objectives through the promotion of education, 
infrastructural development and encouraging and eliminating cultural barriers and 
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enhancing social cohesion in society. It can constitute the bases for research and 
development in the promotion of petroleum production, exploration as well as 
diversification of petroleum resources and improving upon the inclusion of other energy 
sources into the energy mix.  
Economic sustainability is an important pillar.166 A development that is sustainable should 
be able to translate to the good of the people. Sustainability should bring about economic 
development and the people should have the impact of such development. Economic 
development will mean an increase in revenue of the country both in terms of GDP and 
foreign exchange earnings. There will be room for business and trade. Investment will be 
felt in the sector of the country and the development indices of such a country will be one 
to be reckoned with.  
Environmental sustainability is the most prominent pillar. The consequence of 
environmental sustainability tends to support the notion that where there is development, 
there is bound to be some forms of environmental degradation. The degradation of the 
environment will lead to harm. This raises the concern on the right of the persons to healthy 
environment. There is the need to ensure that development does not have negative impact 
on the people. The environment should be kept healthy without the people adversely 
affected thereby leading to diseases, loss of lives. Development and the environment are 
linked because development leads to environmental stress. Thus the ecological carrying 
capacity of the environmental is affected.  
There is the social dimensions to sustainable development also have far-reaching 
implications. Development should bring about incorporation of social values. Developed 
should enhance the social cultural aspect of the people. It should also create an avenue of 
limiting the social gaps between the poor and the rich in the society. Development should 
enhance civilization within the society. It should be avenue for example for the promotion 
of education. In the context of petroleum revenue management, it will be important that the 
proceeds of oil revenue should have positive impact on the people of Ghana. It should be 
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used for the development of schools and other social infrastructure and facets of life.167 
This will foster unity among the people where resources are distributed and the level of 
poverty is reduced thereby closing the gaps between the rich and the poor in the society.  
 
2.5 FURTHER RELEVANT UNDERPINING THEORIES  
 
2.5.1 Theory of Distributive Justice  
 
The concept of distributive justice has become a very important concept in natural 
resources governance. Distributive justice as a concept has been well developed by Rawls. 
Rawls idea of justice connotes that with is just, fair and equitable. The hallmark of the 
doctrine as theorized by Rawls is that there should be Firstly, equality of rights and liberties 
of the people; equal opportunities for all; and thirdly economic inequalities should be 
arranged with a focus maximising benefits of those who are with the least advantaged in the 
society.168 This connotes that in resource distribution, all are equal and it will be equitable 
that resources are channeled to those that cannot afford it or distributed according to needs. 
There should be fair distribution of the national wealth across the country. This is in line 
with the antithesis of the resource course which has been put forward to ensure that oil rents 
do not end in empty hands but a distributed. A major agitation in developing countries is 
the challenge by a group that they have not been given fair share of the natural resources 
within their domain.  Equitable distribution of petroleum resources or revenue is a way of 
enhancing the development of a country. This will allow for a spread of development 
because the benefit of being a resource rich country will be felt by all. If we must take the 
theory of distributive justice into account as forming the theoretical underpinnings of the 
research, it means that the PRMA should show that if offers fair utilisation of petroleum 
revenue for the good of Ghana meeting the needs of the current generation and the future 
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generation. This are central to the questions sough to be answered in the thesis. Thus the 
basic structure of the society as well as its institutional structure have far-reaching 
consequences in the determinants of distributive justice in the society. In the same token, 
there are other approaches to view of distributive justice such as the perspective of 
utilitarianism as propounded by Bentham. Distributive justice is viewed from the 
distribution of resources to meet the welfare of the society under a situation whereby the 
happiness of the society is maximised.169   
 
2.5.2 Stakeholders’ Theories  
 
The stakeholders are persons that are affected directly or indirectly by the actions in 
governance. Its development has been popularized in corporate governance through by the 
works of Freeman, who see corporate governance essential for the success of an 
organization.170 Stakeholders involve a broad spectrum of persons such as regulators, the 
companies, media, host communities and the citizens that will be adversely affected by a 
venture or a decision in the society.171 There is a need that the various interests are 
harnessed and protected in the society is progress is to be achieved. For example in natural 
recourse governance, it will be expected that the host communities see the governance as 
being impactful. The companies operating in the natural resources sector should also 
perceive the governance as impactful. Overall, the citizens and host communities should 
also come to the terms that the governance is done for the common good of the community 
and the people. Interest balancing is key in operation in taking account of stakeholders. 
There are therefore circumstances where the interests may be compatible or 
incompatible.172 Realisation of sustainable development therefore may have linkages to the 
promotion of the interest of the various stakeholders that seek to achieve, economic, social 
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and environmental claims.173 Stakeholders are crucial to success of a venture and it will be 
more instructive for legislators to take account of it in lawmaking process.174  
 
2.5.3 Stewardship Theory  
 
The stewardship theory can be taken to be “a framework which argues that people are 
intrinsically motivated to work for others or for organizations to accomplish the tasks and 
responsibilities with which they have been entrusted”.175 As it implies, there should be 
stewardship in the management and governance of natural resources. Stewardship therefore 
is the taking into account a responsibility of behalf of the people. This will mean that there 
should be a review by the people and the government will need to render account on the use 
of the resources for the good of the people of Ghana. It has been posited that, “stewardship 
involves business decision-makers putting the interests of others (including the 
environment) ahead of their own”.176 Prioritizing the need for sustainable development of 
Ghana should be the central objectives of ensuring that the resources are appropriately 
utilised. Therefore, it will be important that there is accountability for the development of 
the people from oil and gas recourse of the nation. Petroleum revenue management centers 
on development of fro the common good of the people. This means there should be 
accountability in the collection of the revenue as well as adequate management and 
multiplication of the resources. There is therefore a link of accountability and transparency 
in the management of petroleum revenue with the concept of stewardship.  
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This chapter took a look at the resource curse phenomenon which is synonymous with 
resource rich countries. It used the Spanish and Nigerian experience which are known 
examples of resource curse to explain the phenomenon. The research also analyses similar 
terms such as Dutch disease and financial aid curse and their various effects such as 
environmental degradation, monochromic economic system and civil strife. The resource 
curse is a theory that resource rich countries are prone to economic decay and 
underdevelopment compared to their counterparts which are less endowed in natural 
resources. 
The prevalence of contemporary examples such as Norway, Canada, and Botswana support 
the institutional perspective that natural resources per se does not result in resource curse 
but is dependent on the institution that is saddled with the responsibility to manage the 
revenue accruable from the natural resources. Credible institutions are therefore required to 
prevent or overcome the resource curse. These institutions will check corruption and 




CHAPTER THREE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES OF PETROLEUM REVENUE 
GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT IN GHANA 
3.0  INTRODUCTION  
 
The issue that this chapter seeks to discuss is the legal provisions on how Ghana has 
expended its petroleum resources through revenue conversion for future generations in the 
form of fiscal and tax regime, management of petroleum wealth and investments of 
proceeds from petroleum wealth. This will form the bases to answer the research question 
on how Ghana should manage and utilise its petroleum revenues to meet present needs and 
those of the future generations. 
Before 2016, the principal law for upstream petroleum exploration and production in Ghana 
was the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1984.1 Since then Ghana has 
progressed with its law on petroleum resources extraction as shown in the passage of the 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 which replaced the 1984 Act. However, 
the new law contained saving provisions.2 With the combined effect of the PRMA 2011 
and the above laws, it is the desire of the government of Ghana to enhance the sustainable 
management of petroleum revenues and allay the fears of the resource curse which, is also 
referred to as paradox of plenty. 
In Ghana, the management of the new windfall petroleum revenue is a major question 
going by the fact that the management of the revenue from other mineral resources in the 
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country was considered as questionable.3 Therefore if Ghana fails to manage its petroleum 
revenue effectively it will lead to the resource curse with a negative impact on the 
livelihood of the citizens.4 More so, the new oil find is capable of creating an atmosphere of 
tension in the polity from aggrieved stakeholders with varied expectations on what the 
benefits of the proceeds of oil should be.5 Avoiding social dislocation therefore depends on 
how each country becomes responsive to tackling the problem of its resource wealth so that 
it does not translate into a curse. Oil and gas resources should be utilised for the good of the 
state and its citizens. There should be laws that will enhance sustainable utilisation of the 
resource and not allow it to be squandered or not appropriated for the proper motive of the 
stated objective.  
This chapter has set the context through the legal analyses of the main laws connected to 
petroleum revenue management. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the legal regime 
for petroleum revenue generation and management in Ghana. This is to enable the 
appreciation of the factors to be considered and put in place for successful promotion of 
petroleum revenue management in order to address the resource curse in Ghana. 
3.1 AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES IN SHAPING THE NEED FOR UTILISATION OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES IN GHANA  
 
Africa is generally seen as a least developed country. Within the Africa regions are 
initiatives that seeks to promote the development of African countries which should form 
the bases or at least much commitment for the translation of the petroleum resources 
revenue for the good of Ghana. For Ghana, it is a member of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and it is expected that Ghana should translate the benefits 
offered by its membership for the economic development of Ghana. The initiatives are 
endless and it may be essentially too broad for the thesis to take on each of them for 
extensive analysis. The overall position is that Ghana being a major player in the African 
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international political economy should readily draw inspiration from the practices or at least 
appreciate the preeminent importance of most of the initiatives in shaping the development 
in the country.  
For example, it can be argued that there is no doubt that the resource governance in Africa 
through the development of some policy instruments has far reaching implications in 
shaping the situation in Ghana. The Notable of these instruments are the African Mining 
Vision, West African Mineral Development Policy in 2009 which has been further updated 
by the West African Mineral Development Policy of 2012.  The African Union through the 
Assembly Decision on the Action Plan of the African Mining Vision, endorsed the Action 
Plan for Implementing the Africa Mining Vision.6 A notable shared vision relevant to this 
area of research is the vision for “A sustainable and well-governed mining sector that 
effectively garners and deploys resource rents and that is safe, healthy, gender & ethnically 
inclusive, environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by surrounding 
communities”.  
An important consideration that has been put forward is that: 
The key elements to an African Mining Vision, that uses mineral 
resources to catalyse broad-based growth and development need to be, 
from looking at successful resource based development strategies 
elsewhere, the maximisation of the concomitant opportunities offered 
by a mineral resource endowment, particularly the “deepening” of the 
resources sector through the optimisation of linkages into the local 
economy. 
The African Mining Vision has certain major tenets such as optimization of knowledge and 
benefits offered by finite resources; harnessing small scale mining in improving livelihoods 
into the incorporation into rural and national economy, promotion of principles of 
sustainability taking into account the environment, socially responsible mining, safety and 
stakeholders engagement; human and institutional capacity building and promotion of 
innovation, research and development; diversification of the economy and creation of 
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competitiveness in mining Africa; promoting transparency and accountability in the 
resources.  Promotion of good governance and enhanced participation of the communities 
and citizens and equitable distribution of resources.7 
 
African Mining Vision should amount to a transformation of the natural resources sectors 
in African states like Ghana. There is much relevance of the African Mining Vision for 
African countries such as Ghana if account of the small and artisan mining is taking into 
consideration.8 According to Hilson: 
 
Ghana was an obvious candidate to embrace the AMV, 
wholesale, given its lengthy history of mining and donor 
intervention aimed specifically at transforming the sector into 
a catalyst for economic development. The country seems 
perfectly positioned to embrace the “Linkages and 
Diversification” cluster of the AMV because, as explained by 
the author, its government has enshrined a local content 
strategy for mining in the Minerals and Mining (General) 
Regulations, 2012.9 
 
Pursuant to the African Mining Vision, Ghana developed the Minerals and Mining Policy 
of Ghana, 2014. The Minerals and Mining Policy has set of underlying policies as follows: 
 
“1. Ensuring that Ghana’s mineral endowment is managed on a 
sustainable economic, social and environmental basis; 
2. Extracting and managing Ghana’s mineral endowment with due 
regard to internationally accepted standards of health, mine safety, 
environmental and human rights protection; 
3. Fostering the development of a mining sector that is integrated with 
other sectors of the national economy; 
4. Promoting the transformation of mining capital into other forms of 
development capital; 
5. Contributing to the economic empowerment of Ghanaians by 
generating opportunities for local entrepreneurship, increasing demand 
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for local goods and services and continuously creating employment 
opportunities for Ghanaians; 
6. Applying modern principles of transparency and accountability to 
the administration of mining laws and regulations; 
7. Ensuring an equitable sharing of the financial and developmental 
benefits of mining between investors and all Ghanaian stakeholders; 
8. Respecting the rights of communities that host mineral resources 
development; 
9. Encouraging local and foreign private sector participation in the 
exploration for, and commercial exploitation of, mineral resources;  
10. Recognising the need to establish and maintain a conducive 
macro-economic environment for mining investment; 
11. Developing a predictable regulatory environment that provides for 
the transparent and fair treatment of investors; 
12. Ensuring availability and accessibility of geo-scientific data 
necessary for the promotion of minerals sector investment; 
13. Incorporating in the licensing system an early focus on mine 
closure and post closure planning to anticipate and provide ahead for 
environmental, social and economic consequences; 
14. Promoting sustainable livelihoods in mining communities; 
15. Supporting the development of Ghanaian mining skills, 
entrepreneurship and capital by encouraging and facilitating the 
orderly and sustainable development of small-scale mining in precious 
and industrial minerals; 
16. Maximising opportunities for minerals-related education, training, 
career development and other support to empower Ghanaians to 
become owners and managers of mines and other professionals in the 
mining industry; 
17. Respecting employee, gender, children's rights and other human 
rights in mining, and the removal of obstacles to participation in the 
mining sector on the basis of gender, marital status or disability; 
18. Encouraging mining companies to develop a participatory and 
collaborative approach with local communities in decision making 
relating to mine planning, development and decommissioning; 
19. Developing streamlined institutional arrangements with adequate 
capacity for effective promotion and regulation of the mining sector; 
20. Acting in harmony with regional and international conventions and 
other instruments relevant to mining by endorsing and implementing 
principles that are established in these conventions and instruments”. 
 
From the above is well integrated in the minerals and mining sector from a policy 
perspective. However, these policies does not apply to the petroleum industry, being a 




of the African Mining Vision, to the use of best practices. The African Mining Vision 
provides that: “the key element in determining whether or not a resource endowment will 
be a curse or blessing, is the level of governance capacity and the existence of robust 
institutions”. Acknowledging the role of international best practices such as the EITI, the 
Africa Mining Vision sates that “there are clearly no short cuts out of this conundrum, but it 
can be argued that the international environment has improved for breaking the resource 
curse cycle”. 
 
It is also within the agenda of the African Mining Vision has as the short term objective 
within its action plan the Mainstreaming of EITI principles “in national policies, laws, and 
regulations; encourage establishment of national oversight bodies and implicate 
parliamentarians and independent committees in the monitoring of mining projects”.10 It is 
also makes a case for EITI to support “improved governance in resource-rich countries 
through the full publication and verification of company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining”.11 
 
The African Mining Vision requires the African Union Commission “to develop codes of 
conduct for mineral resources development and ensure that international agreed norms and 
standards are adhered to; popularise and promote the domestication into national policies, 
laws, and regulations relevant provisions of the EITI, EITI ++..”.12 
Right to development is seen as being imperative for developing countries; particularly in 
Africa.13  Right to development has been advocated as a distinct rights which Africans 
should embrace.14 It is becoming an important consideration worldwide. The emergence of 
right to development as a distinct aspect of human rights can be traced to the Senegalese 
Jurist, Keba Mbaye who propounded the concept calling for recognition of right to 
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development.15 Consequently the right to development has been propagated and the United 
Nations General Assembly made a Declaration on Right to development in 1986.16 
According to the Preamble, the UN calls for “...a comprehensive economic, social, cultural 
and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom…”17. Article 1(1) provides that: 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.18 
Development and natural resources have much relevance. This is further recognised in 
Article 1(1) of the UN declaration which provides that: “The human right to development 
also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which 
includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human 
Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth 
and resources”.19 
Natural resources should be utilized as a tool for development. The existence of natural 
resource should therefore promote development and not curse for the people. The right to 
development should reflect in a way that the resources are channeled to development. The 
people should also have a say on the use of their resources for development. The 
engagement of the people and ensuring that the people participate in their development are 
very important considerations that will need to be brought to bear in enhancing the 
development of the people. Being impoverished and not having adequate standards of 
living are considered as the bane to development. These find much relevance with the 
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provisions of Article 6(3) which provides that: “Steps should be taken to ensure the full 
exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, including the 
formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other measures at the 
national and international levels”.20 In the same token, Article 10 expressed in normative 
terms that “Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement 
of the right to development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
policy, legislative and other measures at the national and international levels”.21 The 
development of efficient laws that promote prudent and sustainable management of 
petroleum resources is therefore imperative.  
Taking a look at the right to development, which can be seen to be a right that has been 
much popularized and articulated within the UN Systems and as well guaranteed under the 
Africa Charter on Human and Peoples Right, there is avenue for Ghana to continue to ask 
for sustainability in the management of petroleum revenue going by the jurisprudence of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A catena of authorities within the 
African Union setting a quite instructive on the observation of treaty obligations. In Sudan 
Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan,22 the African Commission on Human 
Rights found that the rights in Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7(1), 12(1), 14, 16, 18(1) and 22 of the 
African Charter have been violated by Sudan and more in particular the right to health of 
the indigenous people Darfur region because of the poisoning of their farms and livestock. 
The Commission therefore made a recommendation that the right to Government of Sudan 
should as of urgency, to protect the people against the violation of their rights and carry out 
investigations and prosecution of the violations, and put in place rehabilitate and develop 
education, health, water and agriculture.  
In Centre for Minority Rights Development v Kenya,23  the African Commission held that: 
The Respondent State [Kenya] … is obligated to ensure that the 
Endorois are not left out of the development process or [its] benefits. 
The African Commission agrees that the failure to provide adequate 
                                                          
20 Art. 6(3), UN Declaration on Right to Development 
21 Art. 10,  UN Declaration on Right to Development 
22 (2009) AHRLR 153. 




compensation and benefits, or provide suitable land for grazing 
indicates that the Respondent State did not adequately provide for the 
Endorois in the development process. It finds against the Respondent 
State that the Endorois community has suffered a violation of 
Article 22 of the Charter 
 
The Commission reasoned further that: 
A violation of either the procedural or substantive element constitutes 
a violation of the right to development. Fulfilling only one of the two 
prongs will not satisfy the right to development. The African 
Commission notes the Complainants’ arguments that recognizing the 
right to development requires fulfilling five main criteria: it must be 
equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, accountable, and 
transparent, with equity and choice as important, over-arching themes 
in the right to development. 
 
In Kevin Mgwanga Gumne Others v Cameroon,24 the allegation was that the government 
did not provide for economic infrastructure in the Southern Cameroon and that the 
government relocated the sea port from the region. The African Commission found that the 
action of the government was in violation of the right to development under provided under 
the Provisions of Article 22 of the African Charter. According to the African Commission, 
the state of Cameroon was “under obligation to invest its resources in the best way possible 
to attain the progressive realization of the right to development…” It is therefore 
appropriate to argue that the petroleum resources in Ghana should be utilised for its 
development.  
 
3.2 OWNERSHIP OF PETROLEUM AND ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS IN GHANA 
 
In line with the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources where countries 
have in the past vested the ownership and control of natural resources in themselves, Ghana 
also provides for a similar trend in its law. This provision gives the government a full 
control over the petroleum resources in the state. According to the provisions of Article 
257(6) of the Constitution of Ghana 1992: 
                                                          





Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, 
rivers, streams, water courses throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic 
zone and any area covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is the 
property of the Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in the President on 
behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana.25 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 re-
emphasises the ownership of the petroleum resources by providing that:  
Petroleum existing in its natural state in, under or upon any land in 
Ghana, rivers, streams, water courses throughout Ghana, the exclusive 
economic zone and any area covered by the territorial sea or continental 
shelf, is the property of the Republic of Ghana and is vested in the 
President on behalf of and in trust for the people of Ghana.26 
 
This enables the government to, through laws and regulation, dictate the governance and 
allocation of petroleum rights across the country. Ghana therefore operates the domanial 
form of ownership where the management and control of petroleum resources rests with the 
government. In essence, the principle enshrined in the doctrine of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources has practical application in Ghana.  
The parliamentary control of the petroleum resources is further enhanced by the provisions 
of Article 268 (1) of the Constitution of Ghana which further contains that:  
Any transaction, contract or undertaking involving the grant of a right or 
concession by or on behalf of any person including the Government of 
Ghana, to any other person or body of persons howsoever described, for 
the exploitation of any mineral, water or other natural resource of Ghana 
made or entered into after the coming into force of this Constitution shall 
be subject to ratification by Parliament. 
 
There is the requirement that the resolution for the ratification of the contract or transaction 
must be by two-third majority of the parliament.27 The implication of this provision is that 
the parliament in Ghana will have to approve any form of contract for exploration and 
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production entered between the government of Ghana and its agency with any other foreign 
entity. This provision is of critical importance given the fact that the promotion of 
exploration and production of Ghana’s oil and gas sector, in the absence of indigenous 
actors, will require the engagement of foreign investors and multinational oil corporations. 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 provides that “A body corporate 
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Act, engage in the exploration, development and 
production of petroleum except in accordance with the terms of a petroleum agreement 
entered into between that body corporate, the Republic of Ghana and the Corporation”.28 
Furthermore it is provided that “The Minister shall represent the Republic of Ghana in the 
negotiation of the terms of a petroleum agreement and shall enter into a petroleum 
agreement on behalf of the Republic”.29 To further emphasise the requirements of 
parliamentary ratification of the agreement it is provided that “A petroleum agreement 
entered into by the Minister shall not be effective if it is not ratified by Parliament in 
accordance with article 268 of the Constitution”.30  
 
In the case of Attorney General v. Balkan Energy Ghana Limited,31 the Ghanaian Supreme 
Court confirmed the validity of the provisions of Article 268.  In this case the Supreme 
Court held that a power purchase agreement entered by the government of Ghana with a 
foreign company without obtaining the ratification of Parliament was unenforceable. In the 
case of Amidu (No. 1) v. Attorney General,32 the Supreme Court of Ghana observed that: an 
international business transaction requires parliamentary approval and “a contract made in 
breach of Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution was null and void and it would create no 
rights. It should not be legitimate to evade that nullity by the grant of a restitutionary 
remedy”. 
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Basically, the rights that are acquired in the Ghanaian oil and gas industry can be grouped 
into two. First, acquisition of rights can be through the obtaining of the reconnaissance 
licence for the conduct of data collection, seismic survey and data interpretation and 
evaluation; and secondly, participation in Petroleum Agreement. The Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation is involved in upstream petroleum transactions through the 
compulsory acquisition of stakes in the various contractual arrangements in operation with 
oil companies. This is granted for carrying out studies and the survey for exploration of 
petroleum resources in a defined area.33 The law allows for the acquisition of production 
rights in the oil and gas industry through the participation in petroleum agreements with the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation. It provides for selection of participants to be based 
on public competitive bidding arrangement. The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation is 
expected to hold not less than 10% of the interests in the blocks covered by the contract 
area. There is the Model Petroleum Agreement which is a template provided by the 
government of Ghana that is adapted based on the negotiation of the parties. 
 
Having looked briefly at the legal regime on ownership and the acquisition of rights in the 
oil and gas sector in Ghana, the next step the researcher takes is to assess how the law in 
respect of petroleum revenue management can promote sustainable management of 
petroleum resources thereby avoiding the resource curse. The proceeds from oil can be used 
for the betterment of the lives of the people.34  
 
Since Ghana has permanent sovereignty over the petroleum resources in its domain, it can 
provide for ways it chooses to manage the resources. Like other countries, the management 
of petroleum resources has been achieved through the use of the laws and contractual 
arrangements. To aid this will usually require the establishment of institutions responsible 
for management in line with the agenda of the government to extract and optimally utilise 
the proceeds for the benefits of the state. Therefore, sustainable management of petroleum 
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resources requires that the institutions are well positioned to address the resource curse 
challenges. It is through the existence of strong institutions that private efficiency and 
public accountability can be effectively achieved.35 
 
Briefly, the key institutions in the oil and gas industry are as follows: The ministry is the 
executive arm of the government. The Minister has functions in the oil and gas industry. 
Most oil and gas transactions are subject to the actions taken by the Minster as he 
negotiates on behalf of the government. The Minister is appointed by the president and it is 
expected that the Minister will do the bidding of the president.  The various laws recognise 
the powers of the minister in relation to petroleum or operations and the management of 
petroleum resources (revenue) which is the focus of the thesis. The Petroleum Commission 
is responsible for the regulation and coordination of petroleum activities in Ghana. The 
Petroleum Commission is established under the Petroleum Commission Act. It is 
responsible for overseeing the upstream and midstream oil and gas sector as it affects the 
various participants in the oil and gas industry. It is practically a major regulator for the 
industry.  
The corporation with the corporate mandate to represent and carry out commercial 
activities across the value chain of the oil and gas industry in Ghana is the Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). Established in 1983 GNPC is a corporate entity. It is the 
national oil agency. It is responsible for ensuring that the government’s interest is protected 
and well represented in oil and gas transactions. Countries have explored varied options in 
the exploitation of the petroleum resources through either allowing GNPC to fully take 
control in exploitation of petroleum resources or to leave the sector in the hands of the 
private sector or allow a combination of national oil company and the private sector to 
engage in petroleum exploration and production. Ghana has therefore opted for the 
participation of the national oil agency and private sector in petroleum exploration and 
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production.36  It is the mechanism for the state participation in the oil and gas industry. All 
petroleum agreements entered into by the government are through GNPC. It holds the 
interest of the government in these agreements. 
 
3.3 PETROLEUM REVENUE GENERATION 
 
Examining the petroleum revenue sources is an important consideration that this chapter 
brings on board for some obvious reasons. Firstly, it is the chief source of revenue that 
accrues to the state. Secondly, it shows the government take from the oil and gas activities 
can aid in making projections giving room for the need for accountability. For example, 
even if the government failed to declare what has accrued to it from petroleum revenue of 
the state, the amount accruing to the government can be obtained through the tax audit of 
companies or from the balance sheets or the financial statement of companies. It gives an 
insight into knowing whether the fiscal regime is one that could be sustainable given the 
revenue accruing to the government and the liabilities of oil companies in the light of other 
developments in other jurisdictions and international oil prices.37 The approach adopted in 
Ghana for it to maximise its revenue in the oil and gas industry is through the use of fees, 
signature bonus, royalties, equity stake in investments and petroleum income taxation.38 
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With the discovery of oil and gas in 2007, Ghana, like most countries, commenced in 
getting the proceeds from oil through the use of preproduction charges.  
 
3.3.1 Fees  
 
Countries generally will not wait for the proceeds from oil to come from production. The 
use of fees from the application of licences was utilised by the government. Upon 
application for a licence for an oil block or blocks, the applicant may be invited to inspect 
data for a fee of 1,000 United States Dollars, which is non-refundable.39 The application fee 
is 10,000 United States Dollars.40 
 
3.3.2 Bonuses  
 
Companies are also required to pay signature bonuses upon the signing of the petroleum 
agreements entered with the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation. According to section 
88 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016, “A contractor shall pay bonus 
to the Republic as may be prescribed, except that where the type and quantum of the bonus 
payable is not prescribed, the bonus shall be paid as otherwise provided in accordance with 
the terms of a petroleum agreement in respect of the area to which the agreement relates”. 
3.3.3 Additional Entitlements  
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There is the provision made to enhance the revenue of the government from the additional 
oil entitlement in section 89 that provides that “the Republic is entitled to a portion of a 
contractor's share of petroleum produced from each field on the basis of the after-tax 
inflation-adjusted rate of return that the contractor achieved with respect to each field”. 
2.3.4 Royalties  
 
It is a fact that oil companies pay royalties that enable the government to generate revenue. 
Royalty entails the “entitlement of the Republic to a portion of petroleum produced and 
saved and not utilized in petroleum activities from each field and which is calculated as a 
percentage of gross daily production rates without regard to any prior deductions”.41 The 
contractor has an  obligation under the Act to pay royalties for gross volume of petroleum 
produced and saved.42 The law provides that “royalty to be paid is as prescribed, except that 
where the rates of royalty payable are not prescribed, royalty shall be paid as other- wise 
provided in accordance with the terms of a petroleum agreement in respect of the area to 
which the agreement relates”.43 The royalty is required to be paid in kind except the 
minister directs that it should be paid in cash.44 The rate of royalty is set out in the 
petroleum agreement to be 12.5 % of gross crude oil production.45 The royalty for gas 
production is fixed at 5 %.46 All payments of royalties in kind are made to the corporation 
which in turn makes sales and pays the proceeds to the state as required.47  
 
3.3.5 Acreage Fees 
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Annual acreage fees are also paid for acreages held by companies.48 The amount for the 
acreage fees is prescribed by the Minister but in the absence of a prescription of the amount 
payable, it will be determined by the petroleum agreement. The model petroleum 
agreement provides for 30 US Dollars per square kilometre for the exploration phase and 
50 and 75 US Dollars per square kilometre for the first and second extension periods 
respectively.49 The fee for the development and production is put at 100 US Dollars per 
square kilometre.50 Thus it is provided in the Act that “The Minister shall prescribe the 
amount to be paid, except that where the amount is not prescribed, the annual acreage fees 
shall be as provided in accordance with the terms of a petroleum agreement in respect of 
the area to which the agreement relates”.51  
3.3.6 Taxation of Petroleum Income 
 
This is followed by the utilisation of the tax regime to also get revenue from the oil 
companies upon the sales and making of profits by the companies. The above arrangement 
constitutes the fiscal regime of Ghana. “Every person carrying on petroleum operations 
shall, subject Charge of to the provision of this law, pay for each year of assessment a tax 
on his chargeable income calculated in the manner provided”.52 The chargeable income is 
arrived at for the purpose of taxation upon carrying out deductions allowed under the law.53 
The tax rate is put at 50 % except it is provided for otherwise in the petroleum agreement. 
Therefore, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, petroleum income shall be 
taxed at 50%. By this provision, the government has given a leverage for the negotiation of 
the government take. To a large extent, it is the agreement of the parties that determines the 
amount to be charged by the state.  
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A key consideration in the sector is the need for fiscal stability and also the need for the 
government to be in a position to amend the fiscal regime and meet its development needs. 
The question for determination will be to what extent has the current fiscal regime been 
able to ensure that the petroleum resources will bring about maximisation for the people of 
Ghana. On the one hand, the oil and gas companies will oppose vehemently any alteration 
in the regime that undercuts their profits. This section will therefore look into the law and 
consider whether Ghana is likely to make fiscal adjustments in its petroleum arrangements 
or whether it is locked into the contract it has entered into with investors.  Ghana is likely to 
encounter some difficulties in the management of its petroleum resources through the 
increase of the government take if measures are not clearly in place to check against that. 
According to the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 in section 87, “A 
licensee, contractor, sub-contractor and the Corporation shall pay taxes, including 
petroleum income tax and capital gains tax in accordance with applicable enactments”. The 
complications arising from this development is that the petroleum tax law applicable in 
Ghana is the Petroleum Tax Law of 1987. Ghana did not amend the law even upon 
commercial discovery. Therefore the tax regime in the country is governed by a pre 
discovery tax law. There may be challenges for Ghana if it attempts an amendment should 
investors make a windfall profit or there is a fall in oil prices that necessitates the need to 
device means to increase government take. Though Ghana could place reliance on its 
sovereignty over natural resources or petroleum resources as giving her the powers to 
amend her laws and bring them in tune with the development in the oil and gas industry this 
may be viewed by the foreign oil and gas companies as a breach of commitments made by 
Ghana.  
There are therefore some international law questions that can be conversed in relation to 
this development. This will adversely affect the resources of the state, and Ghana will need 
to defend herself before international investment arbitral tribunals and could even lose the 
arbitration and be made to pay compensation for the change in its legal regime. To 




internationally for the change in her legal regime for the purpose of increasing the 
government’s take and also guaranteeing proper management of petroleum revenue.  
 
3.4 THE MANAGEMENT OF PETROLEUM REVENUE  
 
The PRMA is the lex specialis of the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana.54 The 
conception of the petroleum revenue management law was to provide for accountability 
and foster sustainability in addressing issues such as price volatility.55 Going by the 
preamble of the law, it is provided that “to provide the framework for the collection, 
management of petroleum revenue in a responsible, accountable and sustainable manner for 
the benefit of Ghana in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution and for related 
matters”. 
The provisions of Article 36 are part of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in 
the Constitution. The principles underlie the aspirations of the government. Accordingly, 
Article 34 (1) of the Constitution provides: 
The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter shall 
guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of 
State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in 
applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking 
and implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and 
free society. 
 
Therefore, the PRMA 2011 specifically sets the application of Article 36 as the core 
guidance in the application of the provisions of the Act. The provisions of Article 36 of the 
constitution in the context of petroleum revenue management will be examined here. The 
preliminary conclusion for this is that these would form part of the benchmark for assessing 
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the application of the petroleum revenue management law in making a conclusion for the 
thesis. Article 36 (1) states that: 
 
The State shall take all necessary action to ensure that the national 
economy is managed in such a manner as to maximize the rate of 
economic development and to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and 
happiness of every person in Ghana and to provide adequate means of 
livelihood and suitable employment and public assistance to the needy. 
 
In essence, petroleum revenue should be used to provide for economic development and 
meet the needs of the people and offer a range of social security services for the people in 
the form of infrastructural development and other forms of social amenities.  
 
Article 36 (2) provides: “The State shall, in particular, take all necessary steps to establish a 
sound and healthy economy whose underlying principles shall include: 
 
“the guarantee of a fair and realistic remuneration for production and productivity in order 
to encourage continued production and higher productivity”-citizens engaged in 
employment in the oil and gas sector should ideally have sufficient remuneration for the 
services they render in the oil and gas industry; 
 “ample opportunity for individual initiative and creativity in economic activities and 
fostering an enabling environment for a pronounced role of the private sector in the 
economy”-promotion of private investor in the oil and gas industry should be projected and 
the investment climate should be favourable to investors; 
“ensuring that individuals and the private sector bear their fair share of social and national 
responsibilities including responsibilities to contribute to the overall development of the 
country”-The stakeholders should be able to contribute to the development of the country 
through social responsibility initiatives which will include earmarking the oil revenue for 
the good of the people and the state; 
“undertaking even and balanced development of all regions and every part of each region of 
Ghana, and, in particular, improving the conditions of life in the rural areas, and generally, 




connotes that the petroleum revenue should reflect equitable distribution in the 
development of the various regions in Ghana; 
“the recognition that the most secure democracy is the one that assures the basic necessities 
of life for its people as a fundamental duty”-revenue should be utilised to meet the basic 
necessities of the citizens. 
 
Article 36 (3) requires that “The State shall take appropriate measures to promote the 
development of agriculture and industry”. The implication of this is that the petroleum 
revenue management should give considerations to diversification. Therefore, revenues 
from petroleum resources can be utilised to facilitate the growth of the agricultural sector. 
Agriculture remains a major resources and very vulnerable to the resource curse. It is a 
sector that can easily be neglected when a country is experiencing an abundance of oil, 
hence the resource curse and Dutch disease syndrome can easily manifest themselves if 
care is not taken to address the anomaly.   
 
Article 36 (4) provides that “Foreign investment shall be encouraged within Ghana, subject 
to any law for the time being in force regulating investment in Ghana”. The management of 
the petroleum revenue should therefore be done in a manner that there is the promotion of 
foreign investments. In the effort of the state to harness its petroleum revenue to the fullest, 
it must be borne in mind that attraction of foreign investors is key to the development of the 
oil and gas sector and promotion of foreign direct investment.  
 
Under Article 36 (6) “The State shall afford equality of economic opportunity to all 
citizens; and, in particular, the State shall take all necessary steps so as to ensure the full 
integration of women into the mainstream of the economic development of Ghana” 
buttresses the earlier proposition made above on promotion equity. Therefore, women 
should as a matter of national importance not only benefit but should be involved in the 





Under Article 36 (9) “The State shall take appropriate measures needed to protect and 
safeguard the national environment for posterity; and shall seek co-operation with other 
states and bodies for purposes of protecting the wider international environment for 
mankind”-Petroleum revenue management should take into cognisance the promotion of 
sustainable development and environmental sustainable through the cooperation with other 
states as well as non-state actors. Article 24(1) provides that “The State shall safeguard the 
health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment, and shall establish the basis for the 
full deployment of the creative potential of all Ghanaians” calls for employment and 
capacity building in the oil and gas industry. Under Article 36 (11) “The State shall 
encourage the participation of workers in the decision-making process at the work place” is 
instructive on the participation and decision making in the issues pertaining to the 
management of petroleum revenue in Ghana. 
 
Bearing this in mind the application of the petroleum revenue management law should give 
much life to realisation of the goals and aspirations of the state as contained in Article 36.  
Though the fundamental objectives have been expressed in Ghana as not being justiciable 
as has been articulated in decisions such as New Patriotic Party v Attorney General,56 the 
more recent decisiom of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghana Lotto Operators 
Association v National Lottery Authority.57 The Supreme Court of Ghana held that the 
provisions of Article 36 (1) & (2) are justiciable and more so the contents may meet other 
international treaty obligations which Ghana is obliged to observe. There is therefore 
obligation on the government to improve the welfare of the people.58 By implication, of the 
judgment the sustainable development contents such as promotion of welfare, rural 
development and economic development among others as envisioned in the directive 
principles can be enforced in so far as the citizens can justify such obligations of the 
government. The trends appears to be changing most especially where the legislature take 
steps to make laws in areas that are related to the fundamental objectives and directive 
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principles of state policy or placing reliance on the human rights as enshrined in Chapter 5 
of the constitution. Furthermore, the reasoning of the court is viewed from the perspectives 
of facilitating the realisation of economic social cultural rights or in enhancing the 
constitutional rights that are guaranteed under the Constitution of Ghana.59 Therefore, with 
strategic litigation, there may be avenue to place reliance on the Directive Principles of 
State Policy to continue to call for prudent and sustainable management of petroleum 
revenue in Ghana.  
Furthermore, life has been given to the Directive Principles through their express 
incorporation in an Act of the Parliament. A proactive way of creating justiciability will be 
through the use of the law to compel what would have been justiciable as being justiciable. 
The Long Title provides for: 
 
AN ACT to provide the framework for the collection, allocation and 
management of petroleum revenue m a responsible, transparent, 
accountable and sustainable manner for the benefit of the citizens of 
Ghana in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution and for related 
matters.  
 
The provision of Article 36 is strengthened by the Long Title to the PRMA 2011. It can be 
argued that the provisions of the Article 36 have the force of a positive law for being 
recognised in the PRMA and as well as in judicial decisions.  
 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 provides for the management of 
petroleum resources in accordance with the principles of good governance and transparency 
and accountability.60 Thus it is provided that “The management of petroleum resources by 
the Republic of Ghana shall be conducted in accordance with the principles of good 
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governance, including transparency and accountability and the object of this Act”.61 From 
the perspective of this research good governance will entail allowing democratic processes 
and following due process in the management of revenue accruing to the state from 
petroleum resources. It will also encompass transparency and accountability. To be 
transparent therefore will mean the management of petroleum resources should be done in 
an open manner. Accountability will require that there exist facts on how the petroleum 
revenue has been effectively or efficiently utilised for the proper purpose. That is to say, “to 
be accountable is to be liable to be called to account, or to answer for responsibilities, 
positions, and conduct.”62  
 
On the other hand, the objectives of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 
are stated as “to provide for and ensure safe, secure, sustainable and efficient petroleum 
activities in order to achieve optimal long-term petroleum resource exploitation and 
utilisation for the benefit and welfare of the people of Ghana”. In essence, the management 
of petroleum resources correlates with the sustainable utilisation of the proceeds of oil and 
gas for the benefits and welfare of the people of Ghana. The existence of a provision of 
such may therefore be seen as the overriding objective of petroleum resources management 
in Ghana. It may form the bases upon which a challenge may be brought against the state 
where the government or officials of the various institutions are found wanting in discharge 
of their obligation on petroleum resources management.  
 
Table 1: Allocations from the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF) for the years 2011 - 
201863 
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The table above shows the distribution of US$5.013 billion revenue that has been accrued 
to Ghana from 2011 to 2018 into the respective funds discussed below. 
 
3.4.1 Petroleum Holding Fund  
 
The establishment of the Petroleum Holding Fund is for the purpose of receipt of monies 
accruing to Ghana into the Fund to be held by the Bank of Ghana, for subsequent 
disbursement as may be required by the law.64  The collecting authority for the petroleum 
revenue is the Ghana Revenue Authority which is responsible for the collection, assessment 
and accounting for the revenue.65 The obliged entities that are required to make payment 
into the fund are to do so within 15 days after the month in which the payment is due and 
notify the Ghana Revenue Authority in writing.66 There are instances where the 
government receives oil in place of cash as earlier demonstrated. In such a situation, the 
PRMA 2011 requires that a report of the payment in lieu of cash should be made to the 
Ghana Revenue Authority as payment made into the Petroleum Holding Fund and after 
sales have been made, the proceeds are required to be credited into the fund within six 
calendar days.67 The monies in the Petroleum Fund are to be disbursed as follows: payment 
into consolidated fund for the support of national budgets, payment into the Ghana 
Petroleum Fund-The Stabilisation Fund and the Heritage Fund respectively and any other 
funds as may be exceptionally provided by the Act.68 
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The law specifically sets out a list of areas that the Petroleum Holding Fund should not be 
used for. Therefore, it is provided that: 
 
(1) The amount in the Petroleum Holding Fund earmarked for transfer 
into the Ghana Petroleum Fund, shall not be used  
(a) to provide credit to the government, public enterprises, private sector 
entities or any other person or entity, and  
(a) as collateral for guarantees, commitments or other liabilities of any 
other entity.  
(2) In order to preserve revenue streams from petroleum and ensure 
object of this Act, shall not be any borrowing against Petroleum Holding 
Fund. 
 
In essence, utilising the fund to offer credit facilities is prohibited in so far as they are in 
relation to the amount earmarked for the Ghana Petroleum Fund, which will be discussed 
later. In the same vein, there should be no form of securitisation from the amount 
earmarked for the Ghana Petroleum Fund. The question for determination at this point will 
be what becomes of the part of the fund not earmarked for the Ghana Petroleum Fund? If 
one follows the rule of statutory interpretation, it can be concluded that in so far as the 
amount of monies that are ploughed into the Petroleum Holding Fund does not touch on the 
Ghana Petroleum Fund, they can be utilised for credit facilities and for securitisation.  The 
express mentioning of one thing is to the exclusion of others. On the other hand, the 
provision of Section 4 (2) is quite explicit that no part of the fund should be borrowed and 
that does not in any way preclude the Petroleum Holding Fund to be used for securitisation 
of investments provided it is not from the sum earmarked for the Ghana Petroleum Fund.   
 
Under Section 41 (2) “Any contract, or arrangement, to the extent that it encumbers or 
purports to encumber the assets of the Petroleum Holding Fund and the Ghana Petroleum 
Funds whether by way of security, mortgage or any other form of encumbrance is contrary 
to this Act and is null and void”. The Court is prohibited by Section 41 (3) from making an 
order for the attachment of monies in the Petroleum Funds. 
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3.4.2 The Consolidated Fund 
 
The amount of petroleum revenue earmarked for the annual budget is paid into the 
consolidated fund from the Petroleum Holding Fund on a quarterly basis. The law provides 
for restriction on the amount to be earmarked which shall not be more than 70 per cent. 
Thus Section 18 (1) provides that “The Annual Budget Funding Amount from petroleum 
revenue shall not be more than seventy percent of the Benchmark Revenue”.69 This is 
further reaffirmed by the provisions of Section 19 (2) of the PRMA 2011 to the effect that: 
“The total amount withdrawn from the Petroleum Holding Fund for budget funding for any 
financial year shall not exceed the Annual Budget Funding Amount approved by 
Parliament for that financial year”. There is therefore an attempt to link the utilization of 
petroleum revenue to development plans through the provisions of Section 19 (3) which 
provides for “The exact percentage of the Benchmark Revenue which shall be allocated 
annually to be Annual Budget Funding Amount shall be guided by a medium-term 
development strategy aligned with a long term national development plan, absorptive 
capacity of the economy and the need for prudent macroeconomic management”.70  
Therefore it is further provided in the law that (2) The use of the annual allocation of the 
Annual Budget Funding Amount shall be (a) to maximise the rate of economic 
development; (b) to promote equality of economic opportunity with a view to ensure the 
well-being of citizens; (c) to undertake even and balanced development of the regions; and 
(d) guided by a medium term expenditure framework aligned with a national development 
approved by the Parliament”.71 This provision is quite laudable as it tends to set the 
guidelines to be followed in the utilization of revenue specifically derived from oil and gas. 
Interestingly, the PRMA 2011 gives a list of activities which the government is expected to 
use the petroleum revenue for if there are no plans developed in accordance with the Act.  
The lists provided in the law include: 
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(a) agriculture and industry; 
(b) physical infrastructure and service delivery in education, science and technology;  
(c) potable water delivery and sanitation; infrastructure development in 
telecommunication, road, rail and port; 
(d) physical infrastructure and service delivery in health; 
(e) housing delivery; 
(f) environmental protection, sustainable utilisation and protection of natural resources; 
rural development; developing alternative energy sources; 
(g)  the strengthening of institutions of government concerned with governance and t 
(h) maintenance of law and order; 
(i) public safety and security;  
(j) provision of social welfare and the protection of the physically handicapped and 
disadvantaged citizens. 
An examination of each of the areas will indicate that they are in line with the tenets of 
actualizing sustainable development. Proper utilization of the revenue along these listed 
goals will promote sustainability. For example, the development of the agricultural and 
industrial sectors brings about diversification of the economy which will meet current needs 
and that of the future generation as the future will not be fully reliant on oil and gas will be 
a way to promote sustainability in Ghana. Likewise, the provision for the utilization of 
alternative energy sources also has the advantages of ensuring that the limited petroleum 
resources are not depleted and that the benefits of alternative energy can offer avenues for 
job creation and also increase the access of the teaming population in need of energy 
services. 
 
3.4.3 The Ghana Stabilisation Fund 
 
The PRMA 2011 also makes provision for the establishment of the Ghana Stabilisation 
Fund.72 The purpose of the Ghana Stabilisation Fund is to prepare for periods where there is 
                                                          




shortfall in oil and gas revenue accruing to the government. The Act therefore provides that 
“The object of the Ghana Stabilisation Fund is to cushion the impact on or sustain public 
expenditure capacity during periods of unanticipated petroleum revenue shortfalls”.73 The 
source of funding for the Ghana Stabilisation Fund shall come from payments made from 
the Petroleum Holding Fund based on percentage determined by the parliament.74 It is for 
the purpose of providing stimulus package for the economy in terms of shortage. It is 
therefore a medium for preparing for a rainy day. Therefore, the law provides that if the 
petroleum revenue collected for the quarter is lower than the Annual Budget Funding 
Amount in the first quarter of the financial year, the law permits withdrawal to be made 
from the Ghana Stabilisation Fund.75  
On the other hand where the revenue generated at the end of each quarter of every financial 
year is in excess of the Annual Budget Funding Amount by one-quarter, a minimum of 30 
percent of the excess will be paid into the Ghana Heritage Fund, while whatever is left of 
the amount is paid into the Ghana Stabilisation Fund.76 There appears to be likelihood of 
leakages in the monies that are to be kept in the Ghana Stabilisation Fund. This is because 
the minster can set a benchmark on the amount of moneys to be kept in the Fund, subject to 
parliamentary approval and review from time to time as may be necessitated by 
microeconomic situations in the country; any other amount in excess of the benchmark 
goes into the contingency Fund for debt repayment.77  
3.4.4 Ghana Heritage Fund 
 
The Ghana Heritage Fund is a fund established under the PRMA 2011 as distinct from the 
Ghana Stabilisation Fund.78 The Ghana Heritage Fund is established for the purpose of 
providing “endowment to support development for future generations when petroleum 
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reserves have been depleted” and for receipt of excess petroleum revenue.79 Like the Ghana 
Stabilisation Fund, the disbursement of revenue is from the Petroleum Holding Fund and 
the excess from the Annual Budget Funding Amount.80 The percentage of what goes into 
the Ghana Heritage fund is to be determined by the parliament. Parliament has the 
opportunity of reviewing the Ghana Heritage Fund after fifteen years to determine whether 
there should be restrictions on the transfer from it into other funds provided in the Act, 
where such is agreed by majority of the parliament.  
3.4.5 Decommissioning Funds  
 
The conduct of oil and gas operations at an area or allocated oil block has a life span given 
the fact that petroleum resources are a finite. The arrangement for decommissioning is very 
important because at that stage, the oil companies have managed to recoup their expenses 
and may not show much interest in exercising the obligation imposed on them regarding 
decommissioning of the platforms. More so, the ownership of the installations and facilities 
is transferred to the national oil company, the GNPC that may not have the capacity or 
ability to manage the assets. There is therefore a need for Ghana to make such 
arrangements that will guarantee decommissioning. The petroleum revenue management 
process can be a way to work out such a solution.  Decommissioning of the platforms is a 
very important aspect and there will be need for the restoration of the environment to its 
normal position and evacuation of the equipment from the platform where it is necessary 
for it to be done. There are environmental implications and costs associated with the 
process. Financial resources need be channelled for that purpose and therefore it is 
important that there should be sources of finance for such clearly spelt out accordingly.  
 A progressive development in the legal regime in Ghana is the establishment of 
decommissioning fund under the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016. The 
Act provides thus “A licensee or contractor shall establish a decommissioning fund as 
prescribed”. The definition section of the Act states that the decommissioning fund is a 
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fund meant “for the purposes of funding decommissioning activities upon termination of 
petroleum activities in an area under a relevant petroleum agreement”.81 The Act, however, 
does not go further to prescribe how the fund will be operated. However, there may be an 
indication that future regulation through ministerial powers will create the avenue for the 
operation of the decommissioning fund. The minister has powers to make regulation for 
“decommissioning and decommissioning fund” pursuant to the powers conferred to it to 
make regulations under section 94 (1) and 2 (bb) of the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act 2016. 
The proceeds of the Fund can also be managed for the good of the people of Ghana. With 
the developments in science and technology, the viability of an oil well is known. The 
depletion of the oil well can be predicted, it is therefore important to invest the proceeds 
collected for the purpose of decommissioning. Employment of fund managers to utilise the 
fund is a way that will enhance easy decommissioning.  
A further major concern will be how to utilise the surplus for a particular project. What if at 
the end of the decommissioning there are surpluses? This is another silent provision in the 
law. Will the monies revert back to the state or the oil companies? These are some of the 
issues that will need to be addressed in the law. There are questions to be asked as to who 
should keep the fund for decommissioning. Should it be maintained in an account held by 
the government or should the Fund be kept in banks under an escrow account arrangement 
where the payer into such an account does not have the right to withdraw the monies paid 
into the account. There may also be the consideration on whether the fund should be held 
by fund managers who are capable of transmitting the funds into other meaningful ventures 
thereby increasing the proceeds. These are very important steps that should be taken in line 
with the provisions of the law.   
The establishment of the Decommissioning Challenge Fund (DCF) in Scotland in 
preparation of decommissioning in the North Sea is considered to be a right step taken. The 
fund is in the tune of five million pounds and “will provide opportunities for the supply 
                                                          




chain in Scotland to benefit from the decommissioning of North Sea infrastructure”; 
“support infrastructure upgrades and innovation in salvage and transport methods at 
Scotland’s ports and harbours” and encourage engineering scoping work at key sites to 
build business cases that will attract further private investment”.82 The need for a 
decommissioning fund has currently been felt in Ghana. The Saltpond Field which turned 
out not to be viable could not be decommissioned in good time, leading to the spending of 
74,192.57 United Sates Dollars in maintenance of the field.83   
 
3.4.6 Local Content Fund  
 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 provides for the establishment of the 
Local Content Fund.84 According to the Act, the objective of establishing the fund is to 
“provide financial resources for citizens and indigenous Ghanaian companies engaged in 
petroleum activities”.85 The actualisation of the objective of the fund will require that the 
monies from the fund should be applied for some particular activities.  The Act makes 
provision of the activities which the fund can be applied to include: “education, training, 
research and development in petroleum activities for Ghanaian citizens, indigenous 
Ghanaian companies and Ghanaian institutions of learning”; and loans for small and 
medium scale enterprises to enhance their participation in petroleum activities.86  
The success of the funding for local content can only be actualised if there are resources for 
meeting the fund. The Act gives a provision of list of sources of funds for the local content 
fund. The Act particularly provides for the sources to include contributions made by 
contractors as specified in petroleum agreement; contributions made by subcontractors in 
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the sum of one per cent of the worth of the contract paid by the contractor or licensee; 
approvals made by the parliament; and grants. 
 
The Board of the Commission are required to open an account in a bank approved by the 
Controller and Accountant—General, for the payment of monies meant for the fund.87 To 
ensure the protection of the fund for being mismanaged there is a requirement for 
signatories stipulated in the Act. The signatories to the account in respect of payment made 
from the fund include the chairperson of the Board and the Chief Executive of the 
Commission; or (b) the chairperson of the Board and one other member of the Local 
Content Committee.88  
There is an arrangement made for the management of the fund. The fund is to be 
administered by the minister and the local content committee.89 The Minister and the 
agency shall be responsible for formulation of policies for generation of monies for the 
fund, determine the monetary allocation to meet the fund’s objectives and setting out 
annual targets of the fund.90  
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 provides that “The Local Content 
Committee may invest a part of the money of the Fund that it considers appropriate in the 
manner approved by the Minister and in consultation with the Minister responsible for 
Finance”.91 This will be a good step and is better than keeping the Fund redundant. 
Nevertheless, it will be better to have such funds to be kept and managed effectively by 
fund managers rather than leaving it in the hands of the local content committee which may 
lack the manpower or resources to enhance such investment.  
The accounting and auditing requirements pertaining to the local content funds is another 
important consideration that can be seen as enhancing the local content fund. It is therefore 
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required that the commission shall keep books of accounts and proper records as approved 
by the Auditor-General.92 There is the requirement for submission of the audit report to the 
Auditor-General which must be done within three months of the completion of the financial 
year and the Auditor General also has an obligation to forward the report to the Minister 
within three months of the receipt of such a report.93 There is an obligation on the 
Commission to, within one month of receipt of the report, make a report of the operation of 
the fund to the minister and it shall also include the report of the Auditor-General.94 The 
minister is required to transmit the report to parliament and include a statement, where 
necessary.95 
 
3.4.7 Environmental Fund 
 
One important development in Ghana has been the concern raised about exploitation of 
resources and their environmental imprints on the environment. The establishment of the 
environmental fund is required to be a form of environmental protection from activities 
emanating from the exploitation of petroleum resources in Ghana. This is because the 
proceeds for the fund forms part of the revenue derived because of the activities of 
petroleum exploitation. It is therefore important that the fund should be properly managed 
to ensure that the resource curse does not affect the proceeds and the disbursement of the 
fund in the event of pollution occurring. Section 24 (3) of the Petroleum Management Act 
2011 provides that “Where petroleum operations affect a community, appropriate 
compensation shall be paid for the benefit of the community in accordance with the 
relevant laws”. Where will the monies for the appropriate compensation come from? This 
remains unanswered in the law.  
Funds of this nature should be kept and managed effectively through the private sector. The 
establishment of private companies to effectively manage the proceeds of the funds is very 
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important than leaving it in the coffers of the government. Fund managers can therefore use 
the payments made into the fund to improve the capital base of the funds. The investment 
of the proceeds of the fund will bring about increase in the amount meant for the fund. The 
growth of the fund is important and thus much will be needed to be done to ensure that its 
capital base is increased.  
Other issues that should be determined will be on the kind of business ventures that the 
fund’s manager can venture into. Such funds can attract varieties of investments in various 
capital projects, they can be utilised in investment in the international bonds market, and 
real estate. It is advisable that certain amounts from the funds are kept as reserve funds and 
can be easily accessed. Private sector driven fund management is very important. 
Therefore, if Ghana is to make progress in petroleum revenue management, structural 
adjustment in the fund will be required to accommodate management of funds through 
private sector engagements that promote sustainable investment in the economy. To 
buttress the point made here, venturing into real estate will increase housing for the people 
of Ghana given that there is a housing deficit of about 1.7 million homes in Ghana.96   
It is argued that an important area which the Fund has failed to consider is the utilisation of 
its proceeds to promote renewable energy in Ghana. Renewable energy is considered to be 
environmentally friendly and with the commitments made by Ghana to promote climate 
change mitigation, it will not be out of place that the renewable energy sector benefits from 
this. For example, Poland has environmental funds and the proceeds are devoted towards 
the promotion of renewable energy. In the same vein, the United Kingdom has successfully 
established the carbon trust as a private company to manage the proceeds of the climate 
levy scheme which is a scheme that taxes carbon intensive energy companies. The proceeds 
from this fund can be offered as soft loans to investors who in turn can utilise it for the 
promotion of clean energy projects in the United Kingdom. In the United States, in the 
1980s, the United States Congress passed a law, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), which provided for the 
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establishment of a superfund to prioritise clean-ups arising from environmental pollution 
and the sources of the superfund, were drawn from crude oil and petrochemicals among 
others.97  
3.4.8 Borrowing and Securitisation 
 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 leaves some forms of ambiguity in 
the effort of parliament to ensure that accountability is guaranteed. The law provides that 
“Any borrowing exceeding the cedi equivalent of thirty million United States Dollars for 
the purpose of exploration, development and production shall be approved by Parliament 
and shall be in consonance with the PRMA, 2011 (Act 815).”98 One wonders whether the 
borrowing required here is in respect of dealings connected to the Corporation. The 
question is should it be necessary where the borrowing does not concern the Corporation? 
What if the borrowing is needed by the oil and gas company to meet its own obligation? 
The need to require approval may affect the overall interest of the exploration and 
production if parliamentary approval would have to be sought by the private sector anytime 
it intends to borrow money that exceeds the threshold of thirty million United States 
Dollars.  
 
3.4.9 Investment of Petroleum Revenue  
 
There is requirement for the investments to be made in respect of the proceeds of the funds. 
Section 27 (1) provides that “The resources of the Ghana Petroleum Funds and 
subsequently the Ghana Petroleum Wealth Fund shall be invested in qualifying instruments 
prescribed by Executive Instrument. (2) The range of instruments designated as qualifying 
instruments shall be reviewed every three years or sooner by the Minister on the advice of 
the Investment Advisory Committee”. Investment Advisory Committee is established to 
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advise the Minister on the Management of Petroleum Funds.99 It will make proposals and 
develop policies for the management of the Stabilisation Fund and the Heritage Fund 
meeting bearing in mind that the resources from which the funds are derived are utilized 
giving considerations to the future generations. The Minister therefore is to enter into 
Operations Management Agreement with Bank of Ghana under which there are avenues for 
investing the resources in the funds.100 The operation of investment will definitely involve 
the utilisation of the private sector. This therefore will require further investigation in the 
next chapter in order to consider whether the legal environment, the corporate law and 
practice in particular, is supportive of international best practices in corporate governance.  
 
3.4.10 Transparency Considerations in the Management of Petroleum Revenue 
 
Certain transparency principles have been set out in the Act. Accordingly, Section 49 (1) 
and (2) of the PRMA 2011 requires the management of petroleum revenue and savings, 
duties discharged under the law required to be executed giving regards to “the highest 
internationally accepted standards of transparency and good governance”. On the other 
hand if the information is to be such that it will prejudice the functioning of duties 
regarding the management of the petroleum funds, the Minister may, subject to 
parliamentary approval, declare the information as confidential.101 However, such 
declaration must give reasons and take “into account the principles of transparency and the 
right of the public to information”.102 The Minister is generally duty-bound to make sure 
information regarding the management of the various petroleum funds is publicized. This is 
further tightened by the provisions of section 8 which provides that: 
“(1) For the purpose of transparency and accountability, the records of petroleum receipts 
in whatever form, shall simultaneously be published by the: Minister in the Gazette and at 
least two state owned daily newspapers, within thirty calendar days after the end of the 
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applicable quarter. (2) The information required to be made public shall also be published 
online on the website of the Ministry and presented to Parliament on the date of the Gazette 
publication. (3) The Minister shall publish the total petroleum output lifted and the 
reference price in the same manner as provided in subsections (1) and (2)”. 
There is a risk that a provision in the PRMA 2011 that seeks to penalize the unlawful 
disclosure of information pertaining to the petroleum funds may promote opacity. It is 
provided that: “A person who unlawfully discloses the content document or information 
pertaining to operations of the Funds commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction leading to payment of not less than two hundred and fifty thousand penalty units 
or to a term of imprisonment of not less than seven years or to both”.103 This is further 
complicated by the fact that the PRMA 2011 does not seem to provide for what constitutes 
unlawful disclosure of information.  
In connection with the resource curse is the need for transparency and accountability in 
petroleum revenues. The PRMA 2011 gives detailed consideration for transparency and 
accountability. The Act requires proper books of account should be kept of the various 
Funds.104 Therefore there are provisions for internal and external audit of the account of 
these funds. The internal audit is carried out by the Internal Audit Department of the Bank 
of Ghana, while the Governor of the Bank makes a report to the Minister or any other 
person required by the law to receive such reports.105 On the other hand, the Auditor 
General has the responsibility of conducting an external audit either directly or by way of 
delegation.106 There is an obligation on the Bank of Ghana to submit to the Auditor General 
within a period of three months after the end of the financial year, financial statements and 
other documents which are relevant to the petroleum sector for audit.107 The Auditor 
General shall thereafter within three months of receipt of the financial statements and 
relevant documents submit an audit report to Parliament.108 The Auditor General is required 
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to determine whether the accounts were properly kept; payments due and disbursements 
from the Petroleum Funds were duly made; and the management of the funds are according 
to the Act and shall also bring to the notice of the parliament irregularities discovered.109 A 
publication of the report within thirty days of submission of the report to the Parliament 
must be made.110 There is provision for special audit as recommended by Section 47 of the 
Act which provides that: “the Auditor General may carry out special audits or reviews of 
the Petroleum Funds in the public interest and shall submit reports on audit or review 
undertaken”. There is also the obligation that requires the minister to prepare annual reports 
on the fund as part of presentation to parliament during presentation of budget statements 
and economic policies to parliament.111 The reports should contain relevant documents and 
information on the funds which should be prepared in a manner that it can be easily 
disseminated to the public.112  
The PIAC monitors and evaluates compliance with PRMA. It provides the platform for the 
engagement of the public in the management of petroleum revenue and independently 
assesses the use of petroleum revenue. It assists the executive and parliament in the 
discharge of their oversight functions in relations to the various funds established under the 
PRMA 2011.113 It is required to carry out wide consultations on the management of 
petroleum revenue in line with best practices.114  The reporting requirement of the 
committee is explicitly provided in Section 56 which provides that “The Accountability 
Committee shall (a) publish a semi-annual report and an annual report in at least two state 
owned national daily newspapers by the 15th of September and 15th of March each year; 
(b) publish the reports on the Accountability Committee's website; (c) hold public meetings 
twice each year to report on its mandate to the general public, and (d) submit a copy of its 
semi-annual report and annual report to the President and to Parliament”. 
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The absence of public scrutiny will always give room for poor allocation of the 
resources.115 The PIAC is responsible for the promotion of revenue transparency in the oil 
and gas industry. It is required to bring to the attention of the public and government 
activities that are connected to revenue generation and management. There is a duty to 
produce periodic reports and also publish findings in national dailies.  
The PIAC recently had to intervene to request that the Corporation should cease spending 
monies on the nonviable Saltpond Field that already gulped US$74,192.57 between January 
and June 2017.116 Situations like these can be seen as undermining the need for judicious 
use of petroleum revenue. There is therefore no justification to support a waste of such a 
huge amount by the corporation. Accordingly the PIAC maintained that “the continuous 
use of oil revenues in the payment of emoluments of redundant staff, coupled with 
maintenance-related costs of the facilities offshore, is a drain which must not be allowed to 
continue, and that “the continued use of oil revenues to cater for an idle field did not reflect 
judicious use of the resources and has, therefore, recommended to the GNPC to speed up 
efforts to completely decommission the plant”.117 This situation practically demonstrates 
that supervisory agencies should always be vigilant in ensuring that the actions of the 
officials in the public and private sectors are conducted with the interest of the preservation 
of the petroleum revenue of the state. 
3.4.11 Sanctions Promoting Revenue Management   
 
The breach of a legal duty may attract punishment. The law in Ghana attempts to create 
some forms of punishment that can be used to checkmate the leakages of revenue that 
accrues to the government from petroleum operations. The PRMA also provides for 
penalties for defaulting entities that are required to make payment into the fund.  It provides 
that “Where the liability of an entity to make a payment is not discharged on or before the 
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due date, the entity shall pay as a penalty, an additional five percent of the original amount 
for each day of default or the default rate established under any other law, whichever is 
higher”.118 Section 58 (1) provides for a fine of not less than five hundred penalty units or  
imprisonment of not less than fifteen years or both, for misappropriation of the petroleum 
Funds, defrauding, and attempt to defraud or conspiracy in defrauding in relation to the 
Petroleum Funds or “uses, attempts to use or conspires with another person to use 
information on the Petroleum Funds or documents relating to the Petroleum Funds for 
personal benefit or advantage or for the personal advantage or benefit of another person”.119 
A person who is convicted of abetting the commission of the offence will be fined not less 
than fifty thousand penalty units or minimum of imprisoned for a period of 7 years or 
both.120  
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 provides that a person who obstructs 
the corporation, contractors and subcontractors or their agent and employees in the 
discharge of their obligations under the Act will be liable upon summary conviction to pay 
a fine “not less than one thousand penalty units and not more than ten thousand penalty 
units and, where the offence continues, to a fine of not more than one thousand penalty 
units for each day during which the offence continues or to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than one year and not more than three years or to both”.121  
 
Where petroleum activities are carried out in a manner that contravenes the law, a “fine of 
not less than ten thousand penalty units and not more than fifty thousand penalty units and, 
where the offence continues, to a fine of not more than one thousand penalty units for each 
day during which the offence continues or to a term of imprisonment of not less than one 
year and not more than three years or to both” upon a summary conviction of such a 
person.122 A look at these provisions will reveal that they apply to activities touching on the 
accrual of revenue to the state for petroleum operations. However, there appears to be 
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provisions that tend to exculpate the company from corporate criminal liability. This is seen 
in Section 93(2) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 that provides that 
where there are breaches in respect of the above offences by a corporate entity or 
partnership, the “director or officer of that corporate body or partnership or any person 
concerned with the management of the firm shall be deemed to have committed the 
offence”.123 This concept negates the established and growing notion of corporate liability 
in criminal matters. 
 
In addition to such penalties, the corporation should also be made to bear some form of 
penalty. This will project corporate governance and will cause shareholders to ensure that 
their investments are not exposed to risks owing to the activities of the officers of the 
companies. Developed countries have successfully demonstrated that firms can be made to 
be criminally liable for corporate complicities. The United States imposed a fine of 500 
million United States Dollars on GlaxoSmithKline upon conviction for corruption 
committed in China.124 Siemens was made to make a settlement of 800 United States 
Dollars because the managers were implicated in bribery scandals.125 
 
Other forms of penalties for offences also exist such as engaging in petroleum exploration 
and production without the existence of a petroleum agreement will attract a fine of “not 
less than four hundred thousand penalty units and not more than five hundred thousand 
penalty units”.126 The assignment of a petroleum agreement without approval of the 
minister will attract a “fine of not less than one hundred thousand penalty units and not 
more than two hundred thousand penalty units”.127 Even in respect of payment of annual 
fees, penalties are imposed for the delay. It is provided in the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act 2016 that failure to pay  “annual fees in respect of the acreage to which the 
petroleum agreement relates” will attract an “administrative penalty of five per cent of the 
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annual fee for each day of the first thirty days after the annual fee becomes due in addition 
to the outstanding annual fee” and if it persists after the thirty day period, a pay of  
administrative penalty of one hundred thousand penalty units in addition to the outstanding 
annual fee must be made to the Commission.128 These provisions, if effectively 
implemented can be said to be capable of ensuring that there are no revenue leakages in the 
oil and gas industry and those found wanting are penalised accordingly. The provision of 
the need to supply information required to the commission can have a far-reaching 
implication of enhancing that there is compliance with information that should ideally 
guarantee the transparent management of revenues that are to accrue to the state. It is 
provided that noncompliance of an oil company “with a request to provide information 
under this Act within the period specified in the request, shall pay to the Commission an 
administrative penalty of ten thousand penalty units in the first instance and a further 
penalty of ten per cent of the penalty for each day that the information is not provided”.129 
Criminality pertaining to the natural resources value chain touches on different stakeholders 
which could even be public officers, private sector, individuals, and civil societies and can 
also transcend national boundaries.130  
 
Infractions can be validly challenged and corrected if the above provisions are taken into 
account. Infractions have been observed in the operation of the PRMA. Despite the 
provisions, there are still some considerable infractions.  For example, for the year 2011, 
there was infractions on the function of the Auditor General regarding audit and report to 
parliament within a period of three months upon receipt of financial statement in 
accordance with Section 45 (1) of the Act which requires the Auditor General to audit and 
to submit to Parliament a report not later than three months after the receipt of the financial 
statements and other relevant documents from the Bank of Ghana.131 In 2014, it was found 
that ABFA funds covered very wide areas thereby not giving room for effective impacts of 
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the developmental projects on the economy.132 It was observed that there was no utilisation 
of 55% of the total ABFA allocation, and the monies were mopped up by the Bank of 
Ghana by the end of 2015.133 The percentage earmarked for Agriculture from the ABFA 
was 11% of for the years 2011-2015.134 For 2016 only few projects benefited from ABFA 
allocations, thereby covering limited priority areas.135  
 
It was reported that the since February 2013, Oranto/Stone Energy has not taken steps in 
honouring payment of surface rental standing to the tune of US$67,438.36 as at the time of 
the preparation of 2016 report by PIAC.136  It is reported that “only 36.73% of the total 
ABFA spent in 2017 went into capital expenditure. This is less than the 70% prescribed by 
the PRMA and is in violation” of the PRMA, while 63.27% was used for goods and 
services in contravention of Section 21 of the PRMA.137 Similar contravention was 
recorded in 2018 report where 50.87 percent was spent on goods and services violating the 
requirements for capital expenditure for 70%.138 There was no payment made for gas 
receipts into the Petroleum Holding Fund thereby breaching Section 3 of the PRMA.139 
Surface rentals due to be paid by Brittania-U, Sahara Energy and Swiss African Oil 
Company Ltd remained outstanding as reported in 2018 PIAC annual report.140  No 
allocation was also made for GIIF in 2018 thereby violating the PRMA that requires that “a 
maximum of 25 percent of the amount allocated for Public Investment Expenditure under 
the ABFA shall be allocated to the Fund for the purpose of infrastructure development”.141 
For the year 2018, “50.9 percent of the actual ABFA was spent on recurrent expenditure, 
while 49.1 percent was on public investment”. There was also no payment made into the 
Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF). 
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The focus of this research is on petroleum resources conversion for sustainable 
management of petroleum revenue in Ghana. There are provisions of the law in Ghana that 
are geared towards harnessing of the revenue from petroleum exploration and production. 
The law has set out parameters for the management of the resources through the creation of 
transparency and accountability measures and other provisions pointing towards the 
sustainable management of petroleum resources. The conclusion of this chapter is that 
extractive-led development of the oil and gas industry in Ghana must be balanced by 
sustainability that takes into account how best the revenues are also managed after 
extraction. It has been posited that “the operation and management of O&G [oil and gas] 
resources in a company or government organization is no doubt a difficult and sophisticated 
undertaking. It usually entails a myriad of factors, uncertainties and risks. Decision-makers’ 
options are contingent on the various conditions and limitations covering local–global, 
technical, commercial and social issues”.142 It follows that there are series of variables that 
will come into play to determine how law on sustainable management of petroleum revenue 
and the overall goal of the government to ensure that there is the enabling environment for 
such. Bearing in mind the argument offered in this chapter the next chapter will examine 
the environment and context in which the management of petroleum revenue is carried out 
in Ghana.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT LAW FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to further contextualise the petroleum revenue management 
law in view of the legal environment within which the law operates. It seeks to answer the 
question on the enabling environment that should be in place for promotion of 
transparency, accountability and sustainability in the management of petroleum revenue in 
Ghana. More so, the discourse on the resource curse thesis has been developed from 
different dimensional perspectives which are as follows: economic, political, social and 
environmental dimensions. Many factors will therefore demonstrate whether a country will 
be able to combat the resource course syndrome. Studies have been conducted to 
demonstrate that the resource curse phenomenon occurs in different facets. It has been 
found that in most cases, the existence of abundant mineral resources in states does not 
translate into wealth that will result in economic transformation of the states. This 
presumption about the resource curse is rebuttable, depending on the legal context and the 
best practices in a country.  
In the earlier part of the research, it was demonstrated that the democratic culture of a 
country affects the way the natural resources are managed. In a dictatorial regime, there is 
the tendency that the rule of law may not be observed and the resources of the state will be 
controlled by the few. Democratic governances are not much usually attributes of 
petroleum producing states.1 It is therefore relevant here to examine the democratic context 
that supports the natural resources management in Ghana.  
Like most African countries, Ghana which was formerly known as Gold Coast was 
colonised. Ghana was a British Colony until it gained independence in 1957. Ghana has 
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experienced military intervention with the ousting of President Kwame Nkrumah. The 
incursion of the military into politics further adversely affected full participation of the 
people in governance. Ghana, however, returned to civilian rule between 1969 and 1972 
and from 1979 to 1981, the military took over power again. The year 1992 marked a 
turnaround with political reform.2 The constitution currently in operation in Ghana is the 
1992 Constitution. Ghana has now evolved into a democratic state which saw the then 
military regime under J. J. Rawlings metamorphosing into a civilian government in 1993.  
Till date the democratic culture in Ghana has developed and what made Ghana unique 
among other African countries is that oil discovery in Ghana was made in the era of 
democracy. Therefore, there was room for democracy to play a lead role in the 
development of the oil and gas sector by ensuring that there is a proper management of the 
petroleum resources to avoid the resource curse in Ghana. This position has support in what 
Kan-Dapaah described as while observing that the reform in the late eighties and early 
nineties was that of good governance agitation and which emphasised “human rights, media 
freedom, law and order, personal liberties and parliamentary democracy”, the trend now 
presents new forms of challenges that are reflected in the need to firstly curb government’s 
excesses; secondly, ensuring transparency; thirdly enhancing participation and inclusion in 
governance and  finally financial accountability in the public sector.3 How well this is 
achieved in Ghana as far as the oil and gas industry is concerned will depend on the 
national legal architecture. Therefore, the law making process in Ghana should afford 
opportunity for the oil revenue management to be reactive democratic support and that the 
voice of the people or the majority is taken care of whilst the needs of the minorities are not 
ignored. The law-making process in Ghana may be by legislative or executive initiative and 
may even be canvassed by civil liberty organisations.  
The operation of democratic principles in Ghana is rooted in the observance of the rule of 
law and following due process in the law. The Supreme Court of Ghana was quite assertive 
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on this point where in the case of Amidu v President Kufuor,4 Justice Adjabeng held that: 
“The Constitution makes it clear that everybody in this country, including His Excellency, 
the President, is under the Constitution and the law. This clearly is what we mean by the 
rule of law. It is heartening that governance by the rule of law is one of the cornerstones of 
the policies of the present government. And I have no doubt that adherence to this policy 
will indeed bring about real democracy in this country and therefore real freedom, justice 
and prosperity.” Therefore, it is imperative that the orders laid down by the courts are 
complied with and enforced accordingly owing to a clear democratic culture. In Republic v 
High Court, Accra; Ex parte Afoda,5 Adzoe JSC held that “Compliance with the orders of 
the courts is the only sure route to public order and peace which we need to sustain a stable 
democratic social order.” Broadly speaking, a democratic governance system will be such 
that there is “exercise of the powers of government under conditions where there is the 
existence and observance of freedom of speech and expression; freedom of association and 
movement; rule of law; free flow of information, citizen’s uninhibited involvement in 
politics; fair and objective administration of the law; as well as favourable conditions for 
private enterprise”.6 Good governance will require set of laid down rules embedded in the 
laws to create the transparency and accountability required.7  
In the light of the current democratic practices in Ghana, this chapter seeks to examine the 
environment in which the relevant laws on petroleum revenue management for sustainable 
development and avoidance of the resource curse will be implemented. Therefore it 
assesses the interaction of the petroleum laws in the legal context of Ghana. The selected 
parameters of this are examined to include right to information; enabling environment for 
civil societies; judicial review; anticorruption laws; prosecution of corruption; corporate 
governance practices; and fiscal stability regime in petroleum revenue management. 
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4.2 RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT  
 
Unless there is free flow of information, the chances of promotion of transparency in oil 
and gas revenue management will be slim. There should be adequate information on receipt 
and distribution of oil revenue of the state. The well-informed citizens can deter the 
government from mismanagement of resources.8 The Constitution of Ghana 1992 provides 
for right to information. It is contained in the constitution under Article 21 (1) (f) that “All 
persons shall have the right to information subject to such qualifications and laws as are 
necessary in a democratic society”.  
The promulgation of freedom of information law in Ghana has been a major concern until 
its passage in 2019, after about 20 years.  No doubt as demonstrated in chapter two of the 
thesis, there are avenues for Ghana to benefit from the promotion of information 
dissemination pertaining to petroleum revenue management. There are the requirements to 
publish information and reports on petroleum revenue management in Ghana but there may 
be challenges if the government failed to carry out such a task. The people want to know 
what their stake is in the natural resources they own as being managed for them by the 
government.9 The question will be how the government can be compelled to do so within 
the framework of the legal system of the country. It will ordinarily be expected that 
administrative remedies may be sought in Ghana relying on reliefs such as the order of 
mandamus and certiorari. The implication is that that the usual court system would have to 
be approached to enforce the obligation. This is usually required through the order of 
mandamus. The key concern will be that it becomes difficult for one to enforce such rights 
when one cannot directly demonstrate that there is a legal right or the person will be 
affected by the rights sought to be demonstrated. The Right to Information Act 2019 is a 
welcome development. Under the Act in Section 1, it is provided that “a person has a right 
of access to information”. This is the reinforcement of the provisions of the constitution but 
it is necessary that the machineries be put in place to create an avenue for the citizens to 
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access the information following laid down procedures. For example, in Section 18(1) of 
the Act it is provided that: 
 “An application to access information held by a public institution shall (a) be made in 
writing to the public institution; (b) contain sufficient description or particulars to enable 
the information to be identified, (c) indicate the form and manner of access required, (d) 
state the capacity of the applicant to the satisfaction of the information officer to whom the 
application is made, if the application is made on behalf of another person, (e) state the 
name of the applicant, an address to which a communication or notice can be sent (f) 
provide identification of the applicant; and (g) be signed by the applicant.” 
Lack of information on receipt and on fund management is the bane of corruption.10 Timely 
implementation of the Act will set in motion how the citizens can request for information 
on petroleum revenue management or on the amount of revenue under the watch of the 
agencies of the government. Passage of the Act is expected to have positive impact on 
transparency in petroleum revenue collection and management in Ghana. 
4.3 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETIES AND POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM  
 
In a democratic set up, diverse interests will need to be accommodated. The governance of 
the state must take into cognizance that civil societies and other forms of NGO should have 
a say in matters that touch on the socio-political and economic circumstances of the state. 
The role of civil societies cannot be overemphasized as most of them are engaged in the 
task of serving as watch dogs, ensuring accountability and transparency. Activities of civil 
society will be to ensure that the government account for the revenue it is generating from 
oil and gas. The demands for information on receipts and disbursement of petroleum 
revenue are brought to the notice of the public through the civil societies. In a democratic 
setting, civil societies should be given latitude of freedom to operate. Their ability to 
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effectively operate will definitely have an impact on the way the government allocates and 
manages the revenue from oil. The bases for the existence of the civil societies in Ghana 
are rooted in the constitution which creates the enabling environment for them to operate. 
Human rights under the constitution of Ghana provides for the establishment of civil 
societies organisations and gives room for them to make protest or create public 
enlightenment on the activities of the government on the management of petroleum 
revenue. These rights, some of which may be relevant to the environment and petroleum 
revenue management in Ghana are as follows: “freedom of speech and expression, which 
shall include freedom of the press and other media” “freedom of thought, conscience and 
belief, which shall include academic freedom” ; “freedom of assembly including freedom 
to take part in processions and demonstrations”;  “freedom of association, which shall 
include freedom to form or join trade unions or other associations, national and 
international, for the protection of their interest”; “information, subject to such 
qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic, society”.11 It provided that  “All 
citizens shall have the right and freedom to form or join political parties and to participate 
in political activities subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a free and 
democratic society and are consistent with this Constitution”.12 “Every worker has a right to 
form or join a trade union of his choice for the promotion and protection of his economic 
and social interests”.13 The rights of civil societies appear to have been guaranteed under 
these provisions. This should give rise to the participation of the people in the decision 
making process regarding revenue allocation and management for sustainable development.   
Developing my assertion further, the right of association has been judicially tested in Ghana 
in the case of Mensima v Attorney-General14 and New Patriotic Party v Inspector General 
of Police.15 In New Patriotic Party, a registered political party obtained a permit from the 
police to stage a rally but the permit was withdrawn. The party carried out a peaceful 
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demonstration protesting against the budget of the government without obtaining permit. 
The protesters were eventually dispersed and those arrested were charged before the court 
for protesting without validly obtaining police permit contrary to the Public Order Decree, 
1972.16 The next day was meant to mark the rally for commemoration of the death of J. B. 
Danquah-Adu, a leading politician in Ghana, and the permit which was previously granted 
by the police was withdrawn. There was a challenge before the court to the effect that the 
withdrawal and the provisions of the Public Order granting unfettered powers to the 
minister of interior and the police to restrict demonstrations and rallies were inconsistent 
with the provisions of the constitution guaranteeing freedom of assembly under Article 
21(1)(d). The defence counsel on the other hand quoting Article 21(4) of the constitution 
stated that: 
Nothing in, or done under the authority of, a law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with, or in contravention of, this article to the extent that the 
law in question makes provision – (c) for the imposition of restrictions 
that are reasonably required in the interest of defence, public safety, 
public health or the running of essential services, on the movement or 
residence within Ghana of any person or persons generally, or any class 
of persons; or… 
 
However, the Supreme Court upheld plaintiff’s argument in this case and held that the 
provisions of the Public Order Decree were in violation of Article 21(1)(d) of the 
Constitution. This decision therefore creates an avenue for civil society organisations to 
continue to act as watchdogs in the management of petroleum revenue to promote 
accountability and transparency. In the words of the court as enunciated by Hayfron-
Benjamin JSC: 
 
It will be noted that for the first time in the history of our constitutional 
development, article 21 (1) (d) of the Constitution, 1992 provides for the 
right of the citizen to demonstrate...Once again, whereas in the former 
Constitutions the citizen was not to be ‘hindered’ in the enjoyment of his 
fundamental freedoms, in the Constitution, 1992 there is a ‘right’ 
conferred on the citizen in the enjoyment of his freedoms. This positive 
attitude towards the enjoyment of the freedoms cannot be abridged by a 
                                                          




law which prevents the citizen from delivering his protest even to the seat 
of government.17    
 
The PRMA 2011 accommodates the civil societies and some specific associations through 
their appointment as members of the Public Interest Accountability Committee. According 
to the provisions of the Act the following are listed as members:18 
(a)  a member to represent independent policy research think tanks nominated by the 
think-tanks 
 (b) a member to represent civil-society organisations and community-based organisations 
nominated by civil society,  
(c)  a member each nominated by the  
(i)  Trade Union Congress, 
 (ii)  National House of Chiefs,  
(iii)  Association of Queen Mothers,  
(iv)      Association of Ghana Industries and Chamber of Commerce,  
(v)  Ghana Journalists Association, 
(vi)  Ghana Bar Association,  
(vii)      Institute of Chartered Accountants,  
(viii)    Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; and  
(ix)  Christian groups namely the National Catholic Secretariat, the Christian Council 
and the Ghana Pentecostal Council on a rotational basis,  
(x)       the Federation of Muslim Councils and Ahmadiyya Mission on a rotational basis, 
and  
(xi)  Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
 
Looking at the object for the establishment of the Accountability Committee, it is expected 
that it will “provide space and platform for the public to debate whether spending prospects 
and management use of revenues conform to development priorities...” There is room for 
public engagement in that regard, and the civil society can mobilize to achieve their 
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mandate which could be in relation to transparency and accountability in the management 
of petroleum revenue.  
The law also gives the Accountability Committee the power to engage in consultations 
which could include the engaging with civil society and other non-state actors. It is 
provided in the Act that “To achieve its objects, the Accountability Committee shall (a) 
consult widely on best practice related to management and use of petroleum revenues…”19  
Connected to this as shown above is that citizens and civil society organisations should be 
free to express their minds on the management and governance of their resources. The 
Supreme Court has on many occasions expressed the important role of the freedom of 
expression. Recently, it lent its voice when it held in the case of Ghana Independent 
Broadcasters Association v Attorney General and Another20 that: “The Constitution is thus 
a moribund document without the freedom of expression which enables people to talk 
about infractions thereof and to go to court to seek redress. Thus, for democracy to thrive 
and survive, nothing should be done to stifle this freedom except where the person is said to 
have gone beyond legitimate boundaries prescribed by the Constitution itself or any other 
law which is not inconsistent with the Constitution”. With the freedom of expression, the 
people are able to express their views on whether a party in power has been able to make 
meaningful contribution to the economy by pointing out their strength or weaknesses.21  
In New Patriotic Party v Ghana Broadcasting Corporation,22 the failure of the Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation to grant broadcasting rights to the political party to give an 
opinion on the national budget was considered to be in breach of article 55 of the 
Constitution that made provisions for “fair opportunity to all political parties to present 
their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media”. 
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A look at the fundamental rights provisions as they pertain to civil societies will indicate 
that the civil societies in Ghana, political parties and the media have a role to play in the 
management of petroleum revenue in Ghana by ensuring that there is compliance with the 
law and also making a case for revenue management in a sustainable manner. Even when 
the law is complied with, civil societies can continue to canvass for a more efficient 
management in line with international best practices. The next section which is on judicial 
review of administrative and legislative actions further shows their relevance.  
4.4 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN GHANA AND PETROLEUM REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT  
The role of the courts is important for the sustainable management of oil revenue. The 
courts may be approached by litigants to assert that they have a right against the state or 
even compel the state to discharge their duties according to the dictates of the law. The 
executive arm of the government has responsibility for the management of the petroleum 
resources of the state. The basis for this is in Article 58(1) of the Constitution which 
provides that “The executive authority of Ghana shall vest in the President and shall be 
exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”.  
It provides further in Article 58(2) that: “The executive authority of Ghana shall extend to 
the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and all laws made under or continued in 
force by this Constitution”. The exercise of the functions is either directly by the president 
or through his subordinate officers as provided for in Article 58(3). By implication, 
ministers, public officers in the civil or public service form the executive arm, the Bank of 
Ghana, Ghana Revenue Authority, Ghana Petroleum Commission and other appointees of 
the president in relation to revenue management in Ghana are deemed as public officers 
who are to act within the confines of the constitution of Ghana and other laws that are not 
in contravention of the constitution. 
The management of petroleum revenue in Ghana will benefit from the courts most 
especially as there is democracy in the land and the court will be carrying out the task for 
interpretation of the law and ensuring that the rights of persons or the discharge of duties by 




on the need for constitutionalism in Ghana. It is provided that: “A person who alleges that – 
(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other 
enactment; or (b) any act or omission of any person, is inconsistent with, or is in 
contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court 
for a declaration to that effect”. 
Furthermore, under Article 33(1) “Where a person alleges that a provision of this 
Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is 
likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that 
is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress”. 
According to Article 33 (2) “The High Court may, under clause (1) of this article, issue 
such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, 
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the 
purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions on the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person, concerned is 
entitled”. 
Furthermore, it is provided in Article 23 that “Administrative bodies and administrative 
officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them 
by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right 
to seek redress before a court or other tribunal”. Acts of administrative bodies are subject to 
review by the courts of the land. Their actions must conform to fairness and justice. The 
Supreme Court of Ghana clearly emphasises these elements in the case of Aboagye v 
Ghana Commercial Bank Ltd.23 
The activities of the officers may therefore be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The 
instruments for review will be through the following: Mandamus-A government agency is 
mandated to carry out a duty imposed on it by law. What the order of mandamus does is to 
ensure that the officers of the various government agencies are compelled to carry out a 
legal duty. Where a public officer declines or refuses to carry out a legal duty, an action can 
                                                          




be brought by an aggrieved party to compel him/her to carry out the duty. Certiorari-It is 
used in quashing an order of the court which is considered to have been breached without 
following the law. In orders reached that are ultra vires an officer or the agency are brought 
before the court to quash them.24 The attempt to utilize petroleum revenue for a purpose 
which the law has not earmarked it for will fall under such an example where a person or 
even civil society organizations may seek action to quash the action. There may also be an 
injunctive remedy. An injunction can be sought to forestall the carrying out of an act.  
The doctrine of locus standi is premised on the proposition that only persons who have an 
interest in a matter or the capacity to bring an action can approach the court. By the 
existence of such doctrine the court operates as a gate keeper against frivolous actions. In 
essence, the court should not be bothered by unnecessary proceedings that lead to 
congestion of dockets. The doctrine is a well-founded doctrine established under the 
common law and has been widely applied to stop litigants. Ghana is a common law 
country, and locus standi therefore is an applicable legal principle in Ghana. The major 
contention is that application of the doctrine may operate as a bar to the effective petroleum 
revenue management in Ghana because the promotion of rule of law, good governance in 
the oil and gas sector in Ghana may require the citizens’ vigilance to ensure transparency 
and accountability in the management of the country’s oil wealth. The powers of judicial 
review enable the court to arrive at a decision and even mandate enforcement.25  
Ghanaian cases such as Tuffour v Attorney General26 and Sam (No 2) v Attorney General27 
are illustrative of the application of the doctrine of locus standi in Ghana. Thus, citizens 
may approach the court for accountability of the oil revenue. They may approach the court 
to challenge the way and manner in which the revenue is being managed. The question then 
is to what extent can a citizen of Ghana, for example, bring an action to restrict the Bank of 
Ghana from investing the government funds into a certain portfolio? This can only be 
possible if it can be accommodated under the doctrine of locus standi, which largely 
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depends on the attitude of the court. The first consideration here will be to look into the 
relevant provisions of the law to see if this can be possible.  
In Sam (No 2) v Attorney General28 the court was of the view that in fundamental rights 
cases, the citizens of Ghana are handicapped in bringing an action until they can show that 
their interest will be affected.29 There should rather be much of a liberal approach to the 
doctrine of locus standi. The trend now is to support a liberal approach to the doctrine as 
seen in common law countries. The decision of the Kenyan High Court in Albert Ruturi & 
Another v. Minister for Finance and Others30 is quite instructive here: 
We state with firm conviction that as part of the reasonable, fair and just 
procedure to uphold constitutional guarantees, the right of access to 
justice entails a liberal approach to the question of locus standi. 
Accordingly, in constitutional questions, human rights cases, and public 
interest litigation and class actions, the ordinary rule of Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence, that action can be brought only by a person to whom legal 
injury is caused, must be departed from. In these types of cases, any 
person or social groups, acting in good faith, can approach the Court 
seeking judicial redress for a legal injury caused or threatened to be 
caused to a defined class of persons represented. 
 
A more liberal approach to standing will contribute to the role of civil society organisations 
approaching the courts to make a case for the people on matters that border on revenue 
from oil. For example, residents in the Western Region are advocating a share in the 
petroleum revenue, and there is possibility that in future the courts may be approached to 
define the rights of these locals to more benefits relying on international instruments or 
even making a case for sustainable development as being a customary international law.31  
In Chapter One of this thesis, the case of Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development 
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Company32 was mentioned to the effect that the Federal High Court in Nigeria found that 
laws permitting the flaring of gas amounts to a breach of right to life and healthy 
environment guaranteed under the Nigerian constitution and African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights.  
 
In the same vein, the case of Socio-Economic Rights Accountability Project (SERAP) v 
Federal Republic of Nigeria33 that was brought before the Economic Community for West 
Africa (ECOWAS) Court further confirms that civil society actors can bring an action 
against the government to hold it accountable to the wrong done to the citizens in oil 
producing states living in abject poverty. The Nigerian government and its national oil 
company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) and other multinational oil 
companies were brought before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice for “violation 
of the right to adequate standard of living, including the right to food, to work, to health, to 
water, to life and human dignity, to a clean and healthy environment; and to economic and 
social development”. The case has received much international recognition. It may 
therefore not be out of place to see a situation where it may be argued that the regions 
where exploration and production is taking place should have a fair share of the petroleum 
revenue allocated specifically for their development.  
 
Therefore, a case for right to healthy environment and right to life can be made as basis for 
the support for allocation of petroleum revenues for environmental remediation and for the 
benefits of the locals where exploration and production is taking place in Ghana. The 
support for the development of renewable energy from oil proceeds to achieve sustainable 
development in Ghana may be justified by relying on right to life. Interestingly, the 
Supreme Court of India in the case of Hindustan Zinc Limited v. Rajasthan Electricity 
Regulatory Commission34 recently made a pronouncement supporting a law which provides 
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that electricity companies should utilise a specified percentage of renewable energy as part 
of their energy supply mix. The court grounded its reasons in the right to life and the right 
to healthy environment. 
4.5 GHANA ANTICORRUPTION LAWS AND INTERACTION WITH 
PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT   
At this point of the research, it is important to give a consideration to the general 
anticorruption regime in Ghana because it is within the framework of such environment 
that official corruption in relation to petroleum revenue management can be assessed. In 
chapter two of the thesis, the penal sanctions contained in the relevant provisions of the 
petroleum laws were discussed. It is contended here that the offences defined and penalized 
under the laws as indicated in chapter two of the thesis may not act in isolation as some 
actions inimical to the management of petroleum revenue can be punished as well under 
other laws that may not have a direct connection with the petroleum industry.  
The first consideration for corrupt practices in Ghana has been set out in the Constitution of 
Ghana 1992 as contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy under Article 35(8) 
which states that “The State shall take steps to eradicate corrupt practices and abuse of 
power”.  Whilst there is the contentious issues regarding the justifiability or otherwise of 
the directive principles, it cannot be ruled out completely as it forms part of the aspiration 
of any civilized government that will want to address the problem of corruption which is 
inherent in countries infected by the Dutch disease of resource curse syndrome. Private 
sector may influence officials to be corrupt.35  
A series of laws have been passed in Ghana for checking corrupt practices. It is opined that 
these laws will have an impact on the petroleum revenue management and promote 
sustainability in so far as they are accommodated in the framework for petroleum revenue 
governance in Ghana. There is the Code of Conduct for Public Officers as provided under 
the constitution of Ghana. This Code, if effectively implemented, will have a far-reaching 
effect on petroleum revenue management. Accordingly, the officers to which the code of 
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conduct applies to include; the President, Vice-President; Speaker; Deputy Speaker, 
members of Parliament; Ministers of State or Deputy Ministers; the Chief Justice, Justices 
of the Superior Court of Judicature, Chairmen of Regional Tribunals, the Commissioner for 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice and his Deputies and all judicial officers; 
Ambassadors or High Commissioners; the Secretary to the Cabinet; the Head of a Ministry 
or government department or equivalent office in the Civil Service; a chairman, managing 
director, general manager and departmental head of a public corporation or company in 
which the State has a controlling interest; and “such officers in the public service and any 
other public institution as Parliament may prescribe”.36  
The inclusion of “such officers in the public service and any other public institution as 
Parliament may prescribe” obviously sets out that the list is not exhaustive and the 
legislative arm of government can from time to time expand the list. The key officials 
involved in petroleum revenue management in Ghana fall under this heading. For example, 
the Minister for Finance, the Minister for Energy, the Heads of the respective agencies such 
as the Petroleum Commission, the Ghana National Petroleum Company etc. are public 
officers within the scope of the Act.  
On conflict of interest, it is provided that: “A public officer shall not put himself in a 
position where his personal interest conflicts or is likely to conflict with the performance of 
the functions of his office”.37 This implies that officers that have a role to play in petroleum 
revenue management should do so in such a way that there is no conflict of interest in the 
discharge of their duties.  
There is an obligation imposed on all public officers to declare their assets. Therefore they 
are required by the constitution to “submit to the Auditor-General a written declaration of 
all property or assets owned by, or liabilities owed by” them directly or indirectly before 
assumption of office, also at the end of every four years and by the end of their tenure in 
office.38 Where the public officer fails to disclose his assets or knowingly makes false 
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declaration, it shall amount to a contravention of the provisions of the Constitution.39 
Where assets and liabilities have been declared accordingly and subsequent assets acquired 
by the public officer cannot be attributed to “income, gift, loan, inheritance or any other 
reasonable source’ it would be taken to be in contravention to the constitution”.40 
The provisions of Article 287(1) of the Constitution provides that “An allegation that a 
public officer has contravened or has not complied with a provision of this Chapter shall be 
made to the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice and, in the case of 
the Commissioner of Human Rights and Administrative Justice, to the Chief Justice who 
shall, unless the person concerned makes a written admission of the contravention or non-
compliance, cause the matter to be investigated”. There appears to be a lacuna in that 
Article 287(2) “The Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice or the 
Chief Justice as the case may be, may take such action as he considers appropriate in 
respect of the results of the investigation or the admission”.41 The use of the clause “may 
take such action as he considers appropriate”, leaves the Commissioner for Human Rights 
and Administrative with wide discretion. What he considers appropriate may not be in the 
interest of petroleum revenue management. A better approach would have been for the 
constitution to provide for, once a prima facie case is established from the investigation that 
the Commission shall recommend for appropriate measures such as a further forensic audit 
or even prosecution of the officer implicated. This, however, appeared to have been saved 
by the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act 199342 which places 
on the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice the duty to investigate 
corruption, “allegations that a public officer has contravened or has not complied with a 
provision of Chapter Twenty-four (Code of Conduct for Public Officers) of the 
Constitution”; to investigate “instances of alleged or suspected corruption, and the 
misappropriation of public moneys by an official and to take appropriate steps, including 
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reports to the Attorney- General and the Auditor-General, resulting from that 
investigation”.43  
Having set the scene it is the contention of this thesis that there is a body of laws that is 
geared towards addressing corrupt practices in Ghana which may impact on petroleum 
revenue. Whilst it is not the focus of this thesis to embark on an in-depth analyses of every 
law on corruption in terms of their content and scope, it will be apposite at this section to 
demonstrate that beyond the checks on petroleum revenue as examined in Chapter two of 
the research, there are other laws that may be invoked and they have implications to 
revenue management.  
There is the Criminal Offences Act, 1960: This law provides for a wide range of offences 
and has taken steps to check fraud and corrupt practices. Therefore a public officer who 
receives gratification to act or commits an omission because of gratification is considered 
to have committed corruption; and likewise the person offering the gratification.44 Section 
260 makes withholding of public money to be a crime of misdemeanour by providing that: 
“Where a public officer who is bound in that capacity to pay or account for money or 
valuable things, or to produce or give up documents or any other things, fails as in duty 
bound to pay or account for, or to produce or give up, to any other officer or person 
lawfully demanding the same, commits a misdemeanour.”45 
The Act further criminalises the use of public office to make profit by a public officer or a 
private person in collaboration with the public officer. Thus “A person commits a criminal 
offence who (a) while holding a public office corruptly or dishonestly abuses the office for 
private profit or benefit; or (b) not being a holder of a public office acts or is found to have 
acted in collaboration with a person holding a public office for the latter to corruptly or 
dishonestly abuse the public office for private profit or benefit.”46  
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It is also an offence for a clerk or public officer to conceal information or fail to make 
entries in account, books and records entrusted to him.47 Section 252 provides that: 
(1) A person who accepts, or agrees or offers to accept, a valuable 
consideration under pretence or colour of having unduly influenced or of 
agreeing or being able so to influence, any other person in respect of 
functions as a public officer or juror commits a misdemeanour.   
 (2)  A person who gives, or agrees or offers to give, to a public officer a 
valuable consideration for the grant to that person or to any other person 
of  benefit or an advantage, or for the exercise of influence in favour of 
that person or any other person commits a misdemeanour. 
 
The provisions of Section 239 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 196048 
provide for the penalty by stating that Public Officers found guilty of corruption under the 
Criminal Offences Act 1960 can be sentenced to a maximum imprisonment term of 25 
years. 
 
The Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), is established by the Economic and 
Organised Crime Office Act 2010. The body is responsible for investigating economic and 
organised crime. Therefore, they can investigate economic and organised crime perpetuated 
in the course of petroleum revenue management in Ghana. The Act repealed the Serious 
Fraud Office Act 1993 established as an agency for the investigation and prosecution of 
serious fraud as the Attorney General may require from time to time.49 A wide range of 
powers have been given to the EOCO to carry out investigations and prosecution. 
 
Another Act is the Public Procurement Act 2003: The Public Procurement Act 2003 50 
provides for the establishment of a Public Procurement Authority to make rules for and 
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manage public procurement and bidding processes. It is to ensure that there is transparency 
in the process and that government contracts and services are carried out by the most 
qualified persons or companies. The operating agreement which the Bank of Ghana enters 
with other funds administrators is required to comply with the procurement laws.  
 
There is also the Whistleblower Act 2006 which provides for the protection of 
whistleblowers and shields them from civil and criminal liabilities.51 It also provides for 
compensation to whistleblowers by establishing a whistleblowers fund.  
 
The Financial Administration Act 2003 regulates the management and control of public 
funds and places such responsibility on the Minister of Finance.52 Section 62(1) provides 
that: “An officer or a person acting in an office or employment connected with the 
collection, management or disbursement of public or trust moneys or with the control of 
government stores who (a) accepts or receives money or valuable consideration for the 
performance of official duties; (b) conspires with another person to defraud the 
Government, or makes opportunity for another person to defraud the Government; or… (f) 
demands or accepts or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, as payments or gifts or 
otherwise, a sum of money, or any other thing of value, for the compromise, adjustment or 
settlement of a charge or complaint for a contravention or alleged contravention of 
legislation relating to public finance commits an offence…” 
 
Section 66 establishes the Financial Administration Tribunal that is vested with the  power 
to: (d) make any orders as it considers appropriate for the recovery of moneys, assets or any 
other property due to the Republic;… (e) prohibit an individual whether a public officer or 
not from managing public accounts or funds if the individual is unqualified professionally 
or has been persistently negligent in the management of public funds; and (f) prohibit a 
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person from participating as a bidder in a government procurement or contract where that 
person has a record of defrauding the Republic”. 
 
Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act 1998: Public Office 
Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act 199853 provides for the 
disqualification of persons from holding public offices if found to have “(a) acquired assets 
unlawfully, or (b) defrauded the Republic, or (c) wilfully and dishonestly or corruptly acted 
in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Republic, or (d) knowingly made a false 
declaration of the assets, properties or liabilities of that person.”  
 
Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2007: Anti-Money Laundering Act, 200754 is established to 
ensure that proceeds of crime are not concealed and that they are properly investigated in 
accordance with the law.  
 
An examination of other laws further shows that apart from the punishment provided for in 
revenue management, there are instances where other laws provide for penal sanctions that 
are related to revenue management. Therefore, actions of public officers either by way of 
corrupt or fraudulent practices can be prosecuted under other laws. The laws on revenue 
management, on the other hand, do not clearly provide for how this may be reconciled. It 
therefore creates two scenarios where the prosecuting agencies may choose to prosecute 
either under a particular anticorruption law or the relevant petroleum laws that are 
breached. Some interpretation questions are bound to occur, whether to follow the lex 
specialis rule (the subject matter rule) or to follow the lex posterior rule (recent law rule). 
There is also the concern as to which of the agencies should carry out a particular task 
regarding the investigation of the corruption and thus clarity is required if the fight of 
corruption is to be addressed. 
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4.6 PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION OR FRAUD LINKED TO PETROLEUM 
REVENUE MANAGEMENT  
 
The next step in this chapter is to consider the circumstances for prosecution of cases 
relating to breach of the provisions of the laws under the petroleum revenue management 
laws or other enactment in which an offender can be prosecuted. In Ghana the Attorney 
General is the chief law officer of the state. Accordingly, Section 88(1) of the Constitution 
of Ghana provides that “There shall be an Attorney-General of Ghana who shall be a 
Minister of State and the principal legal adviser to the Government”. One of the roles 
accorded to the Attorney General is the prosecution of criminal cases on behalf of the state. 
Thus, it is provided further in Section 88(3) that: “The Attorney-General shall be 
responsible for the initiation and conduct of all prosecutions of criminal offences”. In the 
same token, the powers of the Attorney General are not only limited to criminal prosecution 
but extend to civil case for and against the Republic of Ghana. Thus Section 88(5) provides 
that “The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil 
cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted 
against the Attorney-General as defendant”. The Court in New Patriotic Party v President 
Rawlings55 citing the case of Tuffuor v Attorney-General56 held that: “President Limann 
was not made a party to the suit, even though it was his acts which were called in question 
in that suit. It was the Attorney General, as the principal legal adviser of the government, 
who was made a defendant. That was the right procedure...The plaintiff, in the present case, 
did the right thing by suing the Attorney General. But it was improper to join President 
Rawlings as a defendant. This is one of the situations where it can be said that the President 
had procedural immunity.” 
It will therefore be expected that the commission of any criminal offence emanating from 
the mismanagement of petroleum revenue will be ideally prosecuted by the Attorney 
General. The powers of the Attorney General as enshrined in the constitution of Ghana 
appear to have some limitations. The office of the Attorney General as it stands may be 
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used to truncate prosecution in respect of revenue management. In Ghana, there is express 
power given to the Attorney General to enter nolle prosequi in criminal cases.57 That is the 
Attorney general can validly discontinue a criminal action.58 The Attorney General moved 
by political motive can exercise his powers most especially if supported by the president 
who appoints him. The court therefore becomes handicapped where the Attorney General 
in the exercise of his powers of nolle prosequi decides to withdraw a case where public 
officers have engaged in the depletion of petroleum revenue.  The case of Tsatsu Tsikata v 
Chief Justice and Attorney General59 is quite illustrative of the argument offered here. The 
former Chief Executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Mr Tsatsu Tsikata, 
was arraigned under section 179A(3)(a) of the Criminal Code 1960 (as amended)60 for 
causing economic loss to the state but the Attorney General of Ghana filed an application 
for nolle prosequi to withdraw the action. This case therefore supports the argument in this 
chapter that the legal environment in which the petroleum revenue management laws 
operate must be a determinant on the extent to which the problems of the resource curse can 
be effectively addressed. 
The Attorney General can choose to delegate the powers to prosecute mismanagement or 
misappropriation of petroleum revenue in Ghana. The bases for this are contained in 
Section 88(4) of the constitution which provides that “All offences prosecuted in the name 
of the Republic of Ghana shall be at the suit of the Attorney-General or any other person 
authorised by him in accordance with any law”. The Attorney General therefore has wide 
discretionary powers on matters relating to the prosecution of crimes and given that it is 
argued here that the Attorney General’s nolle prosequi power may deter criminal 
prosecutions in the petroleum industry, there may be the need to restrict such discretion.    
The Government of Ghana recently established the office of the Special Prosecutor for the 
purpose of prosecuting corrupt officers. Mr Martin Amidu, a former Attorney General 
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under the regime of late President Atta Mills has been appointed. The creation of this office 
has been greeted with mixed feelings. To some it is a welcome development whereby the 
corrupt officials will be subjected to criminal trial to serve as deterrent; to others there is the 
perception that the creation of the office is geared towards witch hunting political 
opponents. 
Given the current situation, one could wonder if it was even necessary at all to create 
another office to prosecute corruption while the provisions of the constitution have given 
such powers to the Attorney General. The existence of the Office amounts to a duplication 
of offices and may not create an avenue for the smooth dispensation of justice. 
Furthermore, there is the likelihood that the special prosecutor will go after serious and 
intricate corruption cases while the cases of little significance are left unattended to. In such 
a situation, the Attorney General’s office may perceive that the special prosecutor is 
saddled with the responsibility of prosecuting similar cases. This loophole may make it 
easy for relatively smaller cases of corruption to go unpunished. There is therefore another 
duplicity that will deplete the revenue of the state. It is the opinion of this researcher that 
such duplications are not necessary and will amount to depleting of the resources of the 
state. 
4.7 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND PETROLEUM REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT  
 
In chapter three, it was discussed that the crux of the petroleum revenue management law is 
to promote accountability and transparency. The promotion of accountability and 
transparency are part of the key discourse in the field of corporate governance. This has a 
direct relevance to this thesis as they are applied in corporations to ensure that they meet 
the standards that have been set to avoid petroleum revenue leakages.  Corporate 
governance is used to describe the corporate management of organizations.  It has become a 
well-articulated concept that has built on company law practice. The idea of corporate 
governance is to develop practices that promote governance of corporations and offer codes 




governance have largely been extended to apply more robustly to non-governmental 
organisations.   
Before going into this discourse, however, it will be more appropriate to first of all 
appreciate the nature of corporations in Ghana in order to note the laws which will govern 
them generally. In the case of corporations, the government enterprises will largely be 
guided by public law, whereas the non-governmental enterprises are governed largely by 
the Companies Act and the provisions of the memorandum and articles of association of the 
companies.   
Therefore, a company within the context of Ghana fulfils the conditions of the common law 
rules laid down in the case of Salomon v Salomon61 which is to the effect that a corporation 
is a distinct entity from its members and officers. A corporation can therefore sue and be 
sued in its corporate name. It can therefore exercise all the powers of a natural person upon 
incorporation.  
The corporate scandals and failures have made countries reconsider the role of corporations 
and the impact of their activities. The global trend is that “large companies must make 
precise, prompt and sincere reports on their activity, not only to their shareholders, but to 
all stakeholders and to the public in general” and must be accountable since good 
governance should provide for  verified financial and non-financial information that 
inspires confidence in all of the company’s stakeholders”.62 The development of corporate 
governance achieved much relevance internationally with the Enron crises in the United 
States of America. The fictitious accounting statements saw some auditing organisations 
being implicated when the economic crises saw series of cases of corporate failures. This 
resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 to build in the corporate governance 
and reporting standards in the United States. Other advanced countries have followed suit. 
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The United Kingdom has the Corporate Governance Code and has required that companies 
should “comply or explain”.63   
 It is a matter of expediency that the corporate governance practices should be taken 
seriously in Ghana as an aftermath effect on the oil and gas industry. As part of the 
promotion of corporate governance, companies should make reports on their audits and 
should do so with the highest level of precision.  These have implications on the 
transparency in the oil and gas industry. Where companies present robust reports, the 
citizen will be able to reconcile these with what the government say it has made from 
petroleum revenue for a given tax year. For example, revenue accruing from petroleum 
exploration and production can be easily compared with the deductions shown in the 
financial statements of the oil and gas companies. If for a given financial year, the 
cumulative number of outgoings from oil companies to the respective government agencies 
shows a sharp discrepancy with what the government claims has accrued to the state, this 
will constitute a ground to call for a detailed audit of the sector to determine the leakages. 
Therefore, from these analysis, it can be seen that the corporate governance of companies 
has a great impact on the petroleum sector and should not be taken lightly. This leads to a 
question on what is the status of the relevant government agencies that have roles to play in 
petroleum revenue management in Ghana? This can be decoded through an examination of 
relevant laws for their establishment. Besides, the Ghana National Petroleum Company is 
also a government owned company. The Petroleum Commission Act, which established the 
Petroleum Commission, provides that: “There is established in this Act a body corporate 
with perpetual succession to be known as Petroleum Commission.”64 Other relevant 
government agencies that will be directly affected in the management of the petroleum 
revenue and have been established as corporate entity include the Ghana Revenue 
Authority and the Bank of Ghana. State owned corporations are better off if corporate 
governance is imbibed. In a study conducted by Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah on why 
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state corporations fail, the researchers used the example of corporate failures in Ghana 
Airways to show that it is attributed mainly to lack of good corporate governance.65 
Another crucial point for the promotion of the practices of corporate governance would be 
seen in the management of the proceeds from the petroleum fund. The Second Schedule to 
the PRMA 2011 provides for a model agreement between government, represented by the 
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, and the Bank of Ghana for the management of 
the Ghana Petroleum Funds. It is provided that “The Bank of Ghana shall undertake the 
daily operational management of the Ghana Petroleum Funds and shall be accountable for 
operational management of the Ghana Petroleum Funds and shall be accountable for its 
operational management to the minister”.66  
“The Bank of Ghana shall be responsible for the operational management of the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds, which shall include the following functions: (a) the investment of the 
capital of the Ghana Petroleum Funds in financial instruments as set out in this Agreement, 
including exercising all the rights and complying with all obligations associated with the 
ownership of the Ghana Petroleum Funds' assets”.67 The Bank of Ghana therefore can 
appoint and enter into a contract with portfolio managers.68 This underscores the 
importance of giving considerations to corporate governance for those to be engaged by the 
Bank of Ghana in whatever investment line it chooses.  Besides the effect that corporate 
governance can have in the areas of investment where the bank of Ghana may choose to 
invest the fund, it also has an impact on the oil and gas industries as companies that engage 
in petroleum exploration and production should continue to operate as a going concern and 
need the corporate health for the nation to continue to derive revenue from them. Lack of 
corporate governance reduces their competitiveness and may lead to corporate distress 
which, in turn, affects the oil and gas sector. A company operating at a loss will not be in a 
position to pay the maximum tax required under the Petroleum Tax Law or as agreed under 
the Petroleum Agreement. Ensuring good corporate governance from this perspective is as 
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good as ensuring that the company continues to produce income for the government to 
increase its revenue take from petroleum resources. Operating good corporate governance 
will also offer avenue for the management of risks thereby allowing for optimal 
performance of organisations.69  Therefore there is a need for the promotion of corporate 
governance culture not only in the private sector but also in government corporations.  The 
Ghana National Petroleum Company being a state-owned company must operate a detailed 
structure of corporate governance as that will contribute to the revenue take of the 
government and there will be plugs against loopholes that may lead to leakages in the 
revenue of the government. The words of Bantekas are very illustrative of the argument 
why there should be an excellent corporate governance practice. According to Bantekas,  
It was logical to assume that companies themselves were best suited to 
allocating salary levels, appointing appropriate board members, etc., as 
well as having the expertise and know-how to invest accumulated funds 
for profit….missing from the picture were the social impacts of corporate 
misgovernance, as in the cases of Enron and WorldCom – corporations 
reporting losses while their CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] were 
receiving extravagant salary raises, the subsequent loss of jobs and 
pensions because pension funds were invested in these deflated 
corporations.70 
 
The dangers inherent in the failure to imbibe robust corporate governance can translate into 
losses. Take for example the Bank of Ghana investing Petroleum Funds in companies that 
lack the corporate governance culture or even the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
going into such investments. It will have an adverse effect on the petroleum revenue of the 
country. In the same token, it is expected that the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
should continue to grow and have strong capital base like other state-owned corporations 
that have distinguished themselves to the extent that they have the status of multinational 
corporations. Typical examples of such corporations are the Petronas of Malaysia, 
Petrobras of Brazil, Equinor of Norway and the Chinese Offshore Petroleum Corporation. 
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These national oil companies have a huge capital base and have been shaping the 
geopolitics of the oil and gas market and investments.   
The Companies Code contains a series of corporate governance provisions and which are 
reflected in the duties of directors such as the duty of care and skills, fiduciary duties, duties 
to avoid conflict of interests71 as well as on the role of auditors that are required to provide 
for audit the account of the companies.72 The US corporate governance mechanisms have 
been advancing corporate governance requirements where matters on disclosures are 
considered as key and are even backed up by statutes as contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 and the Dodd Frank Act 2010. Promotion of corporate disclosure both by private 
and public owned corporation should continue to be enhanced. Besides, investors are the 
ones who suffer loss when there is a corporate failure.73 In the context of this research, the 
government is an investor of the oil wealth on behalf of the people of Ghana and thus there 
will be serious consequences in the event of a corporate failure in ventures entered into by 
the government.  
4.8 FISCAL STABILITY VS. PETROLEUM REVENUE TAKE AND MANAGEMENT  
 
Presumably, the energy policy objective of states is to see how they can maximise the 
proceeds of oil for their economic development, while the petroleum companies are moved 
by their desire to expand their profit margin and increase their capital and earnings for their 
shareholders.74 The host states employ fiscal and tax regimes as one of the main 
instruments for determining the government take and earnings that would accrue to the oil 
and gas companies among other considerations.75  As demonstrated in chapter two, the 
Petroleum Income Tax Law 1987 (PNDCL 188), Petroleum (Exploration and Production) 
Act 2015 and the PRMA 2011 and the Petroleum Agreement are instrumental to the 
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determination of this in line with the economic objectives of the government. It is not the 
intention of this research or this chapter to go into the entire gamut of fiscal stability and 
international investment law but it will be necessary to state  how the fiscal environment 
within which the oil and gas industry and regulation in Ghana operates should be such that 
it does not truncate the goals of maximum benefits from petroleum revenue. Otherwise 
there may be two scenarios that may occur which can become counterproductive to the 
accrual of revenue from petroleum resources. First it can have a chilling effect on investors 
who would rather explore new frontiers instead of investing in Ghana thereby reducing the 
take in the share of revenue. Second, where damages are levied on Ghana for a breach of 
international investment law commitment, this will have an impact on government revenue. 
For example, the Balkan gas arbitration left Ghana with an award debt of USD 11 
Million.76 Such an amount would have been used to transform the lives of the people. One 
point to appreciate is that funds of the nation are depleted in prosecuting the investor-state 
arbitration,77 and the state may turn out to lose the proceeding thereby occasioning further 
losses to the state.  
The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act 2013 guarantees the promotion and 
protection of foreign investors in Ghana.78 Ghana is a party to a number of bilateral 
investment treaties.79 Good examples are the Bilateral Interment Treaty between United 
Kingdom and Ghana80 and between Netherlands and Ghana.81 The United Kingdom-Ghana 
Bilateral Investment Treaty provides that there should be no expropriation without 
compensation. Similar provisions are contained in the Netherlands-Ghana bilateral 
investment treaty. Expropriation has been considered to be part of measures that denies the 
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investors of the economic viability of their investments. Tax increase or cuts on available 
incentives for the purpose of promotion of sustainable petroleum revenue management if 
not done in accordance with the established principles of international investment law on 
expropriation can be a ground for the challenge before an international investment tribunal.  
There are a number of international investment law cases that suggest Ghana exercise 
caution and introspection in carving out its laws in relation to revenue management as they 
so far affect the investors. Investment promotion provisions in bilateral investment treaties 
can be used to protect investors in a way that the property rights of the investors are not 
adversely affected.82  The requirement of the observance of fair and equitable treatment in 
the bilateral investment treaties can also be used to call into question a regulatory change to 
accommodate more revenues for the government. Actions can be considered not to have 
been done in a manner that is fair and equitable to do them.  
As noted earlier, the Ghana Investment Promotion Act 2013 can be rightly said to further 
crystallise the provisions of the bilateral investment treaties that Ghana has entered with 
other nations. Therefore, it is provided in the Ghana Investment Promotion Act 2013 that:  
(a) no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by Government; 
and (b) no person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of any 
enterprise shall be compelled by law to cede his interest in the capital to 
any other person. (2) There shall not be any acquisition of an enterprise to 
which this Act applies by the State unless the acquisition is in the national 
interest for a public purpose and under a law which makes provision for - 
(a) payment of fair and adequate compensation; and (b) a right of access 
to the High Court for the determination of the investor's interest or right 
and the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. (3) Any 
compensation payable under this section shall be paid without undue 
delay and authorization for its repatriation in convertible currency, where 
applicable, shall be issued.83  
 
This provision can operate as a check against changes to the tax and fiscal regime or 
expropriation of assets of foreign oil companies without adequate compensation. The 
Ghana Investment Promotion Act 2013 provides for mutual discussions in resolving such 
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disputes or through the use of investor-state arbitration under the auspices of the rules of 
procedure for arbitration of the United Nation Commission of International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) or “in the case of a foreign investor, within the framework of any bilateral or 
multilateral agreement on investment protection to which the Government and the country 
of which the investor is a national are parties” or “any other national or international 
machinery for the settlement of investment dispute agreed to by the parties”.84 In the same 
token, the Model Petroleum Agreement provides for the settlement of dispute through the 
use of international arbitration conducted under the auspices of the Arbitration Institute of 
the Stockholm International Chamber of Commerce.85  
Looking at the nature of claims that are made nowadays through investor-state arbitration, 
they are capable of affecting a country’s budget. Nowadays, very huge and complex claims 
are brought before international investment tribunals. International investment law which is 
currently backed by the BITs and Ghana Investment Protection Act 2013 include: 
x Protection against expropriation in the course of petroleum revenue accrual and 
management; 
x Fair and equitable treatment of investors in the course of petroleum revenue 
management 
x Full protection and security for investors in the bid to ensure that the state of Ghana 
maximises its petroleum revenue; 86 and  
x Observation of the pacta sunc servanda clause in the course of management of 
petroleum revenue.87   
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Usually actions of host states are such that they reduce the revenue that accrues and affects 
the economic or pecuniary interest of the investors and therefore may be termed as 
expropriation. In effect, if there are changes in the regulatory regime the income base of the 
investor sharply reduces and that may be a ground for alleging expropriation. International 
investment law goes against practices that affect the pecuniary interest of the foreign 
investor without compensation being accorded to the foreign investor. In the same vein, 
such actions may be referred to as breaching the fair and equitable treatment rule. This 
becomes a strong ground where the host states do so without adequate notice. It is also the 
case where investors have made investments without contemplating the laws may change or 
there will be amendment to the fiscal regime. The doctrine of legitimate expectation 
requires that changes will not just occur at random.88 Regulatory changes should be 
systematic and done with adequate notice. Full protection and security will support that the 
regulatory set up for changes in the legal regime for petroleum revenue are such that the 
government of Ghana should ensure that investors are protected.  
For example, it will be necessary that there is protection for foreign investors by the 
government when they are being victimised by officers of the various agencies or when it 
becomes obvious that an agency is acting out of its bounds in a way that the business of the 
investor will be adversely affected. For example, victimisation by an anticorruption agency, 
the Bank of Ghana or the Ghana Revenue Authority will amount to a breach of the duty of 
full protection and security if Ghana fails to act. In the case of full protection and security, 
there is the requirement that the host states must observe in good faith all commitments 
made with the foreign investor.89 
The matter of stability is worth examining because of the fact that the sector in Ghana 
cannot be said to have taken a full shape and the fact that Ghana gives a leeway for 
flexibility in its Petroleum Income Tax Law 1987 (PNDCL 188), where it provides for tax 
rates to be negotiated. Tax law can be subjected to amendment given that there is emphasis 
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on the fact that Ghana should get it right in the development of the country’s petroleum 
revenue base and ensure that there are no leakages in the sector. An example from Nigeria 
can be used to demonstrate this as seen in the work of Adaralegbe90 on fiscal stability under 
the Nigerian law, giving an account of the case of Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) v Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), Ltd.91 In the case, Nigerian government 
passed legislation (the NLNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act 1990) to 
grant tax waivers to the NLNG project for a period of 10 years. It was provided in the law 
that “Without prejudice to any other provision contained herein, neither the company nor its 
shareholders in their capacity as shareholders in the company shall in any way be subject to 
new laws, regulations, taxes duties imposts, or charges of whatever nature which are not 
applicable generally to companies incorporated in Nigeria or to shareholders in the 
companies incorporated in Nigeria respectively”.92  
It was further provided that: “The Government shall take such executive, legislative and 
other actions as may be necessary so as to effectively grant, fulfil, and perfect the 
guarantees, assurances and undertakings contained herein. In order to afford the degrees of 
security required to enable the company’s investment to be made, the Government further 
agrees to ensure that the said guarantees, assurances and undertakings shall not be 
suspended, modified or revoked during the life of the venture except with the mutual 
agreement of the government and the shareholders of the company”.93  
In 2010, the NDDC Act was passed into law with the objective of improving the 
development in the oil rich Niger Delta region. It was required that the programs of NDDC 
will be funded by requiring all oil companies in Nigeria to pay 3% of their annual budget 
into the NDDC fund. This development did not auger well with the NLNG partners that 
include foreign investors such Shell, Total, and ENi. They approached the court to 
challenge the provisions of such a law on ground that there was a commitment not to 
change the law. The Federal High Court of Nigeria ruled in favour of the NNLG but the 
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decision was overturned upon appeal to the Court of Appeal on ground that the NLNG Act 
fettered the discretion of the National Assembly (the legislative arm of government) to 
make law.  
It is contended in this thesis that this case would have resulted in a different decision if it 
was brought before investor-state arbitration within the framework of the bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement which Nigeria has with the government of the foreign investors. 
Kolo’s work can further buttress the argument here where he examines the windfall tax 
phenomenon which made states change the rules of the game by making changes to the 
fiscal regime to increase the take of the state from petroleum revenue.94 In the arbitral case 
of Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador,95 the president of Ecuador submitted a Bill to the 
parliament for an increase in the government take through participatory interests because to 
the government there was a “so-called extraordinary profit” which was occasioned by 
excessive price in the oil and gas market. The Bill was passed into law but in the arbitration 
that ensued, it was decided against the government of Ecuador on the basis that there was 
modification of the tax system contained in the production sharing contract.  
Participation of the State over non agreed or unforeseen surpluses from 
oil selling contracts. Contracting companies having Hydrocarbons 
exploration and exploitation participation agreements in force with the 
Ecuadorian State pursuant to this Law, without prejudice to the volume of 
crude oil which may correspond thereto according to their participation, 
in the event the actual monthly average selling price for the FOB sale of 
Ecuadorian crude oil exceeds the monthly average selling price in force at 
the date of execution of the agreement expressed at constant rates for the 
month of payment, shall grant the Ecuadorian State a participation of at 
least 50%.96 
This situation raises concern about why Ghana should be more forward looking in the 
development of the petroleum revenue base and ensure that the laws are reflected in a way 
that there is flexibility and at the same time stability is promoted. Though there is the 
general argument that a country by virtue of the established principle of sovereignty in 
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international law it can direct the affairs of its petroleum resource and revenue there are 
limitations to such an exercise. The fact that a country has committed itself to international 
instruments or treaties is an indication that it must obey such and the country may derogate 
from it.97  Nevertheless one of the adverse consequences of derogation will be that the 
investor may bring a claim under investor-state arbitration for damages. 
The fiscal regime in Ghana is largely governed by the laws identified in the PRMA 2011, 
Petroleum Income Tax Law 1987 (PNDCL 188) and Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act 2016. As shown in chapter two of the thesis, the negotiated petroleum 
agreement dictates the fiscal regime. Nevertheless, the provision of the law will prevail in 
the normal course of things if there are no changes. The Petroleum Agreement appears to 
limit opportunities for flexibility and possible renegotiation of the terms. The Ghana Model 
Agreement operates a very strict form of stability that leaves the state with no option but to 
be locked in an agreement it enters with foreign oil corporations. Article 26.2 of the 
Agreement provides that the state guarantees the stability of the agreement on its terms and 
conditions and no laws such as the petroleum and the tax laws shall amend the agreement. 
Accordingly, Article 26.2 provides that any of such amendment would amount to a breach. 
Whilst change in circumstances may be grounds for change in an agreement in international 
law, the law gives room for the parties to only negotiate for significant changes. This 
appears to be limited and may be difficult to establish that circumstances have actually 
changed to warrant the parties going back to the negotiation table.  
The approach employed under the Production Sharing Agreement of Tanzania is very apt in 
addressing the changes in law. It is provided that in Article 30 that: 
If at any time or from time to time there should be a change in legislation 
or regulations which materially affects the commercial and fiscal benefits 
afforded by the Contractor under this contract, the Parties will consult 
each other and shall agree to such amendments to this Contract as are 
necessary to restore as near as practicable such commercial benefits 
which existed under the Contract as of the Effective Date. 
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Whatever approach that Ghana decides to take for the eventual review of its laws to 
accommodate current realities, it must be done bearing in mind the various commitments it 
has made with the foreign investors in the business of exploration and production of 
petroleum. It is apt to note here the proposition of the tribunal in the case of ADC Affiliate 
Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of Hungary98 where it 
reasoned that: 
…the basic international law principles that while a sovereign State 
possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of 
such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries.  Therefore, when 
a State enters into a bilateral investment treaty like the one in this case, it 
becomes bound by it and the investment protection obligations it 
undertook therein must be honoured rather than be ignored by a later 
argument of the State’s right to regulate. 
 
Ghana will need to be wary of finding itself in a situation where the resources of the state 
will be depleted in fighting claims before investment tribunals as well as on the costs that 
are capable of crippling the purse of the state. The case of Balkan Energy (Ghana) Limited 
v The Republic of Ghana,99 which was an investor-state arbitration instituted against Ghana 
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration typifies how wasteful it may be for a country to 
engage in dispute with foreign investors most especially where there are no strong 
justification to back the country’s action. In this case a contract entered into by Ghana was 
challenged because it fell short of the requirement for parliamentary approval as provided 
for under the constitution. It was found that the action of the Ghanaian government in the 
entire process breached the investor protection under the BITs. The tribunal awarded USD 
11 Million against Ghana. Unfortunately, Ghana could not pay the judgment debt as 
ordered and Balkan Energy has also been making efforts to seek recognition and 
enforcement of the judgment beyond the shores of Ghana.  
 
Notable among the actions taken so far are the fillings of application for recognition and 
enforcement in the United States and the seeking of attachment of the “six million shares in 
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AngloGold worth US$57million to pay for the judgment debt”100. Certainly, this has 
economic impact on the state of Ghana as resources have been spent in pursuing the case. 
In essence, if the matters on fiscal stability and the need to increase the government take in 
the petro wealth are not appropriately addressed, Ghana risks expending two costs; the first 
being the cost of defence of arbitral claims before international investment tribunals and 
damages against the state if found wanting to be in breach of stability commitment.  
 
4.9 CONCLUSION  
 
The basis of this chapter is that the socioeconomic context within which the society 
operates plays an important role in determining the extent of implementation of the law. 
Therefore, the focus of the chapter was to examine other social and legal context in which 
the relevant laws on revenue management will operate since they will not be implemented 
in isolation. They have to fit into the legal configurations of the country for them to fully 
operate. Appreciating how these laws operate in a context of the country is very important 
otherwise efforts made through policy and regulation may turn out to be counterproductive.  
Much will have to also be done in terms of corporate governance, in particular oil and gas 
companies operating in Ghana should reflect a robust corporate governance model and 
likewise the Ghana National Petroleum Company. Other government-based corporations 
should also, to a large extent, employ the corporate governance trends in their management 
of their affairs and provide for effective managerial control and promotion of transparency 
in the sector. Generally, the laws for the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana 
cannot operate in isolation; their operation depends on the extent to which they fit into the 
socio-legal context. 
Corruption will need to be revisited and there should be clear distinction between 
corruptions committed in the course of petroleum revenue management and those not 
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associated with the petroleum revenue. Such should not be penalized under other laws. 
There will be a need for the various laws bordering on official corruption to operate in 
harmony. The power of the Attorney General to discontinue trial for criminal cases may 
fetter the anticorruption laws relevant to the oil and gas industry. As the state of affairs 
stand, the Attorney General can choose to prosecute or not to prosecute cases of fraud. 
Furthermore, the establishment of the Office of the special Prosecutor to try corruption of 
politicians may not square well as there may be an avenue that the office is used only 
against the opposition.  
The provision for judicial review can be an avenue that can be utilized to compel the 
government agencies to continue to exercise their functions regarding petroleum revenue 
management for sustainable development. It can also be utilized to stop illegal actions or 
even declare null and void actions that have been already carried out on petroleum revenue 
management that are not in accordance with the constitution or the law. The requirement of 
locus standi if care is not taken may be applied to forestall these powers given to the 
citizens by the law and constitution. The courts will have to be proactive to ensure that the 
doctrine does not operate as a bar to the citizens desirous of challenging actions of the 
government that are inimical to petroleum revenue management for sustainable 
development. Finally, the stability of the legal regime is still an issue as Ghana still being a 
new producer may be pushed to amend its laws to increase its revenue take when windfall 
occurs. It is argued that though Ghanaian sovereignty over petroleum resources is 
guaranteed internationally and provided for in the constitution, it owes investors the 
obligation of fiscal stability or risks challenges before investor-state arbitral tribunals. 
Therefore, from the foregoing, the relevant petroleum laws cannot work in isolation as they 
need to interact with other laws in Ghana as has been demonstrated in this chapter. The 
next chapter will examine critically revenue management in Ghana based on international 
best practices. To achieve this, the approach employed will be to look at how Ghana has 
fared in oil revenue management as measured against the established principles of 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EITI STANDARDS AND PETROLEUM REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The essence of this chapter is to seek to answer questions on promotion of transparency in 
the sustainable management of petroleum revenue in Ghana. Historically, natural resources, 
especially mineral resources, have given rise to the widely held view that they are a curse 
rather than a blessing to countries that are endowed with them. Countries which are 
endowed with abundant mineral resources wealth are noted for the paradoxically high rate 
of poverty, monochromic economy, mismanagement of mineral resources, resource 
propelled conflict, corruption etc. Sachs and Warner have observed that: “one of the 
surprising features of modern economic growth is that economies abundant in natural 
resources have tended to grow slower than economies without substantial natural 
resources.”1 This has been the foundational basis of the resource curse theory that has been 
propounded and popularised by scholars in the discipline of economics and political 
science. Richard Auty2 was the first scholar to coin the phrase, ‘resource curse’ as a 
description of this phenomenon. 
However, further research in this field of study supported by exceptional resource rich 
countries like Norway, Canada, USA, Botswana etc. are testimony to the fact that resource 
curse does not arise merely by the possession of abundant natural resources per se. Scholars 
such as Mehlum,3 Acemoglu,4 Boschini et al,5 Wright and Czeluster6 among others have 
propounded the view that it is not the natural resources that is responsible for the dwindling 
consequences on the economy of resource rich countries, but it is the institutions that 
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determine whether the resources would amount to a curse or blessing. Institutions have 
emerged to be used as a tool for effective management of natural resource as long as the 
necessary governance measures are put in place.7 The institutional view point is to the 
effect that if the natural resources of a country are properly managed by the relevant 
institutions, there is likely to be economic prosperity for the state. Conversely, where the 
resources are not properly managed the resource curse syndrome would set in. 
The institutionalist viewpoint has raised awareness about how corrupt practices may affect 
institutions that are responsible for the management of natural mineral resources. For 
example, most countries, which mainly depend on petroleum and have weak institutions 
have tendency towards low economic development.8 There are cases of bribery of 
government officials by multi-national companies.9  
Confronting corruption requires transparency as a counter measure. This is because 
corruption thrives in an atmosphere of secrecy. A transparent system exposes corrupt 
practices and makes it unattractive. The manner by which resource-rich countries manage 
their natural resources has given cause for global concern. This has led to efforts towards a 
collective attempt to establish principles, which have gradually culminated in a universally 
accepted governance model for natural resource management. One of such instances is the 
effort made in 2008 by International Monetary Fund (IMF) in collaboration with the 
International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds.10 The result of the 
collaborative effort is the arrival at some commonly held management principles and 
structure11 of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) which is commonly referred to as the Santiago 
Principles.12 The principles were drafted and concluded at the third conference of the 
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IWG13, which took place in Santiago, Chile.14 Amongst other objectives, the Santiago 
Principles is targeted at ensuring transparency, good governance institution and 
accountability in the management of these funds.15 
In the same vein, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) represents another 
attempt toward regulatory principles for the extractive industries. Even though the EITI has 
a point of convergence with the IWG’s Santiago Principles, they are markedly different 
from each other. The Santiago Principles are primarily targeted at investment practices and 
risk management of the SWFs, with transparency and accountability as incidental matters 
to the effective investment of the fund. It does not include extractive countries who do not 
maintain a SWF. On the other hand, EITI focuses primarily on transparency and 
accountability issues in the extractive industry. The implication is that it is not only 
concerned about the conduct of state parties but also other stakeholders involved in the 
extractive industry of these countries, which includes multinational corporations, state 
owned corporations, public institutions, host communities etc. 
The EITI has recorded some success since its creation. Apart from just establishing 
principles that ends up as soft laws instruments like the fate that has befallen the Santiago 
principles, efforts have been made to compel state parties to the agreement to domesticate 
the EITI principle into their national laws. For instance, Nigeria enacted the Nigerian 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (NEITI), Act in 2007. Even though there is 
room for improvement, for regular reporting, it has been seen that since the adoption of the 
initiative by the Nigerian government, there has been a marked improvement in the level of 
transparency in the Nigerian extractive industry than previous occasion due to more public 
awareness in the going ins in the oil and gas section courtesy of the initiative.16  
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In the case of Ghana, this country is a late comer in respect of oil and gas exploration 
having discovered oil in commercial measures just in 2007. The Ghanaian government has 
not shied away from its intention of tying its developmental agenda along the fortunes of 
oil and gas exploration. Hence, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda 
(GSGDA), is the organisation which the national development plan of the country has 
directed its vision towards a “modern economy based on science and technology” to.17 Like 
most other developing countries, this discovery has been seen as an opportunity to advance 
the economic fortunes of the country. This led to a scramble towards the petroleum 
exploration even before adequate preparedness and a legal framework has been put in place 
to regulate the complex and highly specialised oil and gas industry.18 Also, like most other 
natural resource rich countries which fell prey to the resource curse syndrome, one would 
expect that the Ghanaian government would learn from those experiences.19 Ghana is not 
immune to the disease, hence, serious precautionary and preventive measure should be put 
in place to ensure that they are not caught up with the disease.  
If the institutional perspective of the resource curse is anything to go by, this would require 
that the Ghanaian government establish effective institutional framework to deal with the 
impending doom that would make Ghana one of those exceptional countries that are 
immune to the curse. On the theoretical level, this would just go on to prove the 
institutionalist school of thought right. One way of realising a formidable institution that 
would effectively manage the natural resources of the country is by injecting transparency 
into the system. Ghana has created an institution fashioned after the EITI model, which is 
GHEITI. While this is a step in the right direction, it is imperative that same effort is put in 
place for effective implement of the principles to make it work. It is in this regard that this 
study shall examine how well the Ghanaian government has implemented the EITI 
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principles in the oil and gas sector towards effective management of revenue accruing from 
their oil and natural gas endowment. Also, it would seek to examine how the transparent 
management of the Petroleum resources can result in sustainable development in Ghana.   
5.2 THE ORIGIN AND FORMATION OF EITI 
The activities in the extractive industry are usually shrouded in mystery due to its 
technicality and its close circuit operations. Most oil and gas contracts involving 
governments and companies are not within the public domain, thus, leaving citizens in the 
dark about the affairs in the industry, thereby making it difficult to make their government 
account for how the resources are managed.20 This gives room for practices that do not 
augur well for the management of resources for the collective interest of the people for 
whose benefit the natural resources are held in trust. This gave rise to series of campaigns 
by civil society groups creating awareness about the need for transparency in the workings 
in the extractive industry.  
Foremost of this peer pressure was the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign borne out 
of a collaborative effort by more than 300 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across 
the globe. The PWYP campaign started after the ground-breaking study on Angola was 
carried out by Global Witness’, a London-based NGO. The NGO’s report on diamond 
exploration, captioned ‘A Rough Trade’ (1998) and its 1999 report titled ‘A Crude 
Awakening’ served as eye openers on how the minority cartel of elites have used petroleum 
revenue to shield themselves from accountability and the vast consequences which this 
portends to the society.21 Their demand was a compulsory full disclosure of payments made 
by companies to governments for petroleum and mineral extraction. They also demanded a 
full disclosure of the resource earnings of resource-rich countries.22  
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EITI is claimed to have been proposed by Tony Blair, the then British Prime Minister, in 
2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg. However, it was 
formally launched and became operative in 2003 courtesy of the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) which gathered various stakeholders involved in the 
extractive industry, including governments of resource endowed states, multi-national 
companies, civil society groups, international financial organisations etc. The conference 
urged interested stakeholders in the extractive industry to formulate a framework towards 
encouraging transparency in the payments made and the revenues derived in the course of 
natural resource exploration.23 Thus, the EITI is credited to be “a policy mechanism 
marketed by donors and Western governments as a key to facilitating economic 
improvement in resource-rich developing countries- in sub-Saharan Africa”24 It is an 
international organisation which flourishes on voluntary membership as it is established 
towards the promotion of transparency on the basis of disclosure by the companies and 
government of what they pay and receive respectively.25  
The outcome of the June 2003 London Conference was the formulation of 12 EITI 
Principles. Azerbaijan, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic and Nigeria served as the first four 
countries where the implementations of the EITI principles were first test run. Peru, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Timor Leste, Republic of Congo and Trinidad and Tobago were the 
next set of countries. It was in the course of these test runs programmes that measures such 
as EITI Validation Guide and pointers for EITI compliance were formulated.26 
The governance structure of EITI was established three years after its formation at the EITI 
Conference which took place in 2006 at Oslo, Norway after series of consultative forums 
had been initiated by the International Advisory Group. Thereafter, the EITI Board was 
formulated to bear the responsibility to administer the collective development, strategic 
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plan, sensitisation, advocacy, and ensure that states conform to the process of putting EITI 
into effect. The Board also organises the EITI Conference on a bi-annual basis, wherein it 
must present its reports. The board works hand in hand with the International EITI 
headquarter secretariat domiciled in Oslo, to achieve its goals.27 The Board is made up of 
20 members who are chosen from representatives of governments of state members, 
corporations in the extractive industry and the civil society groups, which constitute the 
three basic constituencies of EITI. A neutral person is appointed to head the board.28 The 
Secretariat performs the everyday activities of EITI subject to the guidance of the Board 
under the leadership of its Chairperson.29 EITI also has another channel of authority known 
as the Members’ Meetings. This body is made up of all states, extractive companies and 
civil society group who identify themselves as EITI members. The members’ meeting is 
convened in the bi-annual EITI conference. Part of its function is to appoint the EITI Board 
Members.30 
As at 2017, there were 56 States, which partook in the EITI scheme. EITI Member States 
generally comprise of supporting States and implementing States. Supporting States 
encourage the idea of creation and implementation of global transparency initiative for the 
benefit of mineral extracting States even though the supporting States need not be resource-
rich countries.31 On the other hand, the implementing States expressly pledge their 
commitment to the adoption and implementation of the EITI standards and requirements.32 
They are mostly extractive rich countries. When a state elects to implement EITI standards, 
it is duty bound to establish Multi Stakeholders Group (MSG) which is responsible for the 
supervision of the implementation process at the State level. The MSG as the name implies 
is a conglomeration of several interest groups such as the resource rich countries either of 
supporting or implementing governments, international mineral extractive corporations, 
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International Non-Governmental Organisations and civil society organisations.33 Majority 
of States have established a national secretariat with full time personnel responsible for the 
administrative process of the program.34 The implementing States also have the duty to 
publish annually reports wherein the States’ governments proffer public disclosure of 
income derived from the enterprise of mineral resource extraction. This further surpasses 
the rigours of independent external audit and verification when placed side by side with the 
records proffered by the resource extractive companies.35 
The EITI has been criticised based on certain limitations which it is faced with. The basic 
limitation is the voluntary nature of the scheme as it largely depends on the co-operation of 
multinational companies to expose their records to the public glare.  The target of the EITI 
is to work out a means of dealing with the resource curse syndrome that afflicts resource-
rich countries. Also, it is mainly concerned with putting a close tab on the revenue accruing 
from the extractive industry without giving a care as to how well the resources are put to 
use by the government for the benefit of the people.36 However, as multi-dimensional as the 
causality of resource curse appears to be, EITI chose to narrow down its focus on revenues 
using the tool of transparency while ignoring other approaches.37 It is apt that corruption, 
which transparency intends to tackle, is not the only cause of resource curse; the rent 
seeking tendencies of institutions, the focus on resource extractive industry as the sole 
means of economic subsistence, reckless recurrent government spending etc. are other 
issues which must be tackled also.   
EITI further set out goals, which it sought to achieve in the long and short term. These 
goals are basically eleven in all and are set out in three categories comprising institutional, 
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organisational and developmental goals. The Institutional goals of EITI are aimed at 
moulding the EITI into a recognised institution and strengthen its position, approach and 
function.38 This category of EITI goals appear to have been more successfully attained 
compared to the others, by virtue of having successfully entrenched itself as a brand of 
global reckoning, in addition to making states embrace the idea of transparency.39 The 
targets are as follows:  
i. “to ensure EITI becomes a brand of nationally and globally reckoning”;  
ii. “to ensure that through EITI transparency is entrenched as a domestic and globally 
norm”; 
iii. “to make sure that governments boost their EITI level of participation, support, and 
compliance”; 
iv. “drive towards the creation and promotion of multi-stakeholder groups which will 
continue to act as the managerial basis and form of governance”. 
The operational goals are the set results, which EITI sought to achieve, and the means 
through which it is to achieve them. These goals entail midway means considered essential 
for EITI to realise the wider developmental goals in connection with the portion within the 
area of direct EITI influence.40 The targets of these goals constitute the following:41 
i. “creation of plain and reliable EITI standards”; 
ii. “ensure the rise in the ability of states to realise the EITI standard and release apt and all-
encompassing report as and when due”; 
iii. “ensure a rise in public awareness, discussion and pressure on issues pertaining to the 
management of natural resource”;  
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iv. “ensure increased effectual and fervent participation of civil society groups in the multi-
stakeholder groups”. 
The developmental goals are wider in scope and are concerned about the ultimate future 
outcomes of realising the society’s needs. This is targeted at achieving the original intention 
for the creation of EITI. These goals fall into the category of:42 
i. “ensure increasing income from the extractive industry for the benefit of the society as a 
result of decrease in corrupt practices”; 
ii. “ensure attractive investment ambience, increase in the flow of financial and material aid 
and encourage equitable distribution of government revenues”; 
iii. “support good governance, advance sustainable development, and advocate for 
progressive living standards for citizens”. 
The developmental goals are the tangibly expected outcomes in the long run. This implies 
that the result may not be immediately obvious but would eventually arise from the 
effective attainment of the combined institutional and organisational goals. They are the 
transformation, which is the expected effect of transparency, and good governance, which 
EITI canvasses for. This set of goals is beyond the sole province of EITI to achieve; the 
role of state parties, civil society, members of the public and other stakeholders will also go 
a long way to ensure its realisation.43 Studies suggest that EITI has succeeded in attaining 
its institutional goals and certain operational goals.44 The foremost goal of intensifying 
revenue transparency by means of ensuring the regular availability of public reports has 
been satisfied; whereas the major goal of public involvement is regarded as having been 
partially fruitful, with a qualified involvement of civil society groups in the MSG but falls 
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short in the aspect of public empowerment to put the governments and companies to public 
accountability.45 
5.3 THE EITI STANDARDS 
The EITI standards is a combination of the EITI Principles, criteria and requirements which 
forms guidelines that must be implemented by States and other stakeholders. Also, the EITI 
validation guide serves as an essential part of the EITI scheme even though it relates more 
to the compliance assessment procedures.46 There are twelve EITI principles, six criteria 
and twenty-one requirements. The requirements are arranged into six categories. The 
standards integrate progressive time frames and deadlines for implementation, which must 
be based on the periodic publication of EITI Reports and constant supervision of the 
process by the MSG. The Standards goes as far as specifying the kind of information that 
must be published and the basic requirements for member States.47 The latest version of the 
Standard has gone on to require the inclusion of contentious issues such as proffering 
information on who are the beneficial owners of extractive companies and the need for 
transparency and specificity in the extractive contract between extractive companies and 
their host states.48 
5.3.1 EITI Principles  
The end of the first EITI Conference in 2003 in London culminated in the creation of the 12 
EITI Principles. These principles are solemn declaration of the convictions of the member 
parties of the conference and they provide as follows: 
1. “We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important 
engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and 
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poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social 
impacts”. 
2. “We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s 
citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interests of their 
national development”. 
3. “We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over 
many years and can be highly price dependent”. 
4. “We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure over 
time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for 
sustainable development”. 
5. “We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the 
extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and 
accountability”. 
6. “We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of 
respect for contracts and laws”. 
7. “We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment that 
financial transparency may bring”. 
8. “We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all citizens 
for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure”. 
9. “We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability in 
public life, government operations and in business”. 
10. “We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of 




11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive 
industry companies operating in that country”. 
12. “In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant 
contributions to make – including governments and their agencies, extractive industry 
companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations, investors 
and non-governmental organisations”. 
5.3.2 EITI Criteria 
In the EITI London Conference of 2005, the six EITI Criteria were adopted as bench mark 
standards which participating countries must be careful to comply with. The criteria include 
the following: 
i. Constant publication for public access of each record of payments made by companies to 
governments and income governments receive from companies pursuant to petroleum, gas 
and mining exploration activities.49 
ii. Subjection of the records of revenue paid or received to independent and reliable audit 
standards in line with international best practices.50 
iii. The records of payments and revenues by companies and governments are examined for 
consistency or discrepancies by independent and trustworthy auditors in line with 
international best practices after which the auditor shall publish opinion of the evaluation 
and findings.51 
iv. Similar standards are applicable to private, public and state-owned companies.52 
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v. Prominent involvement of civil society groups in the creation, monitoring of the process 
and evaluation of outcome which will also give room for involvement of public 
discussion.53 
vi. Responsibility of the host state, with the support of international financial organisations, 
to create work plan with economic sustainability, quantifiable targets, implementation 
timelines and anticipated capacity limitations.54 
All countries involved in natural resource extraction are encouraged to implement EITI 
Standards. Any of such countries has to first be admitted as a candidate by the international 
EITI Board upon application.55 Some of the conditions which it must fulfil include a public 
announcement of its commitment in that regard; formulate a plan of action on their its 
objectives and how it intends to attain EITI Compliance level and create a Multi-
Stakeholder Group (MSG) which involves the multinational companies and civil society 
groups.56 A country, which has attained candidature status, is expected to attain compliance 
level with EITI standard within three years thereafter.57 
Under the 2011 edition of EITI rules, twenty-one requirements are provided for 
implementation by states. These rules are as follows: 
1. The State is expected to make an affirmative public proclamation of its desires to 
implement and be committed to EITI.58 
2. The State is also expected to sound its commitment and willingness to work in co-
operation with civil society groups and corporations towards giving effect to EITI.59 
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3. The State is called upon to assign a high-ranking officer to direct the implementation 
process of EITI.60 
4. The State is requisitioned to create a MSG, which will supervise the implementation 
process of EITI.61 
5. The MSG, after consultation with relevant EITI stakeholders, shall have a consensus and 
publish a work plan with financial projections, which include quantifiable goals and 
implementation timelines and possible restraining.62 
6. The State is expected to guarantee the independence and efficiency of civil society 
groups in the process.63 
7. The State is enjoined to involve extractive companies in the process of EITI 
implementation.64 
8. The State is expected to eradicate every barrier that would stand on the path of EITI 
implementation.65 
9. The MSG is required to reach an accepted understanding of substantiality and reporting 
model.66 
10. The establishment assigned with the duty of formulating the EITI harmonisation report 
must possess the reputation that is perceived to be reliable, trustworthy and their 
professional competence must not be in doubt by the MSG.67 
11. The State is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that every pertinent company 
and public institution hand in their periodic report.68 













12. The government has a duty to ensure that the reports produced by extractive companies 
are founded on audited accounts based on international best practices.69 
13. The government is also to certify that the reports made by government are founded on 
audited accounts on the basis of international best practices.70 
14. Extractive companies are to exhaustively disclose every substantial payment made to 
the government in compliance with acceptable reporting guideline.71 
15. Government agencies are to exhaustively disclose each substantial revenues obtained 
from the extractive companies in compliance with acceptable reporting guideline.72 
16. The MSG must be satisfied that the organisation engaged to harmonise the figures in 
the government and company reports adequately carry out that function.73 
17. The organisation which is to carry out the function in requirement 16 above must ensure 
that a robust EITI Report is produced which will identify every inconsistency, or explain 
them and make possible recommendations for necessary corrective course of actions.74 
18. The State and the MSG have the task of ensuring succinct and open access of the EITI 
Reports to members of the public so as to generate public discussion on the findings.75 
19 Extractive companies are to give their full support to EITI implementation.76 
20. The government and MSG are enjoined to take up measures lay to bare lessons gained, 
deal with discrepancies and make sure that the execution process of EITI is sustainable. 













Implementing countries must make certain of are required to hand in their validation 
reports to the EITI Board as and when they are due.77 
21. The previous twenty requirements must be strictly complied with by relevant parties. 
For State parties, it is a prerequisite and a post requisite to obtain and retain their 
implementing and compliant status.78 
The EITI Standard of 2016 further provides eight requirements expected of countries that 
want to attain or maintain the compliant status. These requirements include: 
1. Oversight functions to be carried out by the MSG; 
2. Adequate legal and institutional framework for the allotment of contracts and obtaining 
licenses in the extractive industry; 
3. Natural resource exploration and production; 
4. Revenue collection; 
5. Revenue distribution; 
6. Social and economic expenditure; 
7. Results and impact; 
8. Compliance timelines within which implementing countries are to give effect to the 2016 
global EITI Standard.79 
The latest EITI Standards of 2016 also amended the Validation procedure. The current 
procedure commences with the preliminary stage of validation, which is followed with data 
gathering, the EITI International Secretariat confer with stakeholders and finally a re-
evaluation is carried out by the independent validator appointed by the EITI Board.80 The 








Board makes the final decision regarding the Validation process.81 The requirements are 
applicable to the EITI Implementing States. The Validation process is a fundamental 
requirement under the EITI Standard for the purpose of gauging State performance.82 It 
encourages dialogue and knowledge dissemination at the State level and preserves the 
credibility of EITI due to the uniform standard which it requires of every EITI 
implementing countries.83 
Even though EITI standards are said to be voluntary, the failure of State parties to comply 
with the requirements of the EITI standards, especially after having expressed their 
commitment to do so, are not without consequences. There are various circumstances and 
various consequences which follow thereto. A State party must attain a certain benchmark 
level of progress in order to avoid certain consequences. 
(i) Where a state party is deemed to have made no progress, this would warrant automatic 
delisting of that country from the membership of EITI. 
(ii) In the event that the country is found to have made inadequate progress, the country 
risks suspension. However, the country still has a lifeline until the second validation 
process within which it may carry out corrective measures that would guarantee its 
restoration. 
(iii) If the country is found to have made meaningful progress, it would be regarded as an 
EITI Candidate and required to undertake corrective measures pending the period of second 
validation.84 
It is apparent that the EITI standards focus more on state parties than resource extractive 
countries and civil society groups. States are subjected to periodic assessment and so a 
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considerable buren is placed on state parties such that they face likely sanctions for default 
in compliance with the EITI Standards. However, similar measures are not applied to 
resource extractive countries and civil society groups. EITI Standards would serve far 
reaching purpose if similar resource extractive countries and civil society groups are also 
placed on similar assessment to determine their level of compliance with their obligations 
under the EITI Standards and face possible sanctions where they are found to have 
defaulted. 
5.3 EITI STANDARDS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
As noted previously in this thesis, states have recognised rights under international law to 
exercise sovereign authority over their natural resources in accordance with their social, 
economic, environmental and developmental objectives. This right confers on the 
institutions of the states the duty to administer natural resources within their own 
geographical space in such a manner as to ensure a judicious, sustainable, and stability of 
the ecosystem in such a way that will lead to the attainment of developmental strides for the 
benefit of their people.85  This standard is not just limited to the present generation. The 
global drive towards sustainable development has drafted future generations into the picture 
and states must acknowledge this in their natural resource management.  By implication, 
relevant stakeholders must ensure necessary actions are put in place to curb profligate 
utilisation of natural resources and the revenue accruing thereof in such a manner as to 
encourage minimisation of economic sabotage and waste.  
An empirical study carried out in 2016 shows that there is no significant improvement in 
the governance and economic development index and compliance of EITI member 
countries between the Pre-EITI and Post-EITI candidacy period.86 EITI has a paramount 
role of transforming critical governance and development pointers. However, the non-
binding nature of EITI principle limits its effect. It is common occurrence to see private and 
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public stakeholders defy EITI standards.87 EITI focuses on public disclosure of the revenue 
accruing from the extractive industry, whereas it shows little concern on how the revenue is 
spent by governments.88 Less short term impact is expected of EITI implementation in poor 
developing countries due to low domestic capability which will guarantee significant 
implementation.89 The implementation process is estimated to take an average of 5 to 10 
years given the challenges encountered by implementing countries. The length of time in 
implementing the EITI standards automatically translates to mean that the positive result 
will only manifest after a long period of time, especially after full implementation of the 
EITI Standards.90 
Stakeholders, especially the civil society groups have constantly advocated the extension of 
the EITI Standards towards incorporation of social and environmental reflections on 
matters bordering on utilisation of revenue obtained from resource exploration, corporate 
social responsibility etc.91 An assessment of the initial decade of EITI implementation 
demonstrates that the initiative fell short of attaining its premier principle of promoting “the 
prudent use of natural resource wealth… for sustainable economic growth that contributes 
to sustainable development and poverty reduction”.92 However, the EITI Standard of 2013 
and 2016 is more forward looking and does not only concentrate on revenue transparency 
like the previous EITI rules. Hence, other issues of concern such as how revenue accruing 
from the extractive industry is expended have been included under the new EITI Standard. 
Since this standard has only been recently formulated, it is yet to be seen how well it would 
be implemented to reflect sustainable deliverables to the people. 
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5.4 GHANA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EITI STANDARDS 
Attaining the status of an EITI implementing and compliant country is a laudable 
achievement for resource rich countries. This shows their intention to ensure effective 
management of their natural resources in order to avoid the natural resources curse. It is 
imperative that states do not lose their status as EITI implementing and compliant country 
by way of dismissal or suspension. This is because of the benefit and credibility which the 
said status confers on such state in the eyes of the international community. Also, 
international financial organisations such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) would easily consider it as a factor that will determine whether to render financial 
assistance to such country especially if it is a developing country like Ghana that would 
easily run to them to finance their budget and developmental projects when there is a down 
turn in their economy. Even though Ghana has attained the status of EITI compliant 
country, it is still imperative to examine how well it has implemented the EITI standards, 
most importantly towards the avoidance of natural resource curse and provide 
developmental deliverables for the benefit of her citizens.  
The rundown of Ghana’s walk with the EITI is as follows: it entered its commitment to 
EITI in May 2003, established Multi-Stakeholders Group in January 2005; became an EITI 
Candidate in September 2007; created its first Report in September 2007; made its 
Validation Report in June 2010 and attained Compliant Status in October 2010.93 Ghana 
has the reputation of being the first country to survey its mining industry under its EITI 
reporting.94 Ghana had focused the implementation of the EITI standard on its mining 
sector until April 2010 when it was broadened to include the oil and gas sector. It would be 
recalled that it was about that time Ghana began serious business in petroleum exploration. 
Apart from the requirements of the EITI standards, there are no clearly defined procedures 
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for its implementation.95 According to the IMF, the four components of revenue 
transparency include clearly defined role and duties of institutions, open budgetary 
procedure, accessibility of information in the public domain and guarantee of integrity.96 It 
is essential to understudy the path towed by Ghana and how well it has implemented the 
EITI Standards in the oil and gas sector, especially with regard to petroleum resources 
revenue management. Hence, this section of this work shall focus on the Ghanaian 
implementation of the EITI Standards under the GHEITI framework and other legislative 
and institutional mechanisms.  
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF EITI STANDARDS UNDER GHEITI FRAMEWORK 
In the early part of the year 2007, the Ghanaian government set up a website for the 
purpose of transmitting information on the extractive industry to members of the public.97 
Civil society groups are of the view that Ghana’s reporting practice on EITI ought to entail 
the social as well as the environmental consequences of mining activities.98 Discontent over 
the limitations of EITI on issues of revenue paid by oil companies to governments without 
concerning itself with issues of how the revenue is managed thereafter, led to the 
formulation of the “EITI++”. The initiative seeks to builds on the foundation set up by 
EITI. The “EITI++” is a transparency initiative by the World Bank which is devised to 
address entire value chain of resource revenue management ranging from revenue 
processing, management and deployment of resource revenue to attain sustainable 
development.99 The initiative relates transparency back to the aspects of licensing and 
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moving forward to the aspect of revenue expenditure.100 This portrays the World Bank’s 
desire to support governments of developing countries to implement good governance 
mechanisms all through the various stages of resource exploitation.101  
With regard to the implementation of EITI, the Ghanaian government created the Ghanaian 
version of the EITI which is known as the Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (GHEITI). The GHEITI is saddled with the responsibility of seeing to the 
implementation of the principles of EITI at the national level. GHEITI acts as an inter-
phase between the government, petroleum companies and civil society groups who are all 
stakeholders in the industry.102 Unlike its Nigerian counterpart which is created pursuant to 
the Nigerian Extractive Industry Act 2007, the GHEITI does not enjoy a legal personality 
pursuant to a statute. Although the EITI standard does not make any requirement for the 
reproduction of EITI at the local level based on any statute, the creation of a national 
legislation can give a tremendous assistance and effectiveness to the implementation of 
EITI.103 National legislation serves the opportunity to enhance the implementation EITI 
Standards. For instance, under the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Act 
2007, compliance with the EITI standards is mandatory. The Act goes on to provide various 
offences for breach of the Act such as failure or refusal to give false information or report, 
rendering false account etc. These offences are punishable with various penalties such as 
fines and penalties.104 
Since 2003 when Ghana signed on to the EITI initiative, it has been operating the EITI 
without a specific local legislative framework. The country faced a lot of challenges in the 
implementation stage due to the existing gap as a result of lack of legislative mechanism to 
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regulate resource governance. It was not until 2015 that a Bill was made as an attempt 
towards filling this gap. Amongst other things, the Bill sought to confer legal personality on 
Ghana EITI (GHEITI); creation of penalties for default by government, the composition of 
the Multi Stakeholders Group, easy information accessibility, establishment of timelines for 
Government agencies to make disclosures and the Ghana Revenue Authority to make their 
report available.105 
Based on the requirements of the EITI Standards, civil society groups are entitled to a 
beneficial environment that would enable them participate and express their freedom of 
speech on matters concerning the transparent management of the petroleum resources.106 
Civil society groups also need to exercise high level of accountability and transparency on 
their own part. Where the credibility and interest of their funding source have become a 
serious cause of questioning, they are unlikely to be taken seriously.107 Apart from the issue 
of funding and access to information, the fundamental issue of capacity to understand the 
intricacies of the highly technical petroleum sector is also a question to be resolved. A 
respondent adequately captured this challenge when he was quoted as saying:  
Seriously, we are here making all the noise about getting contracts 
released, but how many has the capacity to understand how oil recites are 
used, and the implications of all the agreements that are being made in 
respect to Oil and Gas? […]I don’t think more than organizations really 
have the capacity to do Oil and Gas analysis. That really needs to be built 
up if we are going to have a real, meaningful role in the monitoring of the 
legal framework.”108 
Despite the relative success achieved by Ghana in the implementation of the EITI standard, 
the 2017 validation report of Ghana’s level of compliance has shown a deficit in certain 
areas of implementation. In the aspects of distributing revenues accruing from the 
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extractive industry, legal framework and fiscal regime, the report shows that Ghana has 
made meaningful progress.109 Even though the aspect of social expenditures is 
recommended but not a requirement, the report finds that Ghana has not made satisfactory 
progress in that regard.110 The aspect of revenue management and expenditures is yet to be 
considered as a basis of assessment of the compliance level of states.  
EITI has received criticism on the basis that it lacks guidelines for the organisation. This 
leaves Ghana with the discretionary option as to how to implement EITI, giving room for 
the kid gloves approach used in implementing the EITI standard in the mining sector.111 
There have been concerns that GHEITI operates largely on “goodwill” of its “stakeholders” 
and needs to institutionalised, particularly through legislation. These calls have led to 
various commitments to promulgate an EITI law.112 Although there are provisions of 
petroleum laws relating to transparency and accountability in petroleum resource 
management, there is no specific legislative framework, which provides for the realisation 
of the EITI standards. Countries, which have enacted legislative framework on EITI, have 
been seen to quickly implement the initiative in contrast to countries like Ghana who are 
yet to encapsulate EITI into a legislative framework.113 
5.5 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSPARENCY IN GHANAIAN 
PETROLEUM SECTOR 
The PRMA 2011 paid particular attention to issues of transparency and accountability of 
returns obtained from the petroleum industry. Hence, the Act has mandated the Minister to 
ensure a concurrent publication of records of petroleum output, the price and revenue 
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received thereto in the national gazette and in not less than two daily newspapers owned by 
state in not more than thirty days after the end of each quarter.114 The information must also 
be hosted in the official website of the Ministry of Petroleum and presented before the 
Ghanaian parliament on the date of publication of the national gazette.115 The PRMA also 
obliges the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning to infuse reports on the various 
petroleum funds, including audited financial statements for the previous year highlighting 
transfers into and out of the PHF, GSF and GHF, into the annual appropriation statement 
and economic plan the Minister will tender before Parliament.116 The reports must be apt, 
concise and comprehensible in a public friendly manner. The failure of the minister in this 
regard bears severe consequences as the minister may be criminally culpable and liable to a 
fine of up to two hundred and fifty penalty units.117 
Section 49 of the PRMA establishes transparency as a fundamental principle that must be 
observed in the administration of revenue obtained from petroleum resources. Amongst 
other things, the said section provides that international best practice transparency and 
governance be applied in the management and savings of petroleum revenue and connected 
matters. It commands the Ghanaian Parliament, the Minister, Bank of Ghana and the 
Investment Advisory Committee to take necessary steps in the course of their functions 
under the law to ensure that transparency measures and open public access to information is 
guaranteed. The minister is further charged with the duty to ensure that concerns related to 
the Petroleum Funds created under the Act, the Operations Management Contracts and 
yearly reports are put up in the public domain for easy access to the people. 
Even though the PRMA has extensively made provisions on the need for transparency in 
the petroleum industry, these provisions are not couched in the context of particularity for 
the application of EITI.118 The inadequacies in the PRMA is seen in the various 
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impediments which it has placed on information gathering and giving room for the 
classification of certain information as confidential. Section 49 (3) of the PRMA provides 
that “information or data, the disclosure of which could in particular prejudice significantly 
the performance of the Ghana Petroleum Funds may be declared by the Minister as 
confidential, subject to the approval of Parliament”. This provision has the tendency to blur 
the gains of transparency which the Act intends to project. This provision can give room for 
ministerial abuse of power and cover up instances which would have exposed certain 
malpractices in the sector that could lead to mismanagement of petroleum revenue.  
The PRMA was enacted on the understanding that by virtue of Article 257 (6) of the 
Ghanaian Constitution, the ownership of petroleum resources is vested on the President 
who holds it in trust for the people, the beneficiary. Consequently, actions taken by the 
government with regard to the management of the said resources must accrue benefits and 
the paramount interest of the people must be taken into consideration. This underscores the 
need for the PRMA creation of the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) which 
places the body with the responsibility of ensuring that persons in charge of petroleum 
resource management perform their duties in accordance with the provisions of the law.119 
The PIAC was created by the PRMA120 as a citizens-based statutory body which performs 
independent supervisory services over the collection, allotment and utilisation of petroleum 
resources revenue in Ghana.121 The PIAC is created for the purpose of: monitoring and 
appraising the level of compliance with the Act by government, petroleum companies and 
other concerned institutions as regards the management and utilisation of petroleum 
revenue and investments; create  avenue that will generate public discussion on contentious 
issues of petroleum revenue management and expenditure’s compliance with 
developmental strides and objectives; and engage in independent assessment of Executive 
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managements of petroleum revenues on the one hand, and the Parliament’s performance of 
their oversight function thereto.122 
The membership of the PIAC comprises of thirteen persons who include: a member 
nominated by the civil-society and community-based organisations to represent their 
interest and a member each to be nominated by various stakeholder groups including 
GHEITI.123 On the authority of Section 54 (2) PRMA the members of the Accountability 
Committee are to be appointed by the Minister. The provision of Section 54 (2) is quite 
disturbing. Why would the appointment of the Minister still be necessary, for a Committee 
which should ordinarily be civil society driven, after the nominations of the organisation 
whose interest should be protected by the representatives of their choice. The implication of 
the appointing power of the Minister implies that the Minister may elect to disregard a 
particular nomination made by the relevant organisation. In order to guarantee the 
independence of the committee, it would have been more appropriate to remove the 
overbearing influence of the Minister. Thus, ideally, the provision should provide that the 
nomination of a person by the relevant group is sufficient to make such person a member of 
the Committee.  
The PIAC has a prominent role to play in ensuring transparency in the petroleum resource 
management. That is why parliament has provided that the ministerial declaration of 
confidentiality as a ground for withholding information from public consumption shall not 
apply to the PIAC.124 Hence, any factor, which will stand on the way of Committee from 
creditably performing its function, must be curbed.  
Another challenge that stands on the path of the PIAC is the issue of funding. Transparency 
issues have continued to plague the process of grant of petroleum contracts and rights. 
Contract disclosures are currently left at the disposition and pleasure of the government and 
companies without any legislative compulsion for disclosures. The National Petroleum 
Corporation of Ghana has made certain public disclosure of its affairs but has remained 
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discreet on certain issues mostly related to the award of petroleum contacts and 
development chart about the Jubilee field.125 On the few occasions where those contracts 
terms have been brought to the public glare, the criteria for contract awards have been 
problematic.126 Despite the competitive bidding process as required by the PEP Act, 
petroleum contracts have continued to be entered pursuant to direct negotiations with 
varying terms, contrary to the provision of the Act.127 Of late, there has been an infusion of 
anti-corruption certification clause which commits parties to ensure compliance with the 
tenure of anti-graft laws of Ghana, the home country of the company and provisions of 
other anti-graft conventions.128  
In line with the EITI requirement, the MSG is to collaborate with relevant bodies to make a 
publication of its whole cost estimated work plan. The GHEITI Secretariat and the MSG 
jointly created a work plan of GHEITI activities for the year 2017, paying particular 
attention on issues of “responsibilities, timelines, budget and expected output and 
outcomes”.129 The disclosure requirement of the EITI standards has not been, altogether, 
unrewarding in Ghana. Due to the disclosure and reporting requirement, in 2012 and 2013 
reporting an inconsistency in figures amounting up to US$55 million was discovered from 
the payment made to the GRA by Anadarko WCTP Ltd.130 GHEITI has continued to 
canvass that, other than payments given to the government, petroleum companies should 
make detailed disclosure on certain activities of theirs comprising of overhead cost, capital 
allowance assessment, petroleum sales and haulages of petroleum products by GNPC.131 
Multinational companies such as Kosmos Energy and Tullow Oil have often defaulted in 
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this regard. They would rather prefer to supply the information only to establishments of 
their home countries in total disregard for Ghanaian institutions.132 
GHEITI faces a serious crisis of representation, as it has not been forthcoming in instituting 
useful connections with other national and community representatives. Apart from the 
MSG, GHEITI lacks formal connection with any state institutions mechanism of 
enforceable such as the Parliament legislature or Auditor-General. On no occasion has the 
report of GHEITI been a subject of discussion at the Ghanaian Parliament.133 In their 2017 
Annual Progress Report, the GHEITI have listed the various challenges which they 
encountered that otherwise, limited them from fulfilling their objectives for the year. These 
challenges include: limited funds to produce its 2015 mining and petroleum industry 
reports; failed promises by development partners in rendering financial support towards the 
fulfilment of budgetary permutation and scheme of work for 2017; and the failure in having 
the GHEITI Bill enacted into law.134 
According to Oppong, EITI has eased the adaptation of market-based practices and nominal 
policy access, but has proffered minimal impact on transforming the institutional 
landscape.135 The NRGI Report of 2015 pronounced a verdict on the level of 
implementation of EITI in Ghana when it stated thus:  
…there are important issues that remain in terms of legislation, 
institutional capacity building, revenue management, contract disclosures 
and accountability. The same report indicates that despite the existence of 
references in the constitution, legislation and other key documents to an 
overall strategy, the government does not have a coordinated long-term 
strategy that links the decision-making process of extracting natural 
resources and the investments in social, economic and human 
development objectives (NRGI 2015).136 
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Transparency and accountability are the twin pillars that forestall against corruption and 
mismanagement of natural resource revenue. Transparency allows every action of 
government to manifest in the eyes and mind of the public. Accountability ensures that 
private and public entities are subjected to responsibility for their actions. For, what good 
does it serve the public to understanding the workings of government without having the 
means of making them responsible for their actions?  
Transparency per se is disabled in the absence of accountability as the application of both 
variables reduces the chances of corruption and misappropriation of public funds.137 
Transparency and accountability initiatives such as the EITI Standards is essential in the 
business transactions between host States and multinational companies as it aids in 
reducing inconsistency in information dissemination and accrues greater revenue returns for 
host countries; it also lessens the likelihood of  misgivings and ill feelings amidst the 
aristocratic class of host states.138  
Transparency helps host countries find themselves in a position of strength in the 
negotiation table and confer them with strong bargaining power against multi-national 
companies which are mostly more informed.139 When it is introduced into the domestic 
affairs of a state, it sheds light on bargains reached by the elites on behalf of the people and 
encourages elites of developing country to set asidesome portion of revenue for 
developmental project.140 The thought that the citizens of host countries are monitoring and 
appraising the negotiation process encourages the leadership of these countries to strike 
deals that best meet the interest of the people.  
The EITI Standards is targeted at entrenching transparency and accountability and the gains 
which it portends. Ghana had long subscribed to the implementation of the EITI standards. 
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By virtue of being an oil producing country, it is regarded as one of the implementing 
countries of EITI. The country has gained the status of an EITI compliant country. That 
notwithstanding, it is pertinent to examine how well it has implemented the standards of 
EITI regarding revenue management. There are pertinent reasons for Ghana to continue to 
maintain its status as an EITI compliant country and above that, ensure that the impact of 
its compliance is manifest in sustainable socio-economic and human-capital development 
growth in the country. Where there is no physical manifestation of the impact of EITI on 
the lives of the common citizens, it would make little meaning and the whole essence of 
EITI would be defeated.  
Findings from the analysis in this work show that the existing legislative frameworks on 
transparency in the oil and gas sector in Ghana have loopholes on disclosures. It is 
recommended that a proper implementation of the freedom of information should be 
promoted in order to allow citizens free access to information regarding the dealings in the 
oil and gas sector.141 Thus, the adoption of the Freedom of Information Act 2019 (Act 989) 
would ensure open access to petroleum revenue and its utilisation; disclosure of the identity 
of bidders and bidding paper works. However, even if the Freedom for Information Act is 
enacted, there would still be the need to amend the relevant sections of the PRMA, 
especially that which obstructs freedom to information in the pretext of ‘classified 
information’. The reason being that by virtue of Section 1 of the PRMA, the Act has been 
placed on a higher pedestal than any other laws apart from the Ghanaian Constitution. It 
therefore means that the persons could still find cover under the classified information as 
contained in the law to perpetrate opacity, which encourages mismanagement and 
corruption in the extractive industry.  
Also, there is the need to fast track the legislative process in the enactment of the GHEITI 
specific legislation. The creation of specific legislation on transparency is essential to 
guarantee the effectiveness of revenue management.142 There are many advantages in so 
doing. It would, first of all, confer GHEITI with the necessary legal personality to sue and 
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be sued. That way GHEITI would possess the necessary legal clout as a proper party to 
approach the court to enforce compliance with the EITI Standards. The law would also 
create adequate means of funding for EITI and other relevant transparency driven 
institutions. The provision of adequate funding for these bodies would guarantee their 
independence and commitment to effectively play their role as the watch dog in the 
Ghanaian oil and gas industry. On another note, the act would give the EITI Standards an 
imperative undertone; create offences and penalties for breach of the standards.  
Significant improvement in resource governance is crucial in putting together the massive 
revenues estimated to attain the sustainable development in developing countries in Africa 
and Ghana in particular.  EITI still holds the pole position as the most feasible multilateral 
governance initiative on petroleum for oil producing countries to adopt. In order to continue 
to uphold its relevance, EITI must take further steps to be concerned with issues of 
transparency as it affects revenue management and expenditure by government officials.143 
This issue has been addressed in the 2016 version of the EITI Standards. However, EITI is 
yet to start considering these factors in the assessment of a state’s compliance with the 













CHAPTER SIX: SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF PETROLEUM REVENUE 
IN GHANA AND THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Accounting for and management of petroleum revenue in Ghana in line with best practices 
is a major question the research seeks to answer. Apart from the employment of transparent 
means of management of petroleum resources, there is the need to give consideration to 
approaches that foster the increase in the revenue base of the country in a manner that the 
funds from the proceeds of oil accruing to the state are multiplied through the promotion of 
socially responsible investments. One global approach that has emerged has been through 
the recognition of the Santiago Principles on the management of sovereign wealth funds. 
The Santiago principles have a global appeal; demonstrating how countries that have made 
fortune from petro-wealth effectively managed it for the good of the people. 
 
The management of natural resources and petroleum resources of countries in particular, 
has been a major concern. Most countries with oil and gas discoveries see the resources as 
an important source for economic prosperity.1 However, the resources rather than turning 
into a blessing may eventually become a curse to the country because of the failure to 
manage the resources. It may become an opportunity for the political class to engage in rent 
seeking and reward their allies. There is the tendency that the focus will be on exploration 
and production while other critical sectors such as agriculture, mining and real estate are 
abandoned. The implications of this could be economic woes and even the rise of political 
unrest and agitation by groups feeling short-changed by the actions of the political class. 
 
In response to the situation, countries have developed petroleum revenue management laws 
to ensure that the proceeds from oil and gas are managed effectively for the betterment of 
the people. The ideal situation therefore is to ensure that the resources are not wasted and 
that the sectors of the economy needing development are effectively supported. One of such 
considerations in the development of the principles is the management of petroleum 
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revenue through the use of the sovereign wealth fund (SWF). Under the SWF arrangement, 
the proceeds are invested in certain areas as specified by the law and policy establishing the 
fund. Over the years, the development and implementation of the SWF has been taken as 
being questionable and it became imperative that measures are developed and put in place 
for the proper implementation and management of the fund. Therefore, the SWF 
management model was developed under the framework of the Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds (GAPP).2 The GAPP could offer a 
template for the new countries seeking to develop and implement the GAPP. This chapter, 
therefore, makes a case for the development and implementation of the GAPP in oil and gas 
sector in Ghana examining how the current law meets the standards set. 
6.2 SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS  
The question for determination here is: what does a sovereign wealth fund entail? 
According to the International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
“Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that 
are owned by the government.  Created by the general government for macroeconomic 
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and 
employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets.”3 
“SWFs as state-held investment funds that are financed by the proceeds of commodity 
exports, fiscal or trade surpluses and privatizations, with their main objective being 
investment in real or financial assets”.4  
It had been argued that SWFs must satisfy three cardinal criteria such as: government 
ownership; investment in foreign financial assets and it must be macroeconomic oriented.5 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), proposes that SWF seek to achieve five varying 
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objectives which are the (1) stabilization of the economy through provision of revenue for 
use in times of price and exchange rate fluctuation; (2) investment in the asset of the state 
for the needs of the state and for future generations as natural resources may become 
depleted due to exploitation; (3) to increase the countries revenue reserve base through 
returns on investment (4) provision of funding for infrastructural projects; and (5) sources 
for provision of pension for retirement benefits of the citizens.6 
The development of SWF dates back to 1953 when the Kuwait Investment Authority was 
formed to manage its oil revenue as a commodity funded SWF. Since then, there has been 
the growth in sovereign wealth funds with many countries establishing different funds for 
the management of the revenues accruing from natural resources. The global growth of 
SWF has placed them in a position of prime importance in the international financial 
market. These funds now offer different ranges of financial products in the capital market, 
thus making them play lead roles. As at March, 2018, there were 78 functional sovereign 
wealth funds in the world and the assets of investment in sovereign wealth stands at US 
$7.45tn.7 
In the Middle East, Russia and China, concerns were raised regarding the issues of 
transparency and motives behind the operation of the sovereign wealth funds.8 Therefore 
with the strain and relationship of some of these countries operating SWF, it became more 
expedient to ensure clarity and possibly obviate the fears and suspicions. This development 
saw the emergence of the G8 group of industrialised nations giving a directive to the IMF 
to develop a set of codes and standards for the operation of sovereign wealth funds. The 
International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds through the 
instrumentalities of the IMF was put in place with the purpose of: establishing “a 
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framework of generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate 
governance and accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices 
by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis”.9 
 
6.3 RESTATEMENT OF THE GAPP PRINCIPLES  
The GAPP contains 24 principles on the management and implementation of the SWF.10 
This set of principles is regarded as global best practices. Their implementation and 
incorporation are expected to create a sound environment and enhance the promotion of the 
SWF schemes, most especially in countries that have not been able to create a SWF that has 
been structured and operated to achieve its proposed objectives. 
6.3.1 Principle 1: Sound Legal Framework  
Principle 1 provides that “The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support 
its effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s)”. There are other sub 
principles contained in principle 1, which are to ensure that there is soundness in the legal 
framework and transactions carried out by the fund. The next sub principle further provides 
for disclosure of the legal basis of the fund, its structure and relationship with other 
government entities. The GAPP therefore appears to support the operation of the SWF 
under a well-established legal framework.  
6.3.2 Principle 2: Policy Disclosure  
Principle 2 provides that “The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and 
publicly disclosed”. The second GAPP principle requires that there should be transparency 
in the policy. Transparency, as has been shown, is very relevant in the management of 
petroleum revenue. With transparency rules in place, the people are able to question the 
nature of the investment policy and practices involved.  
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6.3.3 Principle 3: Compatibility with Macro Economic Policies   
Principle 3 provides that “Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic 
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the 
domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall 
macroeconomic policies”. The goal of SWFs will be the promotion of sustainable economic 
development of the state. Looking closely at the objective of SWFs in promoting fiscal 
stability or stimulus as well as the use of the proceeds to bring about infrastructural 
development, it may be apt to conclude that the SWF should be directed in a manner that 
they meet the country’s economic aspirations.  
6.3.4 Principle 4: Public Disclosure of Investment Rules and Arrangements  
Principle 4 suggests that “there should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, 
procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, 
withdrawal, and spending operations”. The first sub principle requires that there should be a 
public disclosure of the source of fund for the sovereign wealth fund, while the second sub 
principle requires disclosure of the approaches to spending and withdrawals from the fund.  
6.3.5 Principle 5: Timely Reporting and Inclusion of Statistics in Data Base 
Principle 5 is to the effect that “the relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be 
reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where 
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets”. This principle showcases the importance of data 
and statistics on the functioning of the SWF. It is appreciated that they may be needed from 
time to time for the macroeconomic planning of the state.  
6.3.6 Principle 6: Clarity of Roles and Independence  
Principle 6 requires that “the governance framework for the SWF should be sound and 
establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate 
accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its 
objectives”. For the functioning of the SWF, it will be important that accountability 
framework gives cognizance to allocation of roles and that there should be independence. 




place by a governmental agency. In such a situation, the management is not kept within the 
whims and caprices of the political class, which may turn out to lead to counterproductive 
recommendations, or motives that will not be in the best interest of the fund.  
6.3.7 Principle 7: Formulation of Clear Objectives  
Principle 7 states out that “the owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the 
members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and 
exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations”. Therefore, the question as to what should 
be the procedure for appointment of fund managers should be clearly defined and there 
should be the power in the owner to exercise oversight functions on how the fund should be 
implemented. It, however, provides for the need to enhance independence even though the 
government, who is the owner of the fund, makes appointment.  
6.3.8 Principle 8: Acting in the Interest of the SWF 
Principle 8 requires that “the governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the 
SWF, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its 
functions”. The essence of this is that, the objectives of establishment of the fund should be 
met; the authority administering the fund should possess the requisite expertise to act and 
carry out the functions. The government should, therefore, not create a situation whereby 
the appointment of the fund managers are done in a manner that is aimed to score political 
points. The fund should therefore be divorced from political considerations in the 
appointment of the fund managers. Rather, there should be emphasis on professional 
expertise and not political patronage. 
6.3.9 Principle 9: Independent Implementation of Strategies  
Principle 9 requires that “the operational management of the SWF should implement the 
SWF’s strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined 
responsibilities”. This GAPP Principle places emphasis on strategic implementation in an 
independent manner.  What this entails is that the operation of the fund should enjoy 




6.3.10 Principle 10: Clear Definition for Accountability Framework  
Principle 10 provides that “the accountability framework for the SWF’s operations should 
be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or 
management agreement”. One way that the loopholes or financial leakages can be blocked 
to ensure that the funds for the sovereign wealth are well accounted for is that the law and 
implementation mechanism of the funds should be expressed in clear terms.  
6.3.11 Principle 11: Timely preparation of annual reports in line with best practices  
Principle 11 states that “An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the 
SWF’s operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in 
accordance with recognised international or national accounting standards in a consistent 
manner”. The essence of having an annual report is to provide information on the progress 
made with the funds and enables the managers, the government and the people to question 
its operation. Another reason is to determine whether the result for which the fund is put in 
place is being realised. Corporate governance practices require that there should be 
framework for financial reporting. Disclosure of financial activities remains one of the 
hallmarks of the development and implementation of an effective corporate governance 
code.  
6.3.12 Principle 12: Annual Audit of Financial Statements in line with Best Practices  
Building on corporate governance for the fund is the requirement of annual audit on 
financial statements in accordance with the codes of best practices. Principle 12 
recommends that “the SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited 
annually in accordance with recognised international or national auditing standards in a 
consistent manner”. Auditing is crucial to the operation of the SWF. Auditors’ report is 
very useful in deciding whether the financial conduct in respect of the funds is carried out 
based on regulatory or best practices requirements. It is also a useful feedback mechanism 
in knowing whether the funds are mismanaged and whether the handling of the finances of 




essence of ensuring that there are auditors to verify the authenticity of the outgoings and 
incomings in the management of the SWF.  
6.3.13 Principle 13: Clearly Defined Professional and Ethical Standards  
Principle 13 requires that “professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and 
made known to the members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), management, and staff”. 
Professional and ethical standards in the operation of the fund should be well known. There 
are certain ethical practices that should be employed by the funds. For example, it will be 
expected that SWF should not invest in areas that will result in damaging the reputation of 
the fund or that of the government; thus, making SWF investment prioritise ethics in its 
operation. It will be expected that SWF should not be an instrument for the investment in 
business ventures that are in flagrant violation of the best practices that frowns against 
environmental degradation. Sovereign wealth should therefore promote green investment. 
The path of investment should favour investing in companies that promote climate change 
mitigation or at least that employs the best available technologies to check against gas 
flaring or promoting energy efficiency. It will also be expected that the SWF should not 
engage in investment in the shares or securities of companies that lack good human rights 
practices or engage in unfair labour practices, child labour or labour practices falling short 
of the standards recommended by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Guidelines 
and Conventions. 
6.3.14 Principle 14: Operational Management Be Based on Economic and Financial 
Grounds 
Principle 14 enjoins that “dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF’s 
operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and follow 
clear rules and procedures”. Principle 14 provides that “SWF operations and activities in 
host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and 
disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate”. Sovereign wealth 
investments transcend national boundaries and thus it is incumbent on the fund to comply 
with the laws of the government of the place of operation. It will be the usual practice of 




formalities in registration and even in the nature of the investment which they can venture 
into are regulated.  
6.3.15 Principle 15: Compliance with regulatory and disclosure requirements of host 
states 
Principle 15, building on principle 14, requires that “SWF operations and activities in host 
countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure 
requirements of the countries in which they operate”. Every country has its investment 
regulatory requirement and rules for disclosure. It is expected that these are complied with 
by the fund managers. Thus, a fund with an investment presence in the UK will have to 
comply with the Listing Rules if its shares are listed on the London Stock Exchange.  
6.3.16 Principle 16: Public disclosure of government objectives and independence of 
managing entity  
The 16th principle requires that “The governance framework and objectives, as well as the 
manner in which the SWF’s management is operationally independent from the owner, 
should be publicly disclosed”. Other emphasis is on independent operation of the fund from 
the ownership and there is also the requirement that this should be disclosed publicly. The 
extent of the control of the fund should be a common knowledge. 
6.3.17 Principle 17: Public disclosure of financial information 
Principle 17 states that the “relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be 
publicly disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute 
to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries”.   
6.3.18 Principle 18: Policy embracing sound principles of risk management 
The 18th principle sates that “the SWF’s investment policy should be clear and consistent 
with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or 
the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management principles”. The first 
sub principle requires that policy on investment should be such that it will guard against 
financial risk exposures using leverage. On the other hand, the second sub principle states 




process of selection and performance are monitored.  The third sub principle requires a 
public disclosure to be made on such policies. It is appreciated that different levels of risks 
are associated with investments. These could include political risks which may take the 
form of challenges in the law and regulatory environment, civil unrest or adjustment by the 
government of the regulatory environment regarding investments and the changes in the tax 
and fiscal regime of the state. Risks could take the form of market risks that are seen in 
exchange rate risks, inflation risk and changes in interest rate. These risks call for the need 
for adequate risk management mechanism and portfolio. The SWF should, therefore, 
identify these risks and find a means of ameliorating them or not investing in them, giving 
consideration to the governmental choice or nature of investment allowed in the law or the 
management agreement on the funds. For instance, 82% of SWFs in the world are invested 
in public equities while 78% are placed on fixed income.11 
6.3.19  Principle 19: Risk reduction on sound economic and financial grounds 
“The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in 
a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial 
grounds”. Sub principle 1 requires that where the decision of investment is not based on 
economic and financial considerations, this should be disclosed publicly. The second sub 
principle requires that assets to be managed should be “consistent with what is generally 
accepted as sound asset management principles”. 
6.3.20 Principle 20: Avoiding using privilege information for inappropriate 
competition with the private sector 
“The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate 
influence by the broader government in competing with private entities”. Since it is a 
government owned investment, the fund managers who could be privy to certain 
information should not make use of it for ulterior motives through unhealthy competitive 
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practices. This calls for the need for the fund to observe strictly practices that are not 
inimical to the promotion of competition in the area or field where they invest.  
6.3.21 Principle 21: Exercise of Ownership of SWF in Accordance with Investment 
Policies 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity 
investments’ value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a 
manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its 
investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of 
listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights. 
6.3.22 Principle 22: Framework for Identification and Management of Risks 
Principle 22 recommends that “the SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, 
and manages the risks of its operations”. The first sub principle calls for incorporation of 
“reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate 
monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, 
control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, business continuity planning, and an 
independent audit function”. The second sub principle, on the other hand, requires that the 
general approach should be publicly disclosed.   
6.3.23 Principle 23: Reportage on assets should be clearly defined  
“The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of 
the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined 
principles or standards”. The essence of investment in sovereign wealth is that there should 
be a possible increase in the revenue yield of the state. Therefore, it is of critical importance 
that assets of the fund are periodically reviewed with a view of making necessary 
adjustment or improvement in investment decisions regarding the fund.  
6.3.24 Principle 24: Regular review of the implementation of GAPP  
Principle 24 provides that “A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP 




feedback system. It is important that a review is carried out to know the extent to which the 
managers or any person dealing with the operations of the SWF have been able to apply the 
GAPP accordingly. Whilst the GAPP, as earlier pointed out, is not enforceable but a set of 
guidelines, a country choosing to follow it could make it obligatory for the fund managers 
and staff to follow and apply the GAPP to the letter.  
6.4 RELEVANCE OF THE GAPP TO GHANA 
The above principles are very relevant for effective development of the SWF in emerging 
petroleum producing countries of Africa. The legal codification of these laid down 
principles will have far-reaching consequences. It is therefore recommended that 
employing them will go a long way in ensuring that there is transparency and accountability 
in the entire process of development and implementation of the SWF. The level of 
corruption leading to siphoning of the fund will be reduced if the rules of engagement are 
followed to the letter as articulated in the above principles. Generally, the principle will 
therefore meet the standards of a democratic society as it keeps the people informed and 
engaged in the management of their SWF. 
The ideal legal status of the SWF is an area to further take note in conceptualising the legal 
framework. The Santiago principles call for the use of two broad approaches for investment 
in the proceeds of petroleum revenue. A country can choose to manage the revenue through 
SWF through its central bank, which is the government bank or it can create a separate 
entity as the sovereign wealth fund to manage the revenue.12 There are pros and cons for 
the approaches. In the first option, where the management of the sovereign wealth fund is 
through the central bank, the country may well manage the resources without having to set 
up a new legal entity which will mean an additional overhead cost. The country’s bank can 
manage the revenue.  
There is, however, the challenge in such an arrangement. The already existing traditional 
approaches known by the central bank may not be in tandem with what should be reflected 
in a new agency. Traditional institutions are usually prone to resistance to institutional 
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reforms. These could be a critical issue to be contended with. There is also the fact that 
being a government bank, it may not be well positioned with the expertise of management 
of the revenue for the purpose of exploring other forms of investment. The traditional role 
of functioning as a government bank, as the safe keeper of government funds or revenue 
could be distracting by belabouring it with other activities outside its traditional role. In the 
case of the approach in creating a new legal entity as the sovereign wealth fund, the entity 
manages the fund and can, therefore, sue and be sued in its corporate name. This approach 
favours clarity as the accounting system for the fund is not congested with unrelated 
activities. This offers more of specialty in the management of the fund unlike in the case of 
the central bank which carries out multiple tasks alongside the enormous responsibility of 
being involved in management of the resources. 
6.5 APPRAISAL OF GHANAIAN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND BASED ON THE 
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES  
The Santiago principles have generally assumed the status of internationally accepted 
standards on the management of SWF. The Santiago principles are international soft law 
and do not portend any mandatory obligation on state operators of SWF. However, states 
strive to apply the Santiago principles in the management of the SWF. In the same vein, it 
is necessary to examine the SWF of Ghana to examine its level of compliance with the 
Santiago Principles. This can be determined by examining the relevant statutory provisions 
which create and determine the modalities for the operation of the SWF in Ghana. 
On the Santiago Principle 1: States are required to develop a legal framework that 
regulates the operation of the Fund towards the achievement of the set objectives. In line 
with this principle, the government of Ghana enacted the PRMA in 2011 which established 
the various SWFs sourced from the proceeds of their petroleum resources. The Act creates 




and Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF).13 From the take off funding of $69.2 million for the GPF 
in 2011, the fund rose to $450 million at the end of year 2013.14  
The double impact of the GPF is that it gives support to the Ghanaian economy in the short 
run and provides assurance for future earnings.15 The Petroleum Revenue Management 
(Amendment) Act 2015 created a third fund known as the Ghana Infrastructure Investment 
Fund (GIIF).16 The GIIF has a total of assets worth up to US$540 million under its 
control.17 The essence of this fund is to provide means to remedy the infrastructural deficit, 
increase employment creation and boost the economic fortunes of the country.18 This is a 
measure taken by the Ghanaian government to double and permanently sustain expenses on 
infrastructure via oil revenue.19 The operation of the Ghana Petroleum Wealth Fund 
(GPWF) shall herald the winding up of the GHF and GSF after the petroleum resources of 
the country have dried up.20 The Act further sets out the modalities for the operation of 
these various funds. Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that Ghana complies with the 
Santiago Principle 1.  
On the Santiago Principle 2: States are required to clearly lay out the policy purpose of 
the Fund and ensure its accessibility to the public. The essence of the Act is effectively 
captured in its long title thus: “An Act to provide the framework for the collection, 
allocation and management of petroleum revenue in a responsible, transparent, accountable 
and sustainable manner for the benefit of the citizens of Ghana in accordance with Article 
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36 of the Constitution and for related matters”. The GSF is targeted at balancing the 
budgetary deficit and reducing the hardship of economic crunch.21 In 2015 when the prices 
of crude oil dwindled in the international oil market, the Ghanaian government had to resort 
to the GSF to enable it finance the 2015 budget.22 The GHF is created as a future generation 
endowment maintained via excess crude earnings. The (GPWF) is a fund which shall come 
into operation contingent upon the event of depleted petroleum reserves of the country. The 
Act further empowers the designated Minister23 to develop policy towards the investment 
of the GPF. These provisions of the PRMA are in consonant with the second Santiago 
principles.24 
On the Santiago Principle 3: States are to ensure that in the event where the activities of 
the Funds have direct macroeconomic impact on the country, there should be harmony 
between the activities of the fund and the local financial and monetary authorities, in order 
to guarantee regularity in accordance with the entire macroeconomic policies. The PRMA 
establishes a public account known as the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF) at the Bank of 
Ghana. The PHF serves as a temporary account wherein all petroleum earnings of the state 
are first lodged.25 The revenue is subsequently allocated to the various designated funds 
created under the Act in accordance with the provision of the Act.26 The Bank of Ghana is 
also in charge of the daily management of all the funds created under the Act based on the 
Operations Management Agreement and strategy laid down by the Minister.27 In doing this, 
the Bank must take note of the investment guidelines regulating similar kind of investments 
and the need to protect the Ghanaian currency against factors that would weaken its value 
in line with local and foreign exchange policies.28 This shows compliance with the third 
Santiago principle. 
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On the Santiago Principle 4: States are expected to create and make available in the 
public domain, their policies, principles and procedures regarding the funding, withdrawal, 
and expenditure of the Funds. To a large extent, these have been complied with by the 
PRMA. The Act allows the Ghanaian Parliament the leverage to determine the ratio at 
which the petroleum revenue should be disbursed and transferred to the various funds as it 
deems fit.29 Pursuant to this provision, the credit in the GHF is to be dispersed in the 
following order: 50-70% is to be allocated into the annual national budget; at least 30% 
should be deposited into the GHF whereas the residue will be credited into the GSF.30 The 
requirement placed on the withdrawal from the GHF is very strict. Withdrawals can be 
made from the GSF when total petroleum revenue obtained within a quarter is less than one 
fourth of the Annual Budget Funding Amount for the stated financial year.31 
Notwithstanding this, it is within the discretion of the parliament to reach a resolution that a 
particular fraction of the GHF or the interest accruing from its investment should be used 
for a particular purpose at fifteen years interval.32 In other words, in 2026 the Parliament 
may, by a simple majority of its members, alter the ceiling restraint placed on transfers 
from the fund.33 Part of the objective of the PIAC under Section 52 (b) of the Act is to 
create a platform to disseminate and encourage public reaction regarding the management 
of the petroleum revenue to ascertain its conformity with the development objectives of the 
state. 
On the Santiago Principle 5: Relevant macroeconomic statistical analysis and figures 
regarding the Fund must be timeously reported to the people who are the beneficiaries of 
the fund. There are two ways whereby the facts and figures related to the funds are 
conveyed to the public. The first approach is a direct relay of the information to the people, 
while the other approach is by relaying of the information to the parliament which is a 
representation of the various constituencies of the Ghanaian federation. Thus the Minister is 
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charged with the responsibility of ensuring that every issue connected to the funds, 
including the law, annual reports and the Operations Management Agreement are made 
accessible to the public.34 The Minister is also mandated to settle the actual sum of 
petroleum receipts and Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) of the previous year and 
tender its written report to that effect before the Parliament before the end of the first 
quarter per year.35 
On the Santiago Principle 6: This relates to the governance structure of the SWF which 
must be of sound quality and must establish an unambiguous and efficient distribution of 
duties and responsibilities amongst persons so as to encourage accountability and autonomy 
in the administration of the Fund in order to achieve its purpose. One of the priority areas 
which expenditure from petroleum revenue is to be embarked upon is the strengthening of 
the institutional framework of the state that is responsible for the governance and 
preservation of law and order.36  
Consequently, the Bank of Ghana is mandated to manage the GPF in such a manner that is 
compliant with well-established and reputable internationally principles of good 
governance which will serve the ultimate interest of Ghanaians.37 The Bank, the Minister, 
parliament, and the fund managers all have specific and designated roles to play in the 
realisation of the objectives of the fund. The Act enjoins all parties involved to discharge 
the various duties assigned to them with regard to matters connected to petroleum revenue 
management in a manner consistent with transparency and governance standards of utmost 
international regard.38 The Investment Advisory Committee and the Public Interest 
Accountability Committee (PIAC) play oversight function to ensure the various bodies and 
agencies play their role creditably well. 
On the Santiago Principle 7: According to this Principle, the objectives of the Fund 
should be well laid out; the method of appointment of members into the various governing 
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councils should be plainly stated and oversight mechanisms for the operations of the Fund 
should be provided for. The PRMA have clearly stated the purpose for the establishment of 
the various funds which have been examined earlier. As for the governing body of the 
funds, the existing institutional structure of the Bank of Ghana also doubles as the body 
responsible for the management of the funds. The procedures for the appointment of the 
various officers that are involved in the process are regulated by the relevant statutes that 
create and regulate the operation of the Bank of Ghana. The Act creates the PIAC to play 
an oversight function regarding its implementation, management and achievement of the 
objectives of the funds.39 The PIAC is to also ensure that members of the public are fully 
abreast of the operations of the fund and provide fora for members of the public to air their 
opinion on matters pertaining to the fund. These can be achieved through the effective use 
of mass media medium such as internet websites, periodic reports and newspaper 
publications.40 
On the Santiago Principle 8: By virtue of this principle, the relevant principal body(ies) 
carry the obligation of acting in the paramount interests of the Fund, and must possess the 
specific and ample authority and capability to perform its functions. The explanatory 
memorandum of the PRMA captures the underlining essence of the Act which is to ensure 
that the revenue obtained from petroleum resources is managed in a manner to ensure the 
benefit and sustainable development of the Ghanaian citizens. In giving their counsel on the 
investment undertaken and into which the fund may be put, Investment Advisory 
Committee is obliged to give consideration to the underlining objective of the fund which is 
focused on the benefit which the present and future generations of country stand to gain 
from.41  
However, apart from the case of the Investment Advisory Committee, the Act does not 
make any specific provision in this regard in the case of other bodies like the Bank of 
Ghana and the Minister who have more decisive roles to play with regard to the 
management of the fund. It is to be noted that the Investment Advisory Committee only has 
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advisory role to play with respect to the investment decisions of the fund and it is in the 
discretion of the minister to determine whether to accept or decline the counsel offered by 
the committee. Even though it could be inferred from the language of the Act that the 
interest of the citizens is of paramount consideration in decision making, it would be more 
appropriate to make an express provision in the law in that regard similar to that required of 
the Investment Advisory Committee.   
On the Santiago Principle 9: The operational administration of the Fund should execute 
the strategies of the Fund in a manner that is free from external influence and interference 
from other authorities in line with their clearly stated duties. Part of the objectives of the 
PIAC is to proffer independent appraisal of the management and utilization of petroleum 
earnings thereby providing Parliament and the executive with the requisite information 
needed to play their supervisory role in the petroleum sector of the economy.42 The PRMA 
provides that the forecasts and determination of the amounts of the Annual Benchmark 
Revenue obtainable from petroleum operations are to be independently conducted and 
certified by highly regarded experts who are appointed pursuant to the provisions of the 
Public Procurement Act, 2003.43 Generally, the PRMA grants major decision making 
powers on the Minister. Amongst other things, the minister determines the kind of 
investment wherein the Fund should be channelled to. The minister also has the sole power 
to appoint members to the PIAC.44 These excessive powers exercised by the minister are 
capable of affecting the independence of the relevant bodies in charge of the administration 
of the Funds. 
On the Santiago Principle 10: it deals with the need for an accountability mechanism for 
the operations of the Fund which must be clearly laid out in the applicable statutes and 
management agreement. The PRMA recognised the need to create accountability 
mechanism to ensure effective management of the fund. Apart from the assessment and 
collection of revenue obtained from petroleum exploration, the Ghana Revenue Authority 
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also has the duty to account for such revenue collected.45 The Act does not take lightly the 
need for transparency and accountability in the petroleum industry, thus the combined 
provisions of Section 8 (1) (2) and (3) make it mandatory for the Minister to cause a 
comprehensive record of petroleum proceeds and hauled up output to be conjunctively 
published in the National Gazette, not less than two daily Newspapers published by the 
state and the official website of the Ministry within a period of thirty days following the 
end of each quarter. These publications are to be presented before the Ghanaian Parliament. 
The PRMA provides that the management, savings and other matters connected to 
petroleum revenue must be performed in a manner that is consistent with international 
practices of foremost regard which borders on transparency and good governance.46 The 
implication of this provision of the Act is that the Santiago principles do not just have 
persuasive effect, but must be given compelling consideration when dealing with issues 
bordering on the management of the Ghana SWFs. The Act created the Public Interest 
Accountability Committee47 to inter alia see towards the implementation of the provisions 
of the Act especially with regard to the issues of transparency and accountability in the Act. 
On the Santiago Principle 11: It requires the timely preparation of annual reports and 
additional financial declarations on the operations and performance of the Funds in line 
with foremost acclaim national and international accounting norms. The PRMA made 
requirements for various lines of reporting on annual and quarterly basis by various bodies 
involved in the management of the funds. The Bank of Ghana has the duty to provide 
relevant information to the Minister and the Investment Advisory Committee to enable 
them prepare all the reports and statements in relation to the management of funds as 
required by the Act. The information is expected to be sent to the relevant bodies in not less 
than fifteen working days to the publication.48 The Bank of Ghana shall present to the 
Minister and to the Investment Advisory Committee, quarterly reports on the performance 
and activities of the Ghana Stabilisation Fund and the Ghana Heritage Fund not later than 
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the end of the month following the end of each quarter.49 In the same vein, the Bank of 
Ghana is to issue two publications50 of its semi-annual reports on the Ghanaian SWFs on a 
date not later than 15th of February and August yearly and tender the reports before 
Parliament.51 The Investment Advisory Committee also supplies technical reports on the 
performance of the Ghana SWFs to the Minister not more than thirty working days after 
obtaining quarterly reports from the Bank of Ghana.52 The report also serves the purpose of 
preparing the annual budget and financial statements.53  
On the incumbent’s part, the Minister is required to settle the definite sum petroleum 
receipts and the Annual Budget Funding Amount of the previous year and make an onward 
transmission of the written report to the Ghanaian Parliament on a date not exceeding the 
last day of the first quarter of every year.54 The bulk of submitting annual reports on the 
SWFs to Parliament forms part of the yearly budgetary and economic policies presentation 
to be performed by the Minister.55 In line with its oversight function, the Accountability 
Committee is to cause a semi-annual report and annual report to be published in not less 
than two daily newspapers published by the state on the 15th day of September and March 
of each year respectively.56 The report is also to be transmitted to the Ghanaian President 
and Parliament.57  
On the Santiago Principle 12: It proclaims the need for proper audit of the operations and 
financial declarations of the fund on a yearly interval in compliance with well-established 
national and international auditing standards. The national auditing standard is as contained 
in the PRMA. The Act creates internal and external auditing mechanisms. As such, Section 
43 of the Act mandates the Bank of Ghana to keep accurate books of accounts of the SWFs 
created under the Act. The books of accounts and every other record of the Funds are 
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subject to the auditing rigours of Internal Audit Department of the Bank of Ghana.58 
Thereafter, the Bank of Ghana shall make an onward transmission of the financial records 
of the bank to the Auditor-General for it to be subjected to auditing not exceeding three 
months from the end of its financial year.59  
The Auditor-General is required by law to act as the external auditor of the Funds on a 
yearly basis.60 However, the Auditor-General may elect to outsource this responsibility to 
an external auditor,61 in which case the appointment shall not exceed a non-renewable 
period of three years.62 The Auditor-General has up to three months within which to make 
its external audit and submit the report to the Ghanaian Parliament.63 In his report, the 
Auditor-General shall confirm the accuracy of the accounts; whether payments and 
disbursements from the Funds have been properly made and whether the management of 
the Funds are in compliance with the Act.64 Any inconsistency or irregularity discovered in 
the accounts by the Auditor-General must be brought to the attention of Parliament.65 Apart 
from the external audit, the Auditor General may embark on special audit of the funds as 
deemed suitable. As such, the Bank of Ghana is duty bound to make accessible all the 
books and records connected with the operational management of the Funds as and when 
requested by the Minister, and auditors of the Funds.66 
On the Santiago Principle 13: The professional and ethical code of conduct expected of 
the members, officers and management of the governing body(ies) of the Fund must be 
clearly stipulated and brought to their awareness. Under the Operations Management 
Agreement, the Bank of Ghana is under obligation to ensure the conduct of its members 
saddled with the management responsibility of the GPF are regulated by ethical code of 
conduct and rules to help them stay away from conflicts of interest situation.67 Also, any 
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person, whether substantive or co-opted member of the Investment Advisory Committee, 
who being an interested party in any issue under deliberation by the investment Advisory 
Committee is under duty to divulge the nature of whatever interest the person has, which 
disclosure must be minuted in the record of proceedings where the matter was considered. 
The person is also required to refrain from taking part in the discussion leading up to the 
decision of Committee on the subject matter.68 The foregoing requirement of the Act is 
strict such that persons who are in default of this provision of the Act stand the chance of 
losing their membership of the committee.  
On the Santiago Principle 14: This borders on the relationship with third parties regarding 
the operational management of the fund which must be conducted on economic and 
financial basis pursuant to plainly defined procedures and regulations. The PRMA provides 
the need for the funds to be regulated by the Operational Management Agreement. This 
agreement is to be entered between the Minister and the Bank of Ghana pursuant to Section 
25 of the Act. The Agreement is to be entered in accordance with the provision of the Act 
as contained in the Second Schedule. Therein, the obligations of the Minister and the Bank 
of Ghana are created. The only provision of the Act regarding third party relationship with 
the fund is as regards the procurement of the services of portfolio managers for the fund 
which is to be carried out by the Bank of Ghana. The requirement of the law is that the 
process must be fair, transparent and comply with its internal and statutory procedure, 
especially the Public Procurement Act, 2003. Every information regarding the appointment 
of portfolio managers including issues of remuneration must be communicated to the 
Minister.69 
On the Santiago Principle 15: This concerns a situation where the SWF is operated in 
other countries. This principle enjoins that the activities and operations of the fund must 
also be regulated in accordance with the relevant regulatory and disclosure standards of the 
host countries. This principle is applicable when the fund is invested in a country other than 
Ghana. In such a case, the management of the investment must also be in tandem with the 
applicable lex situ and disclosure requirement. The Act specified that the funds could only 
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be invested in qualifying instruments.70 The definition of qualifying instruments as 
provided for in the interpretation section of the Act71 suggests that the fund can be invested 
in instrument issued or guaranteed by an international financial institution or a sovereign 
country apart from Ghana. However, the Act did not state that such investment would also 
be regulated by the regulations or disclosure standards of the state where the fund is 
invested. This notwithstanding, it is implied that any investment in another country must 
conform to the regulations of the host country due to the internationally recognised 
principle of sovereignty which an independent state enjoys across its territory.72 
On the Santiago Principle 16: This principle calls for the severance of the objectives, 
governance framework and management of the fund from the influence of the ownership of 
the fund to secure its operational independence. These differences must be a subject of 
public disclosure. In an attempt to ensure the independence of the funds, the Act provides 
that the assets of the funds are to be kept in the name of the Bank of Ghana but must 
maintain a distinct identity from the assets of the Bank.73 The owner of the fund is the 
government of Ghana, while the citizens of Ghana are the beneficiaries of the fund. This is 
similar to the trust relationship established under the equitable principles of English law. 
The Bank of Ghana which is saddled with the responsibility of performing the operational 
management of the Funds on a day to day basis and the Minister who exercises supervisory 
management of the fund74 are both representatives of the government in varying degrees.75 
There is no way both entities would not be influenced by the dictates of their principal. The 
parliament is another arm of government which exercises major determination of how the 
fund is to be ran. Pursuance to Section 10 (4) of the Act, parliament can approve the 
transfer of any portion of interest accruing to the GHF to other funds created under the Act. 
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Also, the accumulated resources of the GSF must be approved by the parliament.76 
Parliament has enormous influence over the management of the funds. It may also be 
argued that Parliament is a representation of the citizens of Ghana, who are not the legal 
owner but beneficiaries of the fund. This is not to say that it is unnecessary for parliament 
to exercise supervisory powers over the workings of the fund. However, where such 
supervision becomes overbearing, it runs counterproductive to the essence of having an 
independent management of the fund which Principle 16 seeks to achieve. Bestowing 
distinct legal personality on the SWFs serves the purpose of severing the government from 
controlling the fund, thus shielding it from undue political meddling from the ruling class.77 
In as much as this may not entirely be an assurance of operational independence for the 
Fund, it gives the managers the freedom to exercise their discretion in the decision making 
process of the Funds.78 
On the Santiago Principle 17: The necessary financial data related to the Fund must be 
publicly disclosed to reveal its economic and financial drive towards stability in the 
international financial industry in order to create the confidence of recipient countries. The 
PRMA demonstrated its commitment towards a stable international financial market by its 
expression of the requirement that the fund be invested in instruments of international 
financial institutions such as IMF, World Bank, Bank for International Settlements, 
European Central Bank and the Central Banks of other countries.79 It is common practice 
for countries to invest their SWF in financial assets.80 The GPFs have been invested 
insecurities with guarantee of fixed income.81 The funds have been channelled into 
investment in Euroclear bonds82 but never in assets in the Ghanaian economy.83 At this 
                                                          
76  Section 23 (3) PRMA 2011. 
77 Evaristus Oshionebo, ‘Managing Resource Revenues: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Developing Countries’ 
(2015) 15 Asper Review 217, 235. 
78 Evaristus Oshionebo, Managing Resource Revenues: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Developing Countries 
(2015) 15 Asper Review 217, 234. 
79 See the meaning of qualifying instruments under Section 61 PRMA 2011. 
80 Omosalewa Oluyinka Olawoye, Commodity Based Sovereign Wealth Funds: An Alternative Path to 
Economic Development (PhD Thesis University of Missouri 2016) 62. 
81Centre for Applied Research on International Markets, Banking, Finance and Regulation. Sovereign 
Investment Lab The Sky Did Not Fall Sovereign Wealth Fund Annual Report 2015 11 
<www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/Bocconi%20SIL%202016%20Report.pdf> 
82 Omosalewa Oluyinka Olawoye, Commodity Based Sovereign Wealth Funds: An Alternative Path to 




early stage of the operation of the Ghanaian SWFs, it could be regarded as ‘development 
funds’. As a result of the lack of assimilative capacity of the local economy, development 
funds aim at stashing the assets of the funds abroad pending when the domestic market 
would attain commercial viability.84  
 
Even though the Act called for transparency and open public access to information and data 
relating to the management of the funds, clear details of the asset allotments have not been 
brought to public knowledge.85 This is compounded by the provision of the Act which 
reposes the Minister with the power to label certain information or data as classified and 
inaccessible to the public.86 This provision of the Act certainly defeats the essence of 
Santiago Principle 17. 
On the Santiago Principle 18: The investment policy of the Fund must be lucid and must 
comply with the objectives, risk management and investment plan laid down by the 
proprietor or governing body(ies) which must be based on solid portfolio management 
standards.  
On the Santiago Principle 19: The investment resolutions of the Fund should be targeted 
at optimizing risk-reduced financial earnings in such a way that conforms to its investment 
policy based on economic and financial viewpoints. Principles 18 and 19 could be 
conveniently and jointly addressed together here. The Act places the duty of general and 
investment policy development of the fund on the Minister,87 as proposed and formulated 
by the Investment Advisory Committee.88 Meanwhile, the Bank of Ghana has the duty of 
formulating and implementing risk management strategies to minimize operational loss of 
the Funds.89 The object of the GSF and the GHF are respectively captured in Section 9 and 
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10 of the Act. How these aforementioned management bodies have been able to perform 
their roles in this regard is still subject to further examination to determine its conformity 
with the requirement of Santiago Principle 18. Also, the Act does not state any portfolio 
management standards which must be maintained. It, however, gives the Bank of Ghana the 
leeway to appoint and assess the performance of portfolio managers of the fund.90    
On the Santiago Principle 20: By virtue of its vantage position of being connected with 
the government, SWFs stand the chance of having certain information within its disposal. 
This principle enjoins SWFs to refrain from abusing the privileged information and 
influence within its grip to asphyxiate competition from the private sector. The governing 
body(ies) responsible for management of the Funds created under the Act are the Bank of 
Ghana and the Minister. These are all agents of the government, the former being the apex 
financial institution in the country while the latter being the Minister in charge of finance 
and economic planning in the country. By virtue of their position, they play a cardinal role 
in government. Their roles in the government put them in the position of having certain 
privileged investment position which would certainly give them advantage over entities in 
the private sector which could serve as potential competitors to the investment endeavour 
of the fund. It would have been a slightly different case if the SWFs of Ghana are managed 
by an external entity distinct from the government. The PRMA does not address this fear 
which Santiago Principle 20 intends to safeguard against. 
On the Santiago Principle 21: Shareholder ownership rights are herein viewed as a 
cardinal component of the portfolio investments’ value which must be upheld at all time. 
The ownership rights of the fund must be exercised with due respect on the need to protect 
the investment policy and financial values of the funds. The minister is in charge of making 
decisions regarding the investment policies of the fund. In making these decisions, the 
minister is expected to take cognisance of the financial interest of entities who may have 
invested in the interest of the fund. The PRMA did not make any requirement for the 
minister to consider the investment interest of the shareholders of the fund. The Act only 
                                                          




requires that the citizens of Ghana, for whose benefit the funds were created, should be 
given paramount consideration in the investment decision making.    
On the Santiago Principle 22: It proposes that the Fund should create a framework that 
recognises, provides, and appraises risks management for its operations. This point has 
already been addressed on principle 18 and 19 above. It has to be emphasised that the 
PRMA did not create any risk management framework apart from the requirement that the 
Bank of Ghana should formulate, implement and appraise the risk management strategy of 
the funds. The rolling up of these various risk management functions on the Bank of Ghana 
may not produce a very fantastic result. While the Bank may formulate and implement the 
risk management plan, there is need to create an external body that would evaluate and 
appraise the implementation strategy of the risk management policies of the fund.  
On the Santiago Principle 23: It calls for regular assessment of the assets and investment 
feat of the Fund which are measured by available benchmarks and same being reported to 
the beneficiaries of the fund in line with stipulated rules and standards. Part of the duties of 
the Investment Advisory Committee is to assist the Minister develop investment guidelines, 
benchmark portfolio, and anticipated investment returns and risk of the GPF. In doing this, 
the Committee is to take note of model investment templates which the Bank of Ghana 
used in similar investments.91 Apart from the fact that the Act requires the Annual report to 
be prepared in such a manner that would guarantee its easy circulation to the public, the 
Annual Report is expected to contain certain information including comparing the 
investment income of the GSF and GHF, on one hand, with the “benchmark performance 
indices provided to the Minister”, on the other hand.92  
Pursuant to the powers reposed on the minister by the Act, the Minister may create 
investment mandates, benchmarks and qualifying instruments which the Funds may be 
invested in by the Bank of Ghana.93 The Minister has the power to review what constitutes 
a qualifying instrument for which the fund may be invested within three years interval or 
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less.94 It is, however, submitted that, this cannot be interpreted as granting the minister the 
power to remove any of the items referred to as qualifying instruments under Section 61 of 
the Act. The minister can only add to the list. If the review would require the removal of 
any item in the list, the minister must ensure that a legislative process in that regard is 
conducted by the Ghanaian Parliament which is constitutionally saddled with the law-
making powers of the State. The general performance of GPF is to be examined against the 
benchmark prescribed by the Investment Advisory Committee from time to time. The 
outcome of such examination will also be made available in periodic reports.95 
On the Santiago Principle 24: This principle calls for the engagement in constant review 
of the implementation of the Santiago Principles to be carried out by the Fund or such 
persons procured to do so in the stead of the SWF. The PRMA does not expressly adopt the 
Santiago Principles or expresses the need for its implementation in Ghana. However, most 
other recommendations of the Santiago Principles are reflected in the Act. The Act also 
requires the performance of certain functions in accordance with internationally recognised 
standards. These put the Santiago principles in contemplation. However, Bagnall and 
Truman hold the view that the Santiago Principles can only boast of little influence in 
Ghana.96 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the law on petroleum revenue management in Ghana. It found that 
the development of the oil and gas industry saw the country adopting new laws to rise to 
the occasion of the new situation. A critical area that will require that effort be channelled 
into it is the development of an effective legal framework for revenue management. The 
SWF is part of the options in the development of the framework. Globally, the use of soft 
laws such as the Santiago Principles in the oil and gas industry has been appreciated as 
instruments that will enhance good governance. Soft laws, however, are not binding. From 
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an international perspective, they are not strictly normative in character as countries can 
choose not to follow them but they serve as a form of caution and project the goodwill of 
countries that observe them. A country seeking to develop its petroleum revenue in line 
with best practices, can take some legal steps by translating these best practices into law. 
Ghana has, to a reasonable extent, purposely or unwittingly reflected this in its PRMA. 
However, much still has to be done. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: REPOSITIONING THE LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
 
The factors which have militated against effective management of petroleum revenue has 
been examined. The law is generally referred to as an instrument of social control by the 
sociological school of jurisprudence.851 This is not limited to the control of human beings 
alone, but includes the social institutions established by the law.852 On the other hand, there 
are other jurists who have viewed law as an economic tool.853 In the latter regard, specific 
aspects of law are designed to give direction to economic activities in the society.854 Thus, 
economic efficiency ought to be the primary concern of the law.855 Natural resources are 
means of economic empowerment for states that are endowed with natural resources. Also, 
in the course of the exploitation of the natural resource to create economic benefits, 
different categories of persons are engaged in one form of social relationship or the other. 
Every officer of the state in charge of the tool of economic management of the state is 
under duty to act in accordance with the legal requirement of the law. Such officers also 
bear the responsibility for acting otherwise.856 It has been suggested that law is an 
instrument for occasioning social and economic change which ultimately leads to the 
development of the society.857 In view of this fact, the postulations as conceived by both 
schools of thought on the function of law are relevant for the purpose of natural resource 
management. 
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Law has been identified as an instrument that influences development and at the same time 
has the capacity to be influenced by development.858 In the course of ensuring economic 
efficiency through the instrumentality of the law, the relevant regulation put in place thereto 
must be targeted at specific objectives. This is what is referred to as regulation by 
objectives, otherwise known as goal-based regulation. Regulation by objective is derived 
from the term management by objective which was first conceptualised by Peter Drucker in 
his 1954 work titled ‘The Practice of Management’.859 The concept demands that managers 
put in place precise goals and targets to be attained in the future, allowing for probity, 
creativity and viability in the organisation.860 It is mainly concerned with the procedure or 
arrangement whereby supervisory managers, in conjunction with their subordinate put 
timelines in place within which definite goals are to be realised by the subordinates.861 
Management by objectives is end result focused, directs the commitment of members of the 
organisation towards precise goals and drives them to reflect on the future needs of the 
organization and devise means to achieve those needs.862 
Conversely, regulation by objective is a form of regulation aimed at integrating an array of 
essential and achievable institutional goals into a whole.863  It seeks to provide a yardstick 
and standards for which a system undergoing the process of transition can deal with the 
intricate economic governance issues.864 The objectives of law and its effectiveness have to 
be taken into account.865 In this wise the regulatory bodies are to exercise their functions 
within the dictates of the strategic and operational objectives of the regulation.866 The idea 
underlining regulation by objectives is that regulatory authorities should concern 
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themselves with the essence for which the law was created rather than merely holding on to 
rules with dogmatic tenacity. The application of regulation by objectives signifies the 
regulatory body has attained maturity such that it can function based on laid down 
principles instead of adopting a prescriptive bureaucratic approach.867 Regulatory 
objectives put forth the rationale, the ambit and the category of items or persons affected by 
the regulation which will give direction to the regulator and the regulated.868 The regulatory 
body can easily fall back on the purpose of the regulation to justify steps and actions taken 
pursuant to the regulation.869 
The objectives of the regulation are set at divers scale of specificity which usually include 
broad principles, standards and end result which regulators must strive to attain.870 The 
major concern of the regulator is to achieve the regulatory goal going by the fore-sighted 
approach applied in accordance with their discretion towards the attainment of the 
regulatory goal.871 The regulators are expected to apply well informed best judgement 
decisions in compliance with the regulation.872 The actions and inactions of the regulators 
must be in tandem with the goals of the regulation.873 There are several advantages of 
applying this form of regulation: it makes room for flexibility; it encourages testing and 
trying out different routes to compliance;874 encourages regulators to be futuristic in their 
thoughts and decision;875 it is open-textured and could be easily amenable to alternating 
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circumstances, situations and environment;876 and gives room for the application of 
regulatory discretion.877 
The two major legislative regimes regulating the petroleum sector in Ghana are the PRMA 
and Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016. The objectives of the PRMA can be 
gleaned from its long title which is described as a “framework for the collection, 
management of petroleum revenue in a responsible, accountable and sustainable manner for 
the benefit of Ghana”. Section 1 further makes the Act responsible for regulating the 
collection, allocation and management of petroleum revenue derived from petroleum 
exploration both in the upstream and midstream sector of the industry.878 In the same vein, 
Section 4 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 requires that  petroleum 
resources be managed in line with the objective of the Act. The objective as contained in 
Section 2 of the Act is to “ensure safe, secure, sustainable and efficient petroleum activities 
in order to achieve optimal long-term petroleum resource exploitation and utilisation for the 
benefit and welfare of the people of Ghana”.  
However, the downside of regulation by objectives is its potentiality of creating a breach in 
accountability and can either lead to excessive or insufficient level of compliance 
depending on the level of regulation precision and regulatory body’s risk profile.879 
Inordinate exercise of discretionary powers is a foremost precursor to corruption practices. 
This would call for an introduction of regulatory instrumentality to guard against the 
excessive exercise of discretion powers by regulatory agencies.880  
The institution involved in the management of the petroleum resource proceeds of Ghana 
under the PRMA 2011 is the Bank of Ghana. Going by the principles of regulation by 
objectives, the Bank of Ghana is expected to independently manage the petroleum revenue 
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resources without extraneous interference. This does not give the Bank the leverage to 
exercise arbitrary powers thereto. The Bank of Ghana is to be guided by the provisions of 
the Act and exercise such powers within the allowable limit of the objectives of the Act. In 
order to guard against the abuse of discretionary powers, the Ghanaian parliament has 
certain supervisory roles to play. Parliament has the powers to determine the distribution 
ratio of petroleum revenue for various purposes.881 Parliament may also stipulate a certain 
fraction that may be withdrawn from the Ghana Heritage Fund or interest accruing 
therefrom within a fifteen years period.882 It is also to receive annual and periodic reports 
from the Bank of Ghana.883  
 
Under the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Norway, known as the Government Pensions Fund 
Global (GPFG), the pension managers are given a free hand to manage the fund as they 
think fit. However, there are certain ethical considerations set out by regulations of the 
Council on Ethics, which the GPFG managers must abide by in their management of the 
fund. For instance, assets of the GPFG must not be invested in corporate organisations that 
engage in environmentally unfriendly activities, violations of labour and human rights, 
manufacturing of arms and ammunition etc. From time to time, the Ethics Committee 
makes a black list of companies which must not have the benefit of having the fund 
invested in shortlisted companies. This therefore shows an area where capacity will need to 
be enhanced to promote the management of petroleum revenue.  The sustainable 
management of Ghana’s petroleum revenue from the perspective of capacity building could 
have far-reaching consequences in the management of petroleum revenue: first, where there 
is low institutional capacity and political competition as in the case of Angola, there should 
be consolidation of functions; second, where  institutional capacity is low while political 
competition is high as in the case of Nigeria, the emphasis should be on development of 
technical and institutional capacity; third, where there is high institutional capacity and low 
political competition as depicted in the situation in Malaysia consolidation and separation 
of functions will be ideal since politics is more pluralistic; and last, as shown in  Norway 
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and Brazil where  the variables of  institutional and political competition are high, 
separation of functions will be recommended.884 
Scholars like A. V. Dicey have touted the idea that conferment of discretional powers on 
state actors leads to arbitrariness. While it is correct that excessive use of discretionary 
powers may lead to arbitrariness, it is submitted that the exercise of some discretionary 
powers is necessary for flexibility in public administration to handle unanticipated 
eventualities in governance. The current drift is that there are laid down principles and 
guidelines for implementation of such discretionary powers.885 As often stated by the 
courts, discretionary powers must be exercised judicially and judiciously by administrative 
bodies.886 Otherwise put, it must be based on evidence and reason. In a clime where there is 
respect and compliance with the rule of law, the low points of exercise of discretionary 
powers by regulatory bodies which is an incident of regulation by objective would be 
largely taken care of. The basic condiment of the rule of law is that “government officials 
and citizens are bound by and abide by the law”.887 According to the United Nations,888 the 
rule of law entails: 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated... It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers... 
legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency. 
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The rising need for regulators to take up the rising functions associated with arriving at the 
economic objectives of regulations has put regulators in the position of placing their 
primary focus on the objectives and outcomes which the regulation is poised to attain 
instead of giving priority to procedural issues under the regulation.889 It then becomes the 
duty of the regulator to recognise those goals set out by the regulation which they must 
achieve under the authority of the relevant laws. Expressly laying down objectives of 
regulation creates credibility and transparency which booster the faith of members of the 
public on the regulators.890  
Most regulations have more than one objective. On instances where the objectives of the 
regulation conflicts with one another, the regulatory body usually faces a dilemma as to 
which of the objectives to give priority to in its implementation.891 The Ghanaian regime 
on petroleum resource management as has been stated above has been shown to have more 
than one objective. Uncertainties over the objectives of a regulation poses greater dangers 
than the otherwise situation as it becomes unclear how to strike a balance between the 
conflicting objectives.892 This becomes a huge burden on the various regulators of the 
Ghanaian petroleum resources to exercise due caution in the determination of priority on 
the issue of conflict of objectives. On the whole, the regulatory bodies must consider the 
overall interest of the citizens of Ghana who are the beneficiaries of these funds. According 
to Alex Mould, the former CEO of GNPC, and National Petroleum Authority (NPA), the 
objective of the PRMA is to “establish the legal framework to ensure transparency and 
accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil and gas sector”.893  
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Petroleum resources revenues are distributed in the ratio of 9% for the Ghana Heritage 
Fund, 21% for the Stabilisation Fund and 70% is allocated for the Annual Budget Funding 
Amount.894 Some portion of the revenue is also to be allocated to the Ghana Infrastructure 
Investment Fund (GIIF).895 It could be seen that the Act gives priority to the budget funding 
purpose of the petroleum proceeds than saving for future generation purpose. Even the 
monies allocated for the GHF can still be tampered with if the Parliament so directs. This 
does not show serious commitment towards saving for the future generation. The Ghanaian 
economy is drifting towards high level dependence on petroleum resource revenue. If this 
trend continues, it has the potential of leading to the neglect of other sectors of the Ghana 
economy which could swiftly lead Ghana into the resource curse trap.  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has occasioned hardship for both developed and developing 
countries. Ghana being a developed country has been impacted by the effect of the 
pandemic on the economy with a shortfall in petroleum revenue.896 As part of proposed 
measures in place in Ghana, the Coronavirus Alleviation Programme (CAP) has been put in 
place by the government to aid economic recovery. It proposed the reduction of the cap on 
Stabilisation Fund (GSF) from US$300 million to US$100 million so that the excess is 
used for funding the CAP by amending section 23(3) of the PRMA.897  It is also proposed 
that the PRMA be amended to allow funds in the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) to be 
withdrawn to be used in fidgeting COVID-19.898 The pandemic further underscores the 
need to prepare for the periods of scarcity. Thus, the importance of the GSF for the purpose 
of cushioning the effect of the pandemic will be appreciated in the long run. However, it is 
too early for Ghana to start utilising the revenue in the GHF does not appear to be 
economical and politically viable. It is therefore a further lesson for Ghana to continue to 
                                                          
894Olivia Lwabukuna, ‘Natural Resources for Socio Economic Development in Africa’, Africa Insight (2015) 
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ensure that even after the pandemic is over, much should be done to ensure that there is a 
boost in the GHF for the future generations.  
The Norwegian model presents a better approach which Ghana may take a cue from. The 
Norwegian economy is vastly diversified. Its annual budget is funded almost independent 
from petroleum proceeds. All the petroleum resources are pumped into the Government 
Pensions Fund Global (GPFG), which is the sovereign wealth fund of the country. The 
SWF spending rule is that only 4% of interest accruing from the GPFG can be used to fund 
the Norwegian economy.899 The approach has resulted in Norway gaining the reputation of 
the country with the SWF with highest capital base of over $1.1 trillion as at January 
2018.900 This feat has given economic and social security to the needs of the future 
generation of the country. 
It must be noted that the Ghanaian economy is not viable and versatile enough to take a 
drastic step as the Norwegian position. This is because the country had not taken time to 
develop its non-resource-based sectors of her economy from the outset. The country had 
always depended on resource-based earnings to fund her economy. Before the discovery 
and exploration of petroleum in 2007 and 2012 respectively,901 the country had depended 
on cocoa and gold exploration. The economy of the country had passed through difficult 
times and the country has viewed petroleum resources as a means of bouncing the economy 
back to viability. However, the country must not be only concerned with settling their 
immediate needs. Even if the country cannot match up with the Norwegian standard, 9% is 
far below the standard for the benefit of future generations. The country may consider at 
least 20 to 25 percent savings into the GHF. This figure can be progressively increased as 
time goes on when more effort has been put in place to make the non-resource-based aspect 
of the economy improve.   In the same token, Alex Mould identified the need to continue to 
promote sustainability through putting in place policies that prepare Ghana “for the 
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transition to a low carbon economy by implementing appropriate policies to ensure 
sustainable investment in fossil fuels even in the midst of transition”.902 He continued that 
“Revenue from oil resources should be re-invested in other sectors and industries for 
development and diversification of economy”.903  
Another shortcoming of the petroleum resource management approach of Ghana is the lack 
of consideration for host community interest. Petroleum is solely owned by the state.904 
Thus the state is empowered by law to hold and manage the fund accruing from the 
petroleum exploration for the general interest of the entire people of Ghana.905 This is 
similar to the domainial ownership approach practiced in Nigerian where the legal 
instruments such as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as 
amended),906 the Land Use Act 1978,907 Petroleum Act of 1969908 and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 1978909 have been used to appropriate an allodial interest in petroleum 
resources on the Federal Government of Nigeria.  
The legal regime for petroleum resource management in Ghana does not make provision 
for certain percentage to be specifically dedicated towards the development of the oil 
producing regions or host communities for that matter. This has been reinforced by the 
belief that petroleum resources belongs to the entire citizens of Ghana notwithstanding the 
several inconveniencies and environmental hazards which host communities stand the risk 
of facing as a result of petroleum exploration.910  
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In the case of Nigeria, the historical neglect of its Niger Delta region has led to agitation 
and violent unrest in the host communities in a bid to have control of petroleum resources 
within their communities.911 To ameliorate this situation, the constitution created the 
derivation principle which is to the effect that at least thirteen percent of the revenue 
obtainable to the Federal Government from natural resources exploration shall be given to 
constituent state from which the resources are derived.912 The Oil Mineral Producing Area 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) had been created which was later succeeded by 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)913 pursuant to the Niger-Delta 
Development Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act 2000. The NDDC is charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring the attainment of developmental in the host communities914 with 
the aid of 15% monthly allocations disbursed to the nine Niger Delta States from the 
Federation Account, contribution of 3% from the gross annual budget of oil companies 
operating within the region etc.915 The Petroleum Industry Bill which is yet to be enacted 
into law has provision that creates the host community fund which would be directly 
applied towards the development of the host communities where oil exploration is ongoing.  
Despite these efforts the unrest in the Niger Delta region has not abated. If this is the case, 
one wonders what may become of Ghana where none of these measures has been put in 
place. While at the moment Ghana may not be experiencing civil unrest arising from 
dissatisfaction following the disregard of concerns of host communities, there are signals 
that similar challenges which Nigeria experienced in this regard may soon occur in Ghana. 
To prevent this, it is imperative for the Ghanaian legislature to set aside certain sum from 
the revenue derived from oil exploration to meet the specific development needs of the host 
communities. This is reflective of the principles of equity which is to the effect that certain 
group of persons should not be laden with weightier environmental yoke than others due to 
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government policies. Thus, the burden or reward system should be proportional to 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter set out the recommendations for the study in line with the best ways 
to avoid the resource curse in Ghana through the sustainable management of petroleum 
revenue by using law. It also makes a conclusion to the study. The essence of this research 
is to analyse the petroleum revenue management regime in Ghana with a view of avoiding 
the resource curse through the promotion of sustainable management of petroleum revenue 
in Ghana. The fact that resource rich countries have been found wanting over the years 
given their inability to maximise the benefits of their natural resources has been the 
motivation to review the legal regime in Ghana with a view of ensuring that the law has 
been able to address the challenges which will enhance sustainable management of natural 
resources in Ghana. To achieve this the research examined the legal regime in the light of 
the institutional development and the relevant laws as well as in the context which the laws 
have operated. Therefore, the regulatory and structural environment of the law was 
examined, drawing from best practices and focusing primarily on three main areas: 
 
1. How the law on petroleum revenue management can be utilised in promoting 
sustainable development; 
2. The extent to which the laws provide for transparency and accountability in 
petroleum revenue management in Ghana and how best the law can achieve them; 
and 
3. The management of petroleum revenue in a sustainable manner leading to revenue 
conversion (multiplication of the revenue rather than depletion). 
 
Given this background, the research has been conducted from both desktops relying on a 
variety of primary sources of law and other relevant secondary sources. In furtherance of 
the objectives, the research made reference to other countries to support varied arguments 
made in the thesis. This was followed by effort aimed at examining international best 
practices that have been recommended over time for the realisation of effective 
management of petroleum revenue. Principally, two of these best practices that have 
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informed the research include: EITI Standards in the context of the petroleum revenue 
management in Ghana; and Generally Accepted Practices in the Management of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (The Santiago Principles) in the context of petroleum revenue management 
in Ghana.  
 
8.2 THEORETECAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS   
 
The underlying theories of the resource curse further confirms the need to ensure that there 
is transparency, accountability and prudent management of petroleum resources. The 
review of the PRMA to reflect best ways to avoid the replication of the resource curse 
syndrome is instructive in Ghana. In the same context, sustainability of the management of 
petroleum revenue should meet the needs of the current generations without jeopardising 
that of the future generation. These will be realised through mainstreaming the economic, 
environmental and social pillars of sustainable development in the governance and 
management of petroleum revenue. The theory of distributive justice finding relevance to 
the research requires that there should be equitable distribution in the revenue. For instance 
host communities where the resources is exploited should be accorded with much revenue 
for the development. Overall, there should be benefits accruing to the people of Ghana from 
the petroleum resources, which should be adequately managed and not allowed to end in 
the hands of the few. The stakeholder’s theory finds relevance in the fact that the 
configurations of the oil and gas industry means that the vast stakeholders must be taken 
care of and carried along in the management of petroleum resources. Thus, the role of the 
companies, government, institutions, regulators, civil societies, host communities and the 
citizens cannot be overemphasised and will need to be accounted for a reviews of the 
regulatory environment that will enhance sustainable management of petroleum resources. 
The stewardship theories have a link with ensuring that there is accountability in the 
sustainable management of petroleum revenue. Therefore that all persons involve in 
accounting for their stewardship in their roles in the oil and gas sector in relation to 





There are policy implications coming out from the research conducted. Firstly, the research 
as shown that there are implications for Government of Ghana to ensure that the oil revenue 
are channelled for the appropriate purpose in realisation of the fundamental objectives of 
promoting sustainability of resources for the good of the people of Ghana. The proposed 
study makes recommendations that will ensure that there is transparency and accountability 
in receipt and management of revenue accruing to the coffers of the government as a result 
of petroleum operations. Thus, the fiscal and tax regime aimed at maximising the revenue 
of the government will be directed for the betterment of the people of Ghana.  
 
There are also a wider implications of the study on host communities. Countries that have 
not been able to manage host communities agitations have exhibited the resource curse, 
which is seen in the form of civil unrest. This development should be more worrisome for a 
new producing country such as Ghana so that it should not escalate into agitation or even 
arms struggle by some groups in their bid to fight for a fair share of the resources for their 
development. The study therefore offers the options on addressing such through inclusion 
of host communities by allocating to them potion of revenue accruing from petroleum 
operations in the host communities.  
 
The implementation of the recommendations in the study will have positive impact on host 
communities who will not feel short-changed by the activities of petroleum exploration and 
production. This will consequently not lead to a situation where host communities may 
engage in protests that are likely to stall petroleum operations and will affect the revenue 
which ought to accrue to the government.  
 
It is also equally important that the supervisory ministries that are connected to oil and gas 
resources continue to exercise their functions taking into consideration the commitment that 
there are no leakages and the laws are implemented effectively. Therefore having examined 
the sustainable management of petroleum resources in Ghana, the various officers and 
institutions involved in the management of petroleum revenue and resources such as the 
offices of Auditor General, and Accountant General, Bank of Ghana, Ghana Revenue 
Authority, Public Interest Accountability Committee, have obligations to continue to 
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implemented the law for the realisation of accountability, transparency and sustainability in 
the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana. The proposed reform in the study will 
have positive impact on their services delivery.  
  
Finally, there is implications on the parliament to ensure that law reform are  put in place to 
address shortcomings in the law that can lead to leakages in petroleum revenues or check 
against  situations leading to resource curse in Ghana. It is therefore the duties of the 
parliament to create the law that creates enabling environment that will allow for best 
practices in the management of petroleum revenue. 
 
8.4 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This research commenced with the general study of the legal and structural framework of 
petroleum revenue management in Ghana and the factors leading to the resource curse 
phenomenon that has adversely affected nations. To this end, the research on the resource 
curse was brought into the context of the study with a further narrative of the origin and 
then an analysis of the context of Ghana and the need to effectively address the resource 
curse. The relevant laws and institutions were studied and examined in the context of the 
environment in which the petroleum revenue management laws will operate. The field 
study was conducted to complement the doctrinal analyses employed in this research.  
 
The general notion is that states have the sovereign rights to regulate their natural 
resources. Most of these states have no capacity to exploit these resources. There is an 
obligation on the part of the government to exploit these resources for the benefit of the 
people based on public trust. The government in turn enters into series of contractual 
arrangement with multinational oil companies with the aim of participating in the oil and 
gas sector. There are arrangements in such a way that certain revenue will accrue to the 
government as a result of its participation in the sector. In another way, the fiscal regime 
aimed at maximising the revenue of the government will be directed at the companies so 
that taxes are being used for the government coffers. Overall, it behoves the government to 
ensure that the rules of the games are intact, the participants in the industry follow the 
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required transparency and due process and there is sustainable exploitation of resources. 
The resources should be used for the entire benefits of the state. Attaining the scenario 
painted above will require the right laws and policies to be in place in Ghana, as well as 
robust implementation mechanism. Whether this is actually attained or can be attainable are 
the key investigations the thesis carried out. 
 
The thesis in chapter two took a cursory look at the resource curse phenomenon which is 
found to be prevalent in resource rich countries. The experience of Spain was used for 
demonstrating the resource curse. The research also examined the Dutch disease and 
financial aid curse and how together they have negatively contributed to the degradation of 
the environment, creation of monochromic economic system and political and civil unrest 
which are seen to be prevalent in developing countries. It found that whilst there are 
arguments showing that countries rich in natural resources would exhibit high level of 
resource curse, evidence abound to displace such arguments with notable progress made by 
the use of natural resources to actualise developmental benefits for the citizens as recorded 
in the case of Norway and Botswana. These demonstrated the existence of a robust 
institutional framework and will which together are instrumental in ensuring that resources 
accruing to the state are effectively managed and accounted for by the government.  It 
therefore found that institutional perspective that natural resources per se does not lead to 
resource curse but is dependent on the institution that is saddled with the responsibility to 
manage the revenue accruable from the natural resources. In order to establish credible 
institutions to attain the required positive result, there is the need for the law to ensure the 
establishment of credible institutional framework, reform the ailing institutions and 
establish credible judicial system to checkmate corruption through credible and timely 
adjudication of the law. 
Predicated on the above findings, chapter three focused on petroleum resources conversion 
for sustainable management of petroleum revenue in Ghana. This study has examined the 
law on petroleum revenue management in Ghana following its emerging potential upon the 
discovery of petroleum. It found that the development of the oil and gas industry saw the 
country developing new laws to rise to the occasion of the new situation. There are 
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provisions of the law in Ghana that are geared towards harnessing of the revenue from 
petroleum exploration and production.  
The law has set out parameters for the management of the resources through the creation of 
transparency and accountability measures and other provisions pointing towards the 
sustainable management of petroleum resources. The conclusion of this study is that 
extractive-led development of the oil and gas industry in Ghana must be balanced by 
sustainability that takes into account how best the revenues are also managed after 
extraction. It has been posited that “the operation and management of O G [oil and gas] 
resources in a company or government organization is no doubt a difficult and sophisticated 
undertaking. It usually entails a myriad of factors, uncertainties and risks. Decision-makers’ 
options are contingent on the various conditions and limitations covering local–global, 
technical, commercial and social issues”.  There are series of variables that will come to 
play when it comes to determining how the law on sustainable management of petroleum 
revenue and the overall goal of the government in ensuring there is the enabling 
environment for such are executed. 
The bases for formulation of chapter four is to examine the socioeconomic and regulatory 
context within which the society operates plays an important role in determining the extent 
of implementation of the law. Therefore, the focus of the chapter is to examine other social 
and legal context in which the relevant laws on revenue management will operate since 
they will not be implemented in isolation. They have to fit into the legal configurations of 
the country for them to fully operate. Appreciating how these laws operate in a context of 
the country is very important otherwise efforts made through policy and regulation may 
turn out to be counterproductive. Therefore, from the study, it is discovered that Ghana has 
considerably made progress in terms of the role of civil society in the oil and gas industry 
but there are still no clear indications that they directly have a say in the decision-making 
process beyond the participation in the PIAC. Much will have to also be done in terms of 
corporate governance, in particular oil and gas companies operating in Ghana should reflect 
a robust corporate governance model and likewise the GNPC. Other state-owned 
corporations should also, to a large extent, employ the corporate governance trends in their 
management of their affairs and which are provided for effective managerial control and 
promotion of transparency in the sector. Generally, the laws for the management of 
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petroleum revenue in Ghana cannot operate in isolation; their operation depends on the 
extent to which they fit into the socio legal context. 
Corruption will need to be revisited and there should be a clear distinction between 
corruptions committed in the course of petroleum revenue management. Such should not be 
penalized under other laws. There will be need for the various laws bothering on official 
corruption to operate in harmony. The power of the Attorney General to discontinue trials 
for criminal cases may fetter the anticorruption laws relevant to the oil and gas industry. As 
the state of affairs stand, the Attorney General as the chief law officer of the state can 
choose to prosecute or not to prosecute cases of fraud. The powers are not with 
qualification however. Furthermore, the establishment of the Office of the Special 
Prosecutor to try corrupt politicians may not square well as there may be an avenue that the 
office is used only against the opposition.  
The provision for judicial review can be an avenue that can be utilised by the citizens to 
compel the government agencies to continue to exercise its functions regarding petroleum 
revenue management for sustainable development. It can also be utilised to stop illegal 
actions or even declare null and void actions that have been already carried out on 
petroleum revenue management that are not in accordance with the constitution or the law. 
The requirement of locus standi if care is not taken, may be applied to forestall these 
powers given to the citizens by the law and constitution of the land. The courts will have to 
be proactive to ensure that the doctrine does not operate as a bar to the citizens desirous of 
challenging actions of the government that are inimical to petroleum revenue management 
for sustainable development. Finally, the stability of the legal regime is still an issue as 
Ghana still being a new producer may be pushed to amend its laws to increase its revenue 
take when windfall occurs. It is argued that though Ghana’s sovereignty over petroleum 
resources is guaranteed internationally and provided for in the constitution, it owes 
investors the obligation of fiscal stability or risks challenges before investor-state arbitral 
tribunals. 
The EITI Standards are targeted at entrenching transparency and accountability and the 
gains which they portend. Ghana had long subscribed to the implementation of the EITI 
standards. By virtue of being an oil producing country, it is regarded as one of the 
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implementing countries of EITI. The country has gained the status of an EITI compliant 
country. That notwithstanding, it is pertinent to examine how well it has implemented the 
standards of EITI regarding revenue management. There are pertinent reasons for Ghana to 
continue to maintain its status as an EITI compliant country and above that ensure that the 
impact of its compliance is manifest in sustainable socio-economic and human-capital 
development growth in the country. Where there is no physical manifestation of the impact 
of EITI on the lives of the common citizens, it would make little meaning and the whole 
essence of EITI would be defeated.  
Findings from the analysis showed that the existing legislative frameworks on transparency 
in the oil and gas sector in Ghana have loopholes on disclosures. There would still be the 
need to amend the relevant sections of the PRMA, especially that which obstructs freedom 
of information in the pretext of ‘classified information’. The reason being that by virtue of 
Section 1 of the PRMA, the Act has been placed on a higher pedestal than any other law 
apart from the Ghanaian Constitution. It therefore means that the persons could still find 
cover under the classified information as contained in the law to perpetrate opacity which 
encourages mismanagement and corruption in the extractive industry.   
There is also the need to fast track the legislative process in the enactment of the Ghana 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) specific legislation. It was found 
that there are advantages in such an approach. It would, first of all, confer GHEITI with the 
necessary legal personality to sue and be sued. That way GHEITI would possess the 
necessary legal clout as a proper party to approach the court to enforce compliance with the 
EITI Standards. The law would also create adequate means of funding for EITI and other 
relevant transparency driven institutions. The provision of adequate funding for these 
bodies would guarantee their independence and commitment to effectively play their role as 
the watch dog in the Ghanaian oil and gas industry. On another note, the Act would give 
the EITI Standards an imperative undertone; create offences and penalties for breach of the 
standards.  
Chapter six found that apart from the employment of transparent means of management of 
petroleum resources, accounting for the revenue is crucial. There is the need to give 
considerations to approaches that foster the increase in the revenue base of the country in a 
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manner that the funds from the proceeds of oil accruing to the state are multiplied through 
the promotion of socially responsible investments. One global approach that has emerged 
has been through the recognition of the Santiago Principles on the management of 
sovereign wealth funds. The Santiago principles have a global appeal; demonstrating how 
countries that have made fortune from Petro wealth effectively managed it for the good of 
their people. 
 
The emphasis in chapter seven is on the recommendation as to how best the law can be 
conceived or reviewed to avoid the resource curse. The chapter calls for priority to be given 
to transparency and accountability, setting up of efficient regulatory framework for 
enhancement of sustainability through investment, put in place sustainable investment of 
petroleum revenue for the good of the people through the incorporation of best practices 
that ensure effective management of sovereign wealth fund, creation of mechanisms for 
ensuring the oil rich regions benefit from the proceeds of oil through earmarking of certain 
amount of the oil revenue for their development. 
 
Much will be done by creating an enabling environment that enhances the promotion of 
sustainable development through the management of petroleum revenue in Ghana; 
facilitation of transparency and accountability in petroleum revenue management in Ghana; 
and management of petroleum revenue in a sustainable manner which are essential to the 
development of a viable utilisation of petroleum revenue in a way that the resource curse 
syndrome can be avoided in Ghana. Effective implementation of the measures articulated 
will have a far-reaching consequence in realisation of sustainable development in the 
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